Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era: Ideology and Exchange

222 Pages·2016·2.84 MB·English

by  Dina Fainberg (ed.)

Reconsidering Stagnation
in the Brezhnev Era

Reconsidering Stagnation
in the Brezhnev Era
Ideology and Exchange
Edited by Dina Fainberg
and Artemy Kalinovsky
LEXINGTONBOOKS
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LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData
Names:Fainberg,Dina.|Kalinovsky,ArtemyM.
Title:ReconsideringstagnationintheBrezhnevera:ideologyandexchange/editedbyDinaFain-
bergandArtemyKalinovsky.
Description:Lanham:LexingtonBooks,2016.|Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
Identifiers:LCCN2016002159|ISBN9781498529938(cloth:alkalinepaper)|ISBN
9781498529945(electronic)
Subjects:LCSH:SovietUnion--Politicsandgovernment--1953-1985.|Brezhnev,LeonidIl?ich,
1906-1982--Politicalandsocialviews.|Brezhnev,LeonidIl?ich,1906-1982--Influence.|Stag-
nation(Economics)--Socialaspects--SovietUnion--History.|SovietUnion--Economiccondi-
tions--1965-1975.|SovietUnion--Economicconditions--1975-1985.|Ideology--Socialaspects--
SovietUnion--History.|Politicalculture--SovietUnion--History.|SovietUnion--Relations--
Westerncountries.|Westerncountries--Relations--SovietUnion.
Classification:LCCDK277.R432016|DDC947.085/3--dc23LCrecordavailableathttp://
lccn.loc.gov/2016002159
TMThepaperusedinthispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsofAmerican
NationalStandardforInformationSciencesPermanenceofPaperforPrintedLibrary
Materials,ANSI/NISOZ39.48-1992.
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
Contents
Introduction:StagnationandItsDiscontents:TheCreationofa
PoliticalandHistoricalParadigm vii
DinaFainbergandArtemyM.Kalinovsky
Part1:IdeologybetweenPublicandPrivateSpheres 1
1 ConsumersasCitizens:RevisitingtheQuestionofPublic
DisengagementintheBrezhnevEra 3
NatalyaChernyshova
2 TheLifeandDeathofBrezhnev’sThaw:ChangingValues
inSovietJournalismafterKhrushchev,1964–1968 21
SimonHuxtable
3 PeopleontheMoveduringthe“EraofStagnation”:The
RuralExodusintheRSFSRduringthe1960s–1980s 43
LewisH.Siegelbaum
4 Brezhnev’s“LittleFreedoms”:Tourism,Individuality,and
MobilityintheLateSovietPeriod 59
ChristianNoack
5 EverythingWasOverbeforeItWasNoMore:Decaying
CivilizationinLateStagnationCinema 77
AndreyShcherbenok
Part2:TheSovietUnionandtheWest 85
6 StagnationorNot?:TheBrezhnevLeadershipandEast-
WestInteraction 87
SariAutio-Sarasmo
7 StagnantScience?:ThePlanningandCoordinationof
BiomedicalResearchintheBrezhnevEra 105
AnnaGeltzer
8 IfYou’reGoingtoMoscow,BeSuretoWearSomeFlowers
inYourHair(andBringaBottleofPortWineinYour
Pocket):TheSovietHippie“Sistema”andItsLifein,
Despite,andwith“Stagnation” 123
JulianeFürst
v
vi Contents
9 NortonDodgeinLianozovo:TransnationalCollaboration
andtheMakingoftheSovietUnofficialArtist 147
CourtneyDoucette
10 ChangingDynamics:FromInternationalExchangesto
TransnationalMusicalNetworks 163
SimoMikkonen
Bibliography 185
Index 193
AbouttheEditorsandContributors 195
Introduction
Stagnation and Its Discontents: The Creation of a
Political and Historical Paradigm
Dina Fainberg and Artemy M. Kalinovsky
“Marxismisatheoryofmovement,notofstagnation.”1
—LeonTrotsky
Thepurposeofthisvolumeistotestthebynowwell-establishedimpres-
sionthattheperiodinSoviethistorybetweenNikitaKhrushchev’souster
in 1964 and Mikhail Gorbachev’s election as General Secretary in 1985
was one of stagnation. Accepting the stagnation paradigm generally
means seeing the period as one where resistance to change, corruption,
moraldecay,andothernegativetrendswerecombinedwithariseinthe
standard of living and foreign policy successes abroad (at least until the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979). The failure to confront sys-
temic problems, this view holds, led the Soviet Union to a near crisis
pointby1985.The“stagnation”label,weargue,createdanimpressionof
