Table Of ContentR
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This Element details how elites provide policy concessions s
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when they face credible threats of revolution. Specifically, the u
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authors discuss how the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the s
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subsequent formation of Comintern enhanced elites’ percep- a
tions of revolutionary threat by affecting the capacity and moti- n
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vation of labor movements as well as the elites’ interpretation of K Political economy
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information signals. These developments incentivized elites to u
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provide policy concessions to urban workers, notably reduced s
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working hours and expanded social transfer programs. The
authors assess their argument by using original qualitative and
quantitative data. First, they document changes in perceptions
of revolutionary threat and strategic policy concessions in early
R Reforming
inter-war Norway by using archival and other sources. Second, e
fo
they code, for example, representatives at the 1919 Comintern rm
meeting to proxy for credibility of domestic revolutionary threat in
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in cross-national analysis. States facing greater threats expand- o
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ed various social policies to a larger extent than other countries, u
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and some of these differences persisted for decades. iv
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about the series series editors
The Element Series Political Economy David Stasavage
provides authoritative contributions on New York University
important topics in the rapidly growing Magnus B. Rasmussen
field of political economy. Elements are
designed so as to provide broad and in- and Carl Henrik Knutsen
depth coverage combined with original sserP
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insights from scholars in political science, tisre
economics, and economic history. vin
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Contributions are welcome on any topic e
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ElementsinPoliticalEconomy
editedby
DavidStasavage
NewYorkUniversity
REFORMING TO SURVIVE
The Bolshevik Origins of Social
Policies
Magnus B. Rasmussen
University of South-Eastern Norway
sse Carl Henrik Knutsen
rP
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tisre University of Oslo
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Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781108995474
DOI:10.1017/9781108983334
©MagnusB.RasmussenandCarlHenrikKnutsen2022
Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisions
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placewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress&Assessment.
Firstpublished2022
AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
ISBN978-1-108-99547-4Paperback
ISSN2398-4031(online)
sse ISSN2514-3816(print)
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tisrev CoarmacbcruidrgaceyUonfivUeRrLsistyfoPrreexstse&rnAalsoserstshmiredn-ptahratsyninoterernseptownseibbsiliitteysforerfethrreepdetrosiisntetnhcise
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Reforming to Survive
TheBolshevikOriginsofSocialPolicies
ElementsinPoliticalEconomy
DOI:10.1017/9781108983334
Firstpublishedonline:December2022
MagnusB.Rasmussen
UniversityofSouth-EasternNorway
CarlHenrikKnutsen
UniversityofOslo
Authorforcorrespondence:MagnusB.Rasmussen,
[email protected]
Abstract:ThisElementdetailshowelitesprovidepolicyconcessions
whentheyfacecrediblethreatsofrevolution.Specifically,theauthors
discusshowtheBolshevikRevolutionof1917andthesubsequent
formationofCominternenhancedelites’perceptionsofrevolutionary
threatbyaffectingthecapacityandmotivationoflabormovementsas
wellastheelites’interpretationofinformationsignals.These
developmentsincentivizedelitestoprovidepolicyconcessionsto
urbanworkers,notablyreducedworkinghoursandexpandedsocial
transferprograms.Theauthorsassesstheirargumentbyusingoriginal
qualitativeandquantitativedata.First,theydocumentchangesin
perceptionsofrevolutionarythreatandstrategicpolicyconcessionsin
earlyinter-warNorwaybyusingarchivalandothersources.Second,
sse theycode,forexample,representativesatthe1919Cominternmeeting
rP y toproxyforcredibilityofdomesticrevolutionarythreatin
tisre cross-nationalanalysis.Statesfacinggreaterthreatsexpandedvarious
v
in socialpoliciestoalargerextentthanothercountries,andsomeofthese
U
eg differencespersistedfordecades.
