Table Of ContentReasonable Self-Esteem
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Reasonable
Self-Estetetm
RICHARD KESHEN
McGill-Queen's University Press
Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo
© McGill-Queen's University Press 1996
ISBN 0-7735-1372-8 (cloth)
ISBN 0-7735-1373-6 (paper)
Legal deposit first quarter 1996
Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec
Printed in Canada on acid-free paper
This book has been published with the help of
a grant from the Canadian Federation for the
Humanities, using funds provided by the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
McGill-Queen's University Press is grateful to the
Canada Council for support of its publishing program.
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Keshen, Richard, 1946-
Reasonable self-esteem
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7735-1372-8 (bound) -
ISBN 0-7735-1373-6 (pbk.)
1. Self-esteem, 1. Title.
BF697-5.546x47 1996 179 C96-900689-3
Typeset in Palatino 10/12
by Caractera inc., Quebec City
To Mary Ellen (lucky man I)
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Contents
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii
PART ONE REASONS FOR SELF-ESTEEM
1 Self-Esteem and the Reasonable Person 3
The concept of a reason for self-esteem is
defined. Six guidelines for rationally scruti-
nizing reasons are described. The Reasonable
Person, or RP, is defined as a person who
cares about following these guidelines. The
connection between self-esteem and motiva-
tion is analysed.
2 Reflected Reasons 20
The impact of others' evaluations on our
self-esteem is analysed. The concept of a
reflected reason is defined. The reflected
reason is shown to underlie the trait of
other-dependency. The RP rejects reflected
self-evaluations as out of keeping with her
nature and in the process, inhibits other-
dependency in herself. The RP finds that
autonomy is in keeping with her nature.
3 Competitive Reasons 35
Competitive reasons for self-esteem are anal-
ysed and shown to underlie envy. The RP
viii Contents
rejects competitive reasons as out of keep-
ing with his nature and so inhibits envy in
himself. Self-evaluations involving adjec-
tives such as "poor," "good," and "excel-
lent" are shown to be distinct from
competitive self-evaluations.
4 Identification Reasons 50
Reasons for self-esteem grounded in social
relationships are analysed. Self-evaluations
which imply that an agent has less moral
status than another entity are shown to be
out of keeping with the RP'S nature. Her
ambivalent relationship to group member-
ship is described.
5 Inherent Reasons 69
Reasons for self-esteem involving qualities
we conceive as issuing from ourselves are
analysed. Such qualities are the basis for
what I call inherent reasons for self-esteem.
The notion of "issuing from ourself" is anal-
ysed. It is shown that appreciation of what
has intrinsic worth can be as much the basis
for an inherent reason as voluntary acts. The
trait of attaching importance to one's being a
unique person is analysed. It is shown that
the RP is disposed to have this trait.
PART TWO ELEMENTS IN A WAY OF LIFE
6 Finding Meaning in Reasonableness 91
Self-respect is distinguished from self-esteem.
It is argued that being a self-respecting
teacher, carpenter, etc., involves attributing
positive worth to a tradition or quasi-tradition.
It is shown that reasonableness, as I define it,
can be thought of as a tradition. Hence, the
RP can have the benefit of seeing herself as
self-respecting qua RP. It is argued that part
of the tradition of reasonableness includes
science. It is shown how the RP of a certain
temperament has meaning added to her life
through contributing to science, either by
being a scientist herself or by being a genuine
appreciator of science.
ix Contents
7 Egalitarian Respect 115
The attitude of treating people as equals, or
egalitarian respect, is interpreted. Egalitarian
respect is bifurcated into two further atti-
tudes: the belief that one does not count for
less than others, which is the attitude of
egalitarian self-respect, and the belief that one
does not count for more than others, which
is the attitude of other-respect. These atti-
tudes are analysed in terms of five criteria.
It is argued that neither Kantian nor utilitar-
ian strategies can be successful in justifying
egalitarian respect in such a way that the
attitude can be deeply anchored in our
personalities.
8 "I Do Not Count for Less ..." 135
This chapter argues that the RP, on account
of her nature, is particularly suited to
having egalitarian self-respect.
9 "I Do Not Count for More ..." 146
This chapter argues that the RP'S nature is
congruent with other-respect. Other-respect,
in its fullest sense, is grounded in perspective-
creating experiences, that is, experiences which
cause us to see any other person as an equal.
Two such experiences are discussed: (a) our
common mortality and (b) our common sub-
jection to fortune. It is argued that the RP'S
nature dismantles barriers in himself which
often cause people not to take such experi-
ences to heart. It is then argued that the
guidelines dispose the RP to give expression
to egalitarian perceptions. For these reasons,
other-respect has expressive significance for
him and so is integrated into his self-esteem.
Notes 173
Bibliography 193
Index 201
