Table Of ContentREALISM AND EXPLANATORY PRIORITY
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES
VOLUME 71
Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer
Editor
Keith Lehrer, University ofA rizona, Tucson
Associate Editor
Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe
Board of Consulting Editors
Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Allan Gibbard, University ofM ichigan
Denise Meyerson, University of Cape Town
Ronald D. Milo, University ofA rizona, Tucson
Fran~ois Recanati, Ecole Poly technique, Paris
Stuart Silvers, Clemson University
Nicholas D. Smith, Michigan State University
The titles published in this series are listed at the end o/this volume.
REALISM AND
EXPLANATORY
PRIORITY
JOHN WRIGHT
Department of Philosophy,
The University ofN ewcastle,
Newcastle, NSW,
Australia
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-4823-3 ISBN 978-94-017-2844-7 (e Book)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-2844-7
Printed on acid-free paper
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by K1uwer Academic Publishers in 1997
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE VII
Chapter I: Introductory Remarks
Chapter II: What is the Realism!
Anti-Realism Issue? 11
Chapter III: A Theory of Dependence. 54
Chapter IV: The Explanatory Priority
View of the Realism!
Anti-Realism Issue. 98
Chapter V: Arguments for a Weak
Form of Realism. 125
Chapter VI: A Strategy for Determining
the Scope of Realism 141
Chapter VII: Does Novel Success Need
to be Explained by Truth? 152
Chapter VIII: Epistemic Truth and the
Explanation of Novel
Confirmation. 188
Chapter IX: The Arguments Against
Realism. 233
Chapter X: The Evidence for Realim-l :
Evidence for Truth that is
Independent of the Epistemic. 271
Chapter XI: The Evidence for Realism-II:
The Evidence for Independence
from Discourse. 300
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 323
INDEX 327
PREFACE
This book is about the dispute between Realism and anti-Realism. Since the
late 1950' s a number of philosophers approaching the issue from very different
directions, have expressed doubts about "Realism". Michael Dummett's "Truth"
appeared in 1959. In that paper - which contains the first use of the term "anti
realism"- Dummett attempted to sketch an alternative to the Realist perspective
which he believed had been widely and uncritically accepted by analytic
philosophers this century. At about the same time the philosophers of science
Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend advanced theses about science which were
anti-Realist in spirit. These authors were sceptical of the idea of science
moving toward "One True Theory", wrote as if different theories each referred
to their own "world" of entities and, most notoriously, claimed that major rival
scientific theories were "incommensurable" with each other. A "second wave"
of opposition to Realism in analytic philosophy occurred in the late 1970's.
Although Nelson Goodman's The Structure of Appearance (1951) advanced
theses that were decidedly in opposition to Realism, Goodman's extreme and
thorough going form of anti-Realism (or Irrealism) received its most explicit
formulation in his Ways of World Making (1978). While Goodman is perhaps
the most extreme opponent of Realism, its most vigorous and prolific opponent
has been Hilary Putnam. Up until the mid 1970's Putnam had been one of the
main advocates of Realism. In the Preface to his "Collected Philosophical
Papers" (1975) he nominated Realism as the common thread extending through
his papers. But soon after this Putnam came to believe that Realism was a
mistake. Since then he has devoted a great deal of energy and ingenuity in
helping to destroy the set of doctrines he helped create. Over the last fifteen
years various anti-Realist views have grown in popularity in analytic
philosophy. Dummett might once have been right in thinking that analytic
philosophers tended to uncritically assume Realism, but I think it is fair to say
that now in most philosophical circles the burden of proof is seen to be on the
Realist to justify their views. Richard Rorty has even gone so far as to see "the
death of Realism" as a fait accompli, and that, in consequence, philosophy as
a whole is entering a new phase. While I think Rorty over-estimates the extent
to which Realism has been demolished in the eyes of philosophers, it is surely
true that in some of the humanities disciplines other than philosophy, Realism
is seen as being as definitely dead as the Dodo. I have, on occassion confessed
VB
Vlll
to people trained in some of the humanities that I am a Realist. I believe they
would have been less surprised if I had told them I thought that the Earth was
flat. As Gerald Vision has remarked, anti-Realism is now in many disciplines
regarded as "an uncontroversial assumption ... a prerequisite for getting a serious
hearing". Despite this remarkable change in intellectual climate -I do not think
it is an exaggeration to describe it as something of an revolution - there is still
a great deal of unclarity concerning the fundamental issues involved in the
Realism/anti-Realism issue. There is wide agreement between thinkers from
very diverse backgrounds that Realism is wrong, but there is much less
agreement what Realism is. Consequently, this book begins by attempting to
get clear on just what is involved in the dispute between the Realist and the
anti-Realist.