d
irb
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aC Keywords:revolution,welfarestate,laborregulations,Communism,Norway
y
b
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iln ThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanResearchCouncil(ERC)
o d undertheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020researchandinnovation
e
hsilb programme(grantagreementNo863486)
u
P 4 ©MagnusB.RasmussenandCarlHenrikKnutsen2022
3
3
38 ISBNs:9781108995474(PB),9781108983334(OC)
9
80 ISSNs:2398-4031(online),2514-3816(print)
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Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 LiteratureReview 8
3 ATheoryofElites’PolicyResponsestoRevolutionary
Threats 16
4 CaseStudy:RevolutionaryFearandEliteResponsesin
Norway,1915–24 23
5 MeasuringSocialPoliciesandRevolutionaryThreat
acrossCountries 50
6 StatisticalAnalysis 54
7 MechanismofPersistence:Comintern,theFormationof
CommunistParties,andtheLong-TermEffectsofthe
BolshevikRevolution 69
sse
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ytisre 8 Conclusion 72
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irb References 76
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b e FurtherOnlineAppendixcanbeaccessedat
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ReformingtoSurvive 1
1Introduction
Theicehasbeenbroken.TheSovietshavewonallroundtheworld.Theyhavewon
first of all and above all in the sense that they have won the sympathies of the
proletarianmasses....Thenewmovementadvancestowardsthedictatorshipofthe
proletariat.... The foundation of the third international, of the Communist
International,isthepreludetoanInternationalSovietRepublic.
Lenin,March5,1919(quotedinPons,2014,7)
No,thishasnothingtodowithcommunismorsocialism.
Ifitisanything,itispolicyaimedatthepreservationofsociety!
OddKlingenberg(1923)NorwegianMinisterofSocialAffairs(Conservative)
commentingontheintroductionofold-agepensions
The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 marks the beginning of what
Hobsbawm(1994)labelsthe“short20thcentury,”characterized bytheworld
being divided into a capitalist and a communist sphere. Yet, the Bolshevik
Revolution – led by revolutionaries withaspirations far beyond Russia – also
constitutedathreattoelitesaswellasothersocialgroupsincapitalistcountries;
itwasasymboliceventandlearningexperienceforrevolutionariesacrossthe
world (Pons, 2014). The Bolsheviks also promised ideological and logistic
supporttorevolutionariesoutsideRussia.Thiscontributedtosplitmanylabor
movementsbetweenreformistandrevolutionarygroups,withtheformationof
severalnewcommunistparties(Berman,2006;Lipset,1983).InthisElement,
we propose that these developments, and the resulting new threats to the
politicalandeconomicorderscherishedbyelitesindifferentcountries,helped
shape policymaking even in countries that remained staunchly capitalist. We
sserP present different pieces of corroborating evidence for this proposition.
ytisre Primarily, we present evidence from early-twentieth-century Norway –
vin acountrywhereelitesfacedsevererevolutionarythreatsfrom“theleft”inthe
U
eg aftermathoftheBolshevikRevolution.Wealsopresentvariouscross-country
d
irbm analysesdrawingonoriginaldatafromcountriesacrosstheworld.
a
C y Previous theoretical and empirical work (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000,
b
en 2006; Aidt & Jensen, 2014; Przeworski, 2009) have highlighted how revolu-
iln
o d tionarythreatsbythepoormayspurpoliticalinclusion,notablyintheformof
e
h
silb extendedsuffragerights,andelaboratedontherationalandcognitivemechan-
u
P 4 ismsbehindsuchprocesses(Weyland,2010,2014,2019).1Otherstudieshave
3
33 documentedthatbusinesselites’preferencesforacceptingredistributivepolicy
8
9
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0 iscontingentonperceivingrevolutionarythreats(Paster,2013).Thisobserva-
1
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87 tion could contribute to explain the finding that mass mobilization and
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2 PoliticalEconomy
destructionduringandfollowingtheworldwarsledtomassiveexpansionsin
social spending (Obinger & Petersen, 2017; Obinger et al., 2018; Obinger &
Schmitt,2020).Previousworkhasalsodocumentedhowsocialpolicycanbe
used to enhance regime legitimacy (e.g. Flora & Heidenheimer, 1982;
Rimlinger, 1971), thereby potentially enhancing the durability of the political
regime (Eibl, 2020; Knutsen & Rasmussen, 2018). There can also be inter-
nationaldimensionstosuchdynamics;notably,thecompetitionbetween“East”
and “West” during the Cold War increased political incentives for enacting
generous social policies, in order to shore up internal support, in both camps
(Obinger&Schmitt,2011;Sant’Anna&Weller,2020).
