Table Of ContentRecent Research in Psychology
Wrn J. Baker Leendert P. Mos
Hans V. Rappard Henderikus J. Starn
Editors
Recent Trends in
Theoretical Psychology
Proceedings of the
Second Biannual Conference of the
International Society for Theoretical Psychology,
April 20-25, 1987, Banff, Alberta, Canada
With 14 Illustrations
Springer-Verlag
New York Berlin Heidelberg
London Paris Tokyo
WmJ. Baker Hans V. Rappard
Leendert P. Mos Department of Psychology
Center for Advanced Study in The Free University
Theoretical Psychology 1007 MC Amsterdam
University of Alberta The Netherlands
Edmonton, Canada T6G 2E9
Henderikus J. Starn
Department of Psychology
University of Calgary
Calgary, Alberta
Canada T2N IN4
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
International Society for Theoretical Psychology. Conference (2nd:
1987: Banff, Alta.)
Recent trends in theoretical psychology / proceedings of the
Second Biannual Conference of the International Society for
Theoretical Psychology / editors, William J. Baker ... let al.].
p. cm. - (Recent research in psychology)
Conference held in Banff, Alt!!., Canada, Apr. 20-25, 1987.
Bibliography: p.
1. Psychology-Philosophy-Congresses. 2. Psychology
-Methodology-Congresses. I. Baker, William J. II. Title.
BF38.I545 1988
150'.I-dcI9 88-12164
© 1988 by Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
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Camera-ready text prepared by the editors.
9 8 7 6 5 432 1
ISBN -13: 978-0-387-96757-8 e-ISBN -13 :978-1-4612-3902-4
DOl: 10.1007/978-1-4612-3902-4
PREFACE
This volume constitutes the proceedings of the second biannual
conference of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology (see
Epilogue) held in Banff, Alberta, Canada, April 20-25, 1987. Thirty-nine
papers were presented during the four days of the conference including an
invited address by Kenneth Gergen. Unfortunately, even after severely
restricting the length of the written papers, the required limitation on
printed space permitted only 34 of these to be included in these proceed
ings. While most of the papers required editorial adjustment, the authors
had final word on style and content.
The classification of conference papers tends to be somewhat arbi
trary' but we decided to structure the chapters under four headings: phi
losophy, metatheory, methodology, and theory. By philosophy we refer
primarily to issues in the philosophy of science as these pertain to the dis
cipline of psychology. Metatheory refers to theory, drawing on the philo
sophy of science and having implications for methodology, about psycho
logical theories. Methodology refers to both theory of inquiry and specif
ic methods of investigation as these derive from philosophical and meta
theoretical considerations. By theory we refer to both analyses of the
foundations of extant theory, including historical and sociological ana
lyses, and the advancement of substantive theory.
Eight papers have been included under philosophy. Rejecting any
notion that theories progress towards greater fidelity with nature, Gergen
envisions scientific progress in terms of alternating periods of meaning
stabilization and transformation. The former leads to maximum social
coordination and value expression and the latter, as social institutions be
come progressively restrictive, to social change. Theories, on his view,
are devices which increase the range of our intelligibility and serve to
mold society anew time and again. Terwee in his critical review of
Gergen's rhetorical conception of social psychology maintains that the
latter's rejection of foundationalism is all but impossible. A revised in
terpretative conception of psychology is sketched which leaves room not
only for empirical-analytical, phenomenological, hermeneutical, and rhe
torical methodologies, but adheres to truth founded in our practices and
certainties of everyday life. Tolman recognizes a crisis of disunity in psy
chology. In order to achieve theoretical unification, he makes a case for a
materialist foundation of the discipline and a realist view of its evolu
tionary and historical contexts. Vroon examines the incompatible 'root
metaphors' which have permeated psychology's explanations and despairs
of theoretical unity as, from a historical perspective, the discipline has a
penchant for enriching either the mind or the world. Shames argues for
the role of metaphor in scientific epistemology and, together with Royce,
whose focus is on 'weak' theory, for an exploration of the 'context of
discovery' in our appraisal of psychological theories. Salner reviews the
role of epistemic beliefs in the world views held by psychologists. Also
working within the context of discovery, she notes the structural similari
ties between individuals and scientific communities in the process of com
ing to understand social reality. Kirsch and Hyland complete this section
with a discussion of complementarity and causal isomorphism with respect
to mind-body philosophies. The authors draw out the implications of
their monism for both theoretical and empirical questions of psychophy
siological phenomena. While these diverse contributions adhere to a range
of ontological and epistemological stances, they nearly all appear within a
post-positivistic philosophy of psychology which eschews the strictures of
~~. '
Under the heading of metatheory we have included eight papers.
