Reasons Without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time

219 Pages·2015·2.295 MB·English

by  Brian Hedden

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Reasons without Persons
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Reasons without
Persons
Rationality, Identity, and Time
Brian Hedden
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Acknowledgments
Thisbookisadefenseofapictureofrationalitycenteredontheagent-at-a-time
ratherthanontheagent-over-time.Rationalityisconcernedfundamentallywith
howyouareatparticularinstants,ratherthanwithhowyourattitudesandactions
at different times fit together. It puts the time-slice at the center of theorizing
about rationality. The title is inspired by Derek Parfit’s justly renowned Reasons
andPersons(),whichhasdeeplyinfluencedmythinkingonawiderangeof
issues relating to ethics, rationality, and metaphysics. He perfectly captures the
essence of the time-slice-centric view that I will defend, writing that, “when we
areconsideringboththeoreticalandpracticalrationality,therelationbetweena
personnowandhimselfatothertimesisrelevantlysimilartotherelationbetween
differentpeople”(p.).
Iamdeeplyindebtedtomanycolleaguesandteacherswhohavediscussedthe
ideasinthisbookandinmanycasesreadsubstantialportionsofthedraft.Iwould
like to thank Frank Arntzenius, Boris Babic, Michael Bratman, Rachael Briggs,
John Broome, Jessica Brown, Cian Dorr, Tom Dougherty, Antony Eagle, Kenny
Easwaran, Jane Friedman, David Gray, Hilary Greaves, Daniel Greco, Daniel
Hagen, Alan Hájek, John Hawthorne, Richard Holton, Sophie Horowitz, Maria
Lasonen-Aarnio,HarveyLederman,HeatherLogue,AnnaMahtani,SarahMoss,
Tyler Paytas, Douglas Portmore, Agustín Rayo, Jeff Russell, Joshua Schechter,
Miriam Schoenfield, Paulina Sliwa, Matthew Noah Smith, Declan Smithies,
Robert Stalnaker, Michael Titelbaum, Chris Tucker, Roger White, Timothy
Williamson, and Steve Yablo. Thanks also to two referees for Oxford University
Press,fortheirdetailedandinsightfulcomments.
I presented material from this book at a number of conferences and univer-
sities. Thanks to audiences at the  Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, the
BellinghamSummerPhilosophyConference,theFormalEpistemology
Festival,theUniversityofSt.Andrews/Arché,OxfordUniversity,CambridgeUni-
versity, MIT, the Australian National University, the University of Sydney, the
University of Arizona, Arizona State University, Princeton University, and Yale
University.
I am grateful for permission to use material originally published in various
journals. Chapter  is adapted from “Options and the Subjective Ought,” Philo-
sophical Studies  (): –, and Chapters  and  draw on “Options and
DiachronicTragedy,”forthcominginPhilosophyandPhenomenologicalResearch.
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vi acknowledgments
The backbone of the argument of the book is presented in condensed form
in “Time-Slice Rationality,” forthcoming in Mind. This publication was made
possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not
necessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheJohnTempletonFoundation.
My greatest debt is to Caspar Hare, who served as my doctoral supervisor
at MIT. He helped me to see connections between parts of my research that I
had previously seen as separate and first encouraged me to develop my ideas
into a book. His helpful suggestions and incisive criticisms have left their mark
throughout.
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Contents
. Time-SliceRationality 
. Rationality,Personhood,andTime 
. Time-SliceRationality 
. TheRolesofRationality 
. LookingAhead 
. GeneralMotivations 
. PersonalIdentity 
. Internalism 
. AgainstDiachronicPrinciples 
. Introduction 
. AgainstConditionalization 
. DiachronicPrinciplesforPreferences 
. AgainstReflectionPrinciples 
. ReflectionforBeliefs 
. ReflectionforPreferences 
. TheDiachronicTragedyArgument 
. ConditionalizationandReflection 
. UtilityConditionalization 
. PreferenceReflection 
. OtherCasesofDiachronicTragedy 
. CommonStructure 
. OptionsandTime-SlicePracticalRationality 
. Introduction 
. RationalityandtheSubjectiveOught 
. TheProblemofOptions 
. SkirtingtheIssue:AMinimalistProposal 
. DesiderataforaTheoryofOptions 
. UnsuccessfulTheoriesofOptions 
. OptionsasDecisions 
. OptionsandtheSemanticsofOught 
. OptionsandDiachronicTragedy 
. DiachronicTragedyandthePrisoner’sDilemma 
. DepragmatizationandtheNoWayOutArgument 
. RationalityandtheStabilityofIntentions 
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viii contents
. ReplacingDiachronicPrinciples 
. ReplacingConditionalization 
. ReplacingUtilityConditionalization 
. Coda:Uniqueness,Coherence,andKolodny 
. ReplacingReflectionPrinciples 
. ExpertDeference 
. PreferenceDeference 
. DoxasticProcessesandResponsibility 
. DoxasticJustification 
. WhataboutReasoning? 
. RationalEvidence-Gathering 
. RationalityandtheSubject’sPointofView 
Bibliography 
Index 
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
Time-Slice Rationality
Thisbookisaboutwhatittakestoberational.Asaroughfirstpass,wecansay
that being rational is a matter of being sensible, given your perspective on the
world. It is a matter of believing, desiring, and acting in sane, reasonable ways.
Rationality does not require that you always get things right, but only that you
makethebestpossibleuseofthelimitedinformationavailabletoyou.Ofcourse,
thisisnottogiveareductiveanalysisofrationality,onewhichavoidsuseofrelated
normativetermslike“sensible,”“sane,”and“reasonable,”butIdoubtwhethersuch
areductiveanalysisispossible.Norisareductiveanalysisneededinordertofix
ideas.Exampleswilloftensufficeforthat.
Suppose that your friend has a headache, and you have some pills that you
justifiably believe to be pain relievers. But you’re wrong. They are really poison.
Giventhatyouwanttohelpyourfriend,yourationallyoughttogivehimthepills,
eventhoughtheywillinfactdohimharm.Youwouldbequiteirrationalif,despite
yourconfidencethatgivinghimthepillswillrelievehisheadacheandyourdesire
to help him, you neglected to offer him the pills. Of course, when your friend
windsupwrithingaroundonthefloorandfoamingatthemouth,youwillquite
rightlyregretofferingthepills,butthisdoesnotmeanthatyourinitialdecision
wasirrational.Itjustmeansthatbeingrationalisnoguaranteeofsuccessinyour
endeavours.
So,whatyourationallyoughttobelieveisnotjustwhateverisinfacttrue,and
whatyourationallyoughttodoisnotjustwhateverwillinfactsatisfyyourdesires
ormakeyouhappy.Rather,whatyourationallyoughttobelievedependsonthe
evidenceavailabletoyou,andwhatyourationallyoughttododependsonwhat
yourevidencesuggestswouldbestsatisfyyourdesires.Thisisasubjectivenotion
of rationality, on which how you rationally ought to be depends on your—the
subject’s—perspective rather than on an objective, god’s-eye perspective on the
world.1
1 SeeNagel()fordiscussionofobjectivevs.subjectivepointsofviewandtheimportanceof
thisdistinctionforanumberofphilosophicalproblems.
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