Integratingthesedifferentinsights,wetheorizeandassesshowrevolutionary
threatsshapepolitics,andwefocusonpolicychangeasouroutcomeofinterest,
ratherthanregimechangeorinequality.Further,wemovethefocusfromlong-
termlegitimacyconcernsandratherconsiderhowsocialpolicycanbeusedto
preemptimmediatethreats.Wealsogobeyondfocusingonbusinesselitesand
broaden our scope to consider how various (political and economic) elites
respond to revolutionary threats.2 When doing so, we specify the different
cognitive and rational mechanisms that may induce elites to expand social
policytomitigateperceivedthreats.
We embed this general argument in a particular context. Specifically, we
address how developments following the Bolshevik Revolution – and espe-
cially after the formation of Comintern in 1919 – shaped social policies by
spurring perceptions of credible revolutionary threats among elites, who
responded with expanding social policies aimed at defusing the threat.
sse Comintern participation by domestic worker organizations enhanced (percep-
rP y tionsof)workingclassrevolutionarythreats,potentiallyduetomultiplemech-
tisre anisms:First,theinternationalnetworkandRussiansupportthataccompanied
v
in
U Cominternparticipationincreasedthecapacityofdomesticrevolutionaryactors
e
g
dirb andevenhelpedspurneworganizationswithrevolutionarypotential.Second,
ma participationinCominternalteredthesegroups’ideologicaloutlook,ifnothing
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b e elsebystrengtheningmoreradicalandrevolutionaryfractions.Third,working
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eh tionedasaneasy-to-identifyinformationalcuethatenhancedeliteperceptions
silbu ofacrediblerevolutionarythreat.
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3 The exact relevance of these channels notwithstanding, an increase in per-
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1 subsequent formation of Comintern, induced elites to pursue large-scale
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ReformingtoSurvive 3
expansionsofsocialtransferprograms,reduceworkinghours,etc.,inorderto
appeasetheworkingclassesandquellgrievancesthatcouldfuelarevolution.
Ourprimaryfocusonrevolutionarythreatsdoes,ofcourse,notimplythatother
proposeddeterminantsofredistributivepoliciesandsocialtransferprogramsare
irrelevant,eveninthecontextofrevolutionarythreat.Someofthesefactors,such
assuffrageextensionsortheadoptionofproportionalrepresentation(PR),may
evenbepotentialtransmittersof(partsof)therelevanteffectfromrevolutionary
threat to policy change (Aidt & Jensen, 2014; Gjerløw & Rasmussen, 2022;
Iversen,2005;Iversen&Soskice,2006).Yetotherfactors,suchaswarmobiliza-
tionandcross-borderpolicydiffusion,maybeorthogonal(Obingeretal.,2018;
Scheve & Stasavage, 2012, 2016). Further, the formation of the International
LaborOrganization(ILO)in1919likelyalsocontributedtoshiftinggovernmen-
talpolicypositions(Rasmussen,2021),andinmany(European)countriessocial-
istpartiesenteredgovernmentforthefirsttimeafterWorldWarI,enablingthem
to implement their programs into policy (Korpi, 1989, 2006). In our empirical
analysis,wetrytoensurethatourrelationshipofinterestisrobusttoaccounting
forsuchalternativeexplanationsofpolicychange.