Danziger points, by way of a historical case study, to the ontological and
theoretical presuppositions .informing methods of inquiry. Whereas on
the received view of science any method may be legitimately employed to
test a theory, if theory and method are indeed interdependent it is incum
bent upon the investigator to demonstrate that the presuppositions of
method do not conflict with those of the theory being tested. But then,
methods do not merely serve to test theories, but to demonstrate them in
action. That methods are indeed theory-laden and serve to structure the
domain of inquiry is exemplified by Ratner who, from a critical examina
tion of biological explanations of psychological phenomena, argues for the
relative autonomy of psychological theory. Hezewijk draws attention to
the same point, that methods and theories are informed by ontological
presuppositions, with reference to the. representationist and presentationist
styles of theorizing by von Helmholtz and Mach, respectively. In his dis
tinction between predicational and mediational theorizing, Rychlak ela
borates not only on the asymmetry in the explanations offered by psycho
logists of their own behavior and the pehavior of others, but also his te
leological conception of psychology which demands a view of the 'predi
cating organism ready to take a position in life experience'. Madsen, in a
meta-analysis of Skinner's psychology, notes how his materialist monism
and radical empiricism lead to mediational theorizing which, however, can
well withstand the criterion of piecemeal testability . Maiers, in his iron
ical critique of the claim that psychology follows a natural science model,
argues against those who would demarcate the sciences from the humani
ties. He, instead, rejects antiscientism by avoiding the bifurcation in fa
vour of a historical-empirical study of 'real practices': a critical psychol
ogy in the Marxist tradition. In concluding this section, Mos and Smythe
inaependently address various issues in the foundations of contemporary
cognitive psychology. Thus Mos, with reference to phenomenology, ar
gues that the current focus on the concept of representation in cognitive
vi
theory fails as an account of the semantic relation of 'aboutness' and,
hence, as an explanation of intentionality which is the mark of the men
tal. Smythe distinguishes between propositional and skillful knowing in
terms of propositional attitude theory and forcefully formulates the chal
lenge that this distinction poses for any psychological theory of cognition.
What is notable in these eight contributions is that they invoke not only
issues in the philosophy of psychology but that their metatheoretical ana
lyses have implications for both methodology and theory construction.
Under the heading of methodology we have included eight papers.
In a critique of the concepts of reliability and validity, Giorgi presents a
phenomenological understanding of these concepts as achievements of in
tentionality. Both logical empiricism and phenomenology share the com
mon goal of determining the proper evidence for knowledge claims .. But
phenomenology. in distinguishing between acts and objects, takes validity
as an essential description of an intuited essence and reliability as such an
essential description in use. Horley examines the assumptions, criteria,
and implications for his proposed units of analysis in the description and
explanation of human action. Similarly, Kuiken and Wild are concerned
with the analysis of units but specifically from within and with regard to
the development of a phenomenological methodology. Drawing on both
the horizon analysis of meaning and paraphrase in discourse analysis, they
propose a psychological analysis of language which is fully concordant
with human subjectivity. Rappard, from a historical perspective, pro
poses a systematization rather than a unification of psychology and illu
strates how the 'founding definitions' of such a systematization affect
empirical research in social psychology. Mishara. with reference to the
theory of irreversible dynamics in physics, presents a model for conceptu
alizing processes of behavioral change. Van Geert, too, is concerned with
describing a model of change but with a model of developmental transi
tions. He reviews the various properties of transition concepts in devel
opmental theories with a view towards comparing and evaluating them.
Rogers, in a social-historical analysis of the concept of construct validity,
argues that its resilience derives from unwarranted metatheoretical as
sumptions which continue to plague contemporary personality assessment.
In the final paper of this section, Thorngate presents a social-psychologi
cal analysis examining the implications of his proposed principles of 'at
tentional economics' in an evaluation of information produced and con
sumed in the marketplace of psychological research. Again, the contribu
tors in this section cling to a range of philosophical presuppositions, but
what they have in common is a sensitivity to how methods of inquiry are
informed by metatheory and have implications for theory appraisal.
Nine papers have been included under the final heading of theory.
The ftrst paper presents an overview of the contributions of Ludwig von Ber
talanffy. Weckowicz describes the late theoretician's influence, especially
vii
by way of his systems theory, on psychology and philosophy as well as
biology and cybernetics. The remaining papers by Jorna, Lewicka, Kose
and Heindel, Starn, Parrott, Yeudall, Hague, and Cartwright and Peckar
address foundational issues pertaining to current theories or domains of
inquiry in the discipline. Joma's paper examines the implicit assumptions
of two contemporary cognitive theories, Anderson's and Tulving's, and
finds their formulations wanting at both the descriptive and explanatory
level. Lewicka compares theories of rational judgment in terms of her
distinctions between subjective and objective anchoring, and sufficient
and necessary conditions of cognitive acts. In the process, she mediates
between constructivist and realist views of human cognition. The latter
distinction is also addressed by Kose and Heindel in their critical e:l(amina
tion of contemporary interpretations of Piagetian theory which have vari-
0usly misconstrued his genetic epistemology. Taking Piaget's central
problem as the 'formation of cognitive structures', the authors focus on
the 'activity of the subject' and its implications for psychological theory.