Realists and anti-Realists are usually represented as disagreeing on the
nature of truth, with Realists being seen as advocating a correspondence theory
of truth, while anti-Realists are represented as advocating some epistemic or
coherence theory. Occassionally, the disagreement is instead seen as focussing
on existence, with Realists in a domain asserting that entities with that domain
exist, while anti-Realists deny it. In this book it is argued that both these
approaches are mistaken. The approach of this book is to argue that the dispute
between Realist and anti-Realist is best seen, not as focussing on the nature of
truth or on questions of existence, but on the scope and direction of
explanation. It is argued that by shifting the focus of attention to explanation
it is possible to gain a more unified, comprehensive and illuminating grasp of
the range of Realist and anti-Realist positions, and, most importantly, to resolve
the disputes between them. Although the position defended in this book is
Realist, it must be emphasised that it is a very narrow and guarded Realism.
It may be that, in many domains, some form of anti-Realism is appropriate.
The main aim of the second half of the book is to develop a technique for
determining in which domains Realism is appropriate, and in which it is not.
The ideas in this book were a long time developing. Although the
position advocated here is very different from that developed in Michael
Devitt's Realism and Truth, the staunch and thorough-going Realism defended
in that work encouraged me (and I believe, many other philosophers) to develop
their own Realist views at a time when anti-Realism was decidedly in the
ascendant. Some articles by Robert Farrell, at about the same time, also helped
me to get clearer on the issue. The first statement of the perspective of this
book appeared as a conference paper called "Realism and Explanatory Priority",
given at the Universities of Adelaide and Newcastle in 1989 and the University
of Sydney in 1990. The ideas developed in that paper appear in parts of
chapters III and IV of this book. Also in 1989, I published "Realism and
Equivalence" in Erkenntnis; the views defended there are further articulated in
chapter XI. In 1992, I gave a paper "Metaphysical Realism and Explanation
IX
of the Success of Science" at the International Conference for the Philosophy
of Science in Beijing, China, subsequently published in the edited proceedings
of the Conference. The arguments developed there appear in a modified form
in parts of Chapter VIII. The ideas of the rest of the book have nowhere
appeared in print before.
Work commenced on this book at almost exactly the same time that I
took up my present position at the University of Newcastle, Australia. Since
then I have received much support and intellectual stimulation from my
colleagues at Newcastle, including Mr Wayne Christensen, Dr David Dockrill,
Ms Yin Gao, Ms Nicole Gerrard, Dr Bill Herfel, Mr Barry Hodges, Professor
Cliff Hooker, Dr John Lee, Dr Joe Mintoff, Ms Melanie Purcell, Mr Bill
Sparkes, Dr Colin Wilks and Dr Shi Yanfei. Deserving of a special mention
is Dr 1 Collier who pointed me in the direction of some work which proved to
be exactly what I wanted, and which made a substantial improvement to a
crucial part of the overall argument of the book. I would also like to thank
Professor llC. Smart for encouragement and kind words about the parts of the
book I showed him. Worthy of particular thanks is Mr John Atkins, who for
several years collaborated with me in teaching courses on the Realism/anti
Realism issues, and whose careful comments on the penultimate draft of the
book lead to substantial improvements. Finally, I would like to thank my
partner Judith Fielsen, whose unswerving support, understanding and
encouragement helped me especially through the difficult final stages in the
completion of the book.
Most of this book was typed by Mrs Dorrit Nesmith. Her efficiency and
accuracy in typing the manuscript, her ability to keep track of the innumerable
changes and alterations that I made, and her unfailing good humour are greatly
admired, not just by myself but the whole Department. Ms Paula Rayfield was
given the difficult job of completing the final version of the manuscript and
despite a terrible run of misfortunes (none her fault) performed admirably. The
very last stages in the completion of the manuscript were performed, with
efficiency and good humour, by Ms Liza Cardozo.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
In recent years a number of prominent philosophers have argued that there is
a deep sense in which the way the world is depends at least in part upon the
human mind. For example, Hilary Putnam has written:
I shall advance a view in which the mind does not simply 'copy' a
world which admits of description by One True Theory. But my
view is not a view in which the mind makes up the world, either ....
If one must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this:
the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world.'
Apparently similar ideas to those of Putnam have been advanced by
Nelson Goodman. Goodman says that there is a sense in which our languages
or 'symbol systems' 'make' the world. He writes:
The worldmaking mainly in question here is making not with hands
but with minds, or rather with languages or other symbol systems.
Yet when I say that worlds are made, I mean it literally ... we make
versions, right versions make worlds.2
Goodman calls his own position 'Irrealism'.
There is at least a prima facie similarity between the views of Putnam
and Goodman and a position in the philosophy of science developed by authors
such as Thomas Kuhn. Richard Boyd has called this position 'constructivist
anti-Realism'. Boyd writes:
... according to the constructivist, ... the world which scientists study
must be, in some robust sense, defined or constituted by, or
'constructed' from, the theoretical tradition in which the scientific
community in question works.)
And Kuhn himself has written:
the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in
different worlds. One contains constrained bodies that fall slowly,
the other pendulums that repeat their motion again and again. In one
solutions are compounds, in the other, mixtures. One is embedded
in a flat, the other in a curved matrix of space. Practicing in
different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things
when they look from the same point in the same direction.'
The most prominent advocate of British anti-Realism is Michael
Dummett. Dummett sees the dispute between Realism and anti-Realism as