TheempiricalanalysispresentedinthisElementistwo-fold,comprisingboth
anin-depthhistoricalcasestudyofNorway1915–24andcross-countryanalysis
usingdifferentnewproxiesofrevolutionarythreatsandvariousnewmeasures
of policy characteristics. These analyses provide complementary pieces of
evidence – the case study gives ample material for carefully mapping the
relevantmechanismsandthecross-countryanalysisisattunedtogeneralizabil-
ityandassessingimplicationsconcerning“averagetreatmenteffects.”Byand
sse large, thesedifferentpiecesofevidence turnouttosupportourargumentthat
rP y fearofrevolutionpushedelitestoextendvarioussocialpolicies,asconcessions,
tisre aftertheBolshevikRevolution.
v
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e
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dirb historians to document perceptions on the likelihood of revolution from
ma employerorganizations,thepolice,militaryofficers,andpoliticians,andtheir
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b e strategiesforcounteringthisthreat.Admittedly,theNorwegiancaseisselected,
n
iln in large part, because of “convenience reasons,” predominantly the access to
o
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eh ample archival and other source material (the authors are native-Norwegian
silbu speakers), which is a requisite for carefully assessing our argument. Yet, the
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3 Norwegian case is also especially suited for our purposes of identifying the
3
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89 theorizedmechanisms,sinceitexpectedlyscoreshighonour“treatmentvari-
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1.0 party,whichalsojoinedtheComintern.Hence,Norwayislikelyacaseinwhich
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4 PoliticalEconomy
There are also other good reasons for zooming in on the Norwegian case.
Major Norwegian welfare expansions, at least from the 1930s onwards, have
typically been interpreted as resulting from social democratic reformism
(Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1986), the interests and negotiations between
farmers and workers (Alestalo & Kuhnle, 1986; Baldwin, 1988, 1990;
Manow,2009),orcross-partywelfarestateconsensus(Kuhnle,1978).Insofar
asthesealternativedrivingforcesaregenerallyconsideredasthemainfactors
behind social policy development, one might expect it to be harder to detect
a strongand clear role for revolutionary threat perceptions (even ifthey were
present) in driving policy and institutional change in Norway than in other
cases.Moreimportantly,pressuresforsocialpolicyadoptionwerenotdirectly
tiedtomobilizationduringWorldWarI,asNorwayremainedneutral.Hence,
selectingNorwayasourmaincasemitigatesoneimportantpotentialsourceof
confounding,namelymassmobilization(seeObingeretal.,2018;Scheveand
Stasavage,2016).3
We detail how Norwegian elites believed that workers truly could conduct
a revolution in Norway following the Bolshevik Revolution. We show how
institutionallinkagesbetweentheLaborPartyandComintern,strikewaves,and
the formation of solider and worker councils, after 1919, helped shape this
belief. Economic and political elites coordinated their response against this
perceived revolutionary threat by using various stick-and-carrot tactics. We
provide numerous and very clear statements from the main actors themselves
(as well as several historians) as to their motivations for pursuing different
reforms and policies, including their desire to mitigate the prospect of
sse a revolution. We find this to be strong evidence that the perceived threat of
rP y a revolution was high, and directly contributed to several actions and policy
tisre changes.4 Regarding the carrots, elites strategically pursued appeasement and
v
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dirb ment, implementing several reforms that they initially had opposed, notably
m
a including the eight-hour workday and electoral rule reform, which were eco-
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b e nomicallyandpoliticallycostlyreformsfortheelitestoconcede.Otherchanges
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iln included accepting a government-funded plan for socialization of all
o
deh Norwegian firms, major expansions of sickness and unemployment benefits,
silbu a temporary act of company councils, and franchise expansion with the poor
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89 3 However, similarly to the Netherlands and other Scandinavian countries, Norway mobilized
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187 4 Granted,“perceivedriskofrevolution”isacontinuousvariable,anditishardtopindownthe
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.01 eliteswouldhaveconcededevenmoreintermsofpoliciesandinstitutionalchanges,orenacted
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