Starn argues that the absence of theoretical foundations in the domains of
health psychology and behavioral medicine is motivated to ensure that
these psychological specialties do not clash with those of the health care
professions. In a historical review, Parrott takes seriously the phenome
nological experience of emotion and argues for a conceptual reintegration
of affect and cognition in order to account for those cognitively complex
emotions which have no unique physiological basis. Yeudall proposes a
comprehensive three-dimensional model of brain functioning in relation
to psychopathology. In doing so, he exemplifies the interdependence of
theory, clinical practice and research. Hague argues for the intuitive basis
of moral objectivity as rooted in Dabrowski's conception of authentic
subjectivity. In concluding this section, Cartwright and Peckar argue,
from a review of theories in the physical and biological sciences, for a
layered -structure conceptualization of contemporary personality theories.
These nine contributions to theoretical psychology address not merely is
sues of substantive theory but also those of methodology, meta theory
and, even, philosophy. Finally, Baker in his Epilogue presents a brief
overview of the conference.
In the preparation of this volume we gratefully acknowledge Evelyn
Murison who entered the text and Casey Boodt who provided editorial as
sistance and prepared the tables, figures, and author index. The Univer
sity of Alberta financed the facilities and resources at the Center for
Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology which made it all possible.
The Editors
February, 1988
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface ... . . v
Contributors . . xiii
PHILOSOPHY
The Concept of Progress in Psychological Theory
K. J. Gergen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Need Rhetorical Analysis Lead to Relativism? An Examination
of the Views of K. J. Gergen
S. Terwee .......•.................. 15
Theoretical Unification in Psychology: A Materialist Perspective
C. W. Tolman ........................ 29
Psychology Between Ecological Laws and the Scientific Revolution
P. A. Vroon ...................... 37
Scientific Epistemology: A Psycholiterary Approach
M. L. Shames. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
The Implications of Differential Theory Appraisal and
the Context of Discovery for Advancing Theory in Psychology
J. R. Royce. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 59
Epistemic Beliefs and their Developmental Relationship
to Post-Positivist Psychology
M. Salner .. . . 65
Complementarity, Causal Isomorphism, and
the Mind-Body Problem
1. Kirsch and M. E. Hyland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
METATHEORY
On Theory and Method in Psychology
K. Danziger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Psychology's Relation to Biology: Qualitatively Distinct Levels
C. Ratner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Interpretation Styles of Psychologists and
their Consequences for Psychology
R. van Hezewijk .................. . . 107
Predicational Versus Mediational Theorizing In Psychology
J. F. Rychlak ......................... 117
Skinner's Philosophy and Metatheory: A Metatheoretical Analysis
K. B. Madsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Has Psychology Exaggerated Its "Natural Scientific Character"?
W. Maiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Cognitive Representation: A Psychology in Search of Mentality
L. P. Mos .......................... 145
The Conceptual Distinction Between Propositional
and Skillful Knowing
W. E. Smythe. . . ... 157
METHODOLOGY
Validity and Reliability from a Phenomenological Perspective
A. Giorgi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 167
The Units of Analysis Problem in Psychology: An Examination
and Proposed Reconciliation
J. Horley ........................... 177
Meaning Horizon, Paraphrase, and Phenomenological
Investigations in Psychology
D. Kuiken and T. C. Wild . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. 189
On History and System, and Social Psychology
H. V. Rappard ................... . ... 199
Understanding the Complex Dynamics of
Human Stability and Change
B. L. Mishara. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
x
The Concept of Transition in Developmental Theories
P. Van Geert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 225
The Introduction of Construct Validity to the Assessment Field:
An Historical Analysis
T. B. Rogers ......................... 237
On Paying Attention
W. Thorngate .......... 247
THEORY
Ludwig Von Bertalanffy's Contribution to
Theoretical Psychology
T. E. Weckowicz ................. . . 265
Category Mistakes in Act* and Gaps: Remarks on Anderson's
Adaptive Control of Thought and Tulving's
General Abstract Processing System
R. J. Jorna . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
On Objective and Subjective Anchoring of Cognitive Acts:
How Behavioural Valence Modifies Reasoning Schemata
M. Lewicka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Piagetian Theory Reconsidered: An Interpretive Reading of Piaget
G. Kose and P. Heindel ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
The Practice of Health Psychology and Behavioral Medicine
Whither Theory?
H. J. Starn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
The Role of Cognition in Emotional Experience
W. G. Parrott. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
A Three-Dimensional Model of the Brain and Psychopathology
L. T. Yeudall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Moral Objectivity: Toward a New Understanding of Intuition
W. J. Hague ......................... 349
xi
