Reagan and the Iran-Contra Affair: The Politics of Presidential Recovery

230 Pages·1999·57.46 MB·English

by  Robert Busby (auth.)

REAGAN AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
Reagan and the
Iran-Contra Affair
The Politics of Presidential Recovery
Robert Busby
Lecturer in American Studies
Liverpool Hope University College
First published in Great Britain 1999 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London
Companies and representatives throughout the world
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-14728-1 ISBN 978-1-349-14726-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-14726-7
First published in the United States of America 1999 by
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-21982-6
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Busby, Robert.
Reagan and the Iran-Contra Affair: the politics of presidential
recovery / Robert Busby.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-21982-6 (cloth)
I. Reagan, Ronald-Public opinion. 2. Iran-Contra Affair,
1985-1990-Public opinion. 3. United States-Politics and
govemment-1981-1989. 4. Public opinion-United States.
I. Title.
E876.B857 1998
973.927'092--dc21 98-38451
CIP
© Robert Busby 1999
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1999
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made
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No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with
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Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to
criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance
with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and
sustained forest sources.
10987654321
08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99
To my parents
Contents
List of Tables and Exhibits ix
Acknowledgements xi
Introduction 1
1 Political Scandal in the United States 9
2 Damage Limitation: the Modern Experience 30
3 Origins of the Iran-Contra Scandal 54
4 Teflon Trauma: October-November 1986 67
5 Riding the Storm: November 1986 - February 1987 98
6 Searching for Stability: February-July 1987 129
7 Congressional Finale: July-November 1987 148
Conclusions 180
Notes 186
Index 216
vii
List of Tables and Exhibits
3.1 Missile shipments to Iran, 1985-86 60
4.1 August 1986: 'How would you rate President Reagan
on ... ?' 69
4.2 President Reagan job approval ratings, October 1986 69
4.3 Key events of October and November 1986 79
5.1 'Do the following aspects of the Iran-Contra
connection bother you a lot, a little or not at all?' 125
6.1 President Reagan job approval ratings, March 1987 134
6.2 Presidential approval ratings, October 1986 -
February 1987 144
6.3 'What kind of job do you think Reagan is doing
handling the Iran-Contra situation?' May 1987 145
6.4 Comparisons with Watergate, June 1987 147
7.1 North: truthfulness during testimony to Congressional
committees, July 1987 163
7.2 'Do you approve or disapprove of the way North
handled the Iran/Contra operation?' July 1987 165
7.3 'Do you think President Reagan has told the
American people everything he knows about the
Iran-Contra issue?' July 1987 176
7.4 Reagan's knowledge of the diversion issue, March 1988 177
Exhibit 4.1 Reagan's 13 November 1986 speech on Iran 82
Exhibit 4.2 Damage control, OctoberlNovember 1986 97
ix
Acknowledgements
I would first like to thank my parents and sister for their encour
agement and help in the formulation of this text. Thereafter a number
of colleagues and friends have assisted across time and given help
ful advice and comment, particularly Gareth Davies, Robert Williams,
Kevin Felstead and Mike O'Grady. Others have provided support,
shown great interest and given inspiration: Gretchen Knapp, Carol
Clark, Barry Jervis, Ymke Bleumink, Heather Cooper, and espe
cially Steve Garratt whose miraculous acquisition of Congressional
material at a second-hand book sale made all the difference.
In the United States a host of individuals and institutions gave a
warm welcome and made the task of researching this work all the
easier. In particular I'd like to thank Professor James Orten for
his initial assistance and thereafter, for their hospitality and friendship:
Steve and Judy Patton, Scott and Kate Atchley, Mike and Jamie
Desmond, Mark and Arvilla Mastromarino, and Kelley and Ben
Broome.
The staff at the following institutions gave invaluable advice and
access to files and materials: the National Security Archive, the
Center for Media and Public Affairs, the Center for National Se
curity Studies, the Carter Presidential Library and the University
of Tennessee.
Xl
Introduction
The Iran-Contra scandal of 1986-87 was one of the most promi
nent and captivating political scandals of modern times. In spite of
its complexity, its vast array of characters and lack of hard evi
dence, it captured the attention of politicians, media and public.
Old questions, familiar from the infamous Watergate scandal, re
emerged. What did the President know about the activities of his
aides? How could the safeguard of checks and balances, so central
to the American political system, have been subverted in such a
callous fashion? Where did responsibility ultimately lie? In the after
math of the exposure of the Iran-Contra scandal many in Washington
struggled to come to terms with a further scandal which struck at
the very heart of the national government.
Scandal is a common occurrence in contemporary American
politics. Watergate, Iran-Contra, Whitewater; all are familiar names
and products of a flourishing scandal industry. Of all the modern
scandals, Watergate stands out as the most significant and notable,
Richard Nixon resigning from office in the face of almost certain
impeachment. Watergate showed that scandal was no game, the
political life of the President was at stake and allegations of wrong
doing could not be taken lightly. Nor could they be discarded in
the hope that the American nation would be oblivious to the ac
tivities of popularly elected rulers in Washington. Watergate had
many profound consequences for the American political system.
Increasingly the American public looked upon its leaders with scep
tical eyes. Could the officials and bureaucrats in Washington be
trusted to undertake their Constitutional duties in an ethical and
upstanding manner? Concern also existed at the elite levels of govern
ment. Congress viewed the White House with suspicion. During
the 1970s it sought to reassert its political authority, using its over
sight responsibilities and Legislative measures to keep the Execu
tive in check. The media corps had enjoyed a field-day during the
Watergate scandal. A constant diet of surreptitious activity, cover
ups, espionage, and dishonesty at the highest levels produced a
flood of political stories of an intensity previously unseen in American
politics. The central character in the unfolding drama was of course
Nixon, and the televised Congressional hearings, heroic actions of
1
2 Reagan and the Iran-Contra Affair
the Special Prosecutor and emotional debates in the Congress made
for a political drama of soap opera proportions.
Iran-Contra produced a similar fare of drama, emotion and un
expected twists. The exposure of a covert Executive policy designed
to prompt the release of hostages from the Lebanon, and there
after support the Contra freedom fighters in Nicaragua, caused con
troversy in Washington. The lessons of Watergate had been ignored,
Congress having once again been excluded from the formulation
and execution of policy. The branches of government were again
at odds with one another, and into the bargain an administration
which congratulated itself on its tough stance against terrorism had
violated its own policy of no deals with terrorists. For the second
time in 14 years the American nation endured an elongated and
politically painful process of uncovering what had gone wrong with
the system of checks and balances. Once more the media could fill
its broadcasts