the period as one endless monolith, and therefore glossed over political,
social, and cultural developments, as well as the state’s attempts to lead
andinitiatechange.Theassumptionthattheperiodasawholewaschar-
acterized by rampant cynicism and decline of faith in the socialist creed
obscuredthepersistenceofpopularengagementwiththesocialistideolo-
gyandthepoweritcontinuedtowieldwithintheSovietUnion.
ItwasGorbachevwhogavetheeraitsappellation.AttheXXVIIParty
Congress in 1986 he spoke of the leaders’ failure to deal with mounting
problemsinthecountry:
Overthecourseofmanyyears,andduenotjusttoobjectivefactorsbut
alsotoprimarilysubjectiveones,thepracticalworkofpartyandstate
organsfellbehindthedemandsofthetimes,oflifeitself.Problemsin
thecountry’sdevelopmentsweregrowingratherthansolutions.Iner-
tia, freezing of forms and methods of management, declining dyna-
misminwork,growthofbureaucratization—allofthisdidsignificant
damagetoourwork[delu].Phenomenaofstagnationbeganappearing
inthelifeofsociety.2
vii
viii DinaFainbergamdArtemyM.Kalinovsky
Gorbachev,ofcourse,wassettingthestageforamajorpoliticalshake-up,
astepinhissearchforacureforthecountry’sillsthatwouldbepossible
only once the disease was properly identified. Nearly a year into his
tenure, he already became frustrated with the friction his proposals for
reform faced within the party, government, and security structures. The
stagnationlabelwasanimportanttoolindrawingthelinebetweenthose
whosupportedthepartyandcountry’srenewal,andthosewhoopposed
Gorbachev’sprogram:
Ourpartyisahealthyorganism,onethatrefinesthestyleandmethods
ofitsactivity,rootsoutformalism,bureaucratismandredtape(kazens-
chinu), cuts out everything stagnating and conserving that impedes
movement forward, frees itself from those who have compromised
themselveswithpoorworkorunworthybehavior.3
In representing stagnation as alien to the true spirit of the Communist
Party, Gorbachev was attempting to justify his future reforms, and to
mobilizetheparty’srankandfiletojointheeffort.Todosoeffectively,he
positionedhisreformsasareturntothetrueprinciplesofLeninism,asa
rallyingcrytohealthepartyafteralongperiodofdegeneration.
In evoking the binaries of stagnation and revival, Gorbachev em-
barkedonawell-travelledhistoricalandintellectualpath.Onmorethan
oneoccasion,concernswithcorruption,stagnationanddegenerationhad
arisenasaprelude to campaignfor thetransformationofSoviet society.
Inthe1920stheseconcernswereattheheartofthedebateoverNEP.As
earlyas1922LeninstressedthepotentialoftheBolsheviks’degenerating
by adopting “bourgeois culture.” Trotsky warned that “bureaucratiza-
tion” in the state and party apparatus “under certain social conditions,
mightsapthebasisoftherevolution.”4StudentsoftheFrenchrevolution,
theBolsheviksworriedthatanewThermidorwasjust aroundthebend.
By the end of the 1920s fears of this double stagnation had pushed vari-
ous factions in the party to support a break with NEP, even if they dis-
agreedabouthowtomovetowardthenextstageindevelopment.5
After Stalin’s death, critiques of bureaucratization and stagnation
were mobilized to support a break with the Stalinist past. As in the late
1920s, Khrushchev positioned his reforms as a return to the true princi-
ples of revolution and Leninist methods. Attacks on bureaucratization
andelitism,aswellasstagnationintheconstructionofsocialismbecame
the central components of the culture of the Thaw and Khrushchev’s
attacks on Stalin.6 Sometimes the term stagnation was used in a more
limitedsense.Thus,speakingatthe20thPartyCongress,MikhailSuslov
usedittointerveneinthedebateoverprioritiesindevelopment,criticize
“ill-starred economists who were spreading anti-Marxist views on the
need to slow down the pace of developing heavy industry, [and thus]
spreadatheoreticaljustificationforstagnationandconservatismintech-
nology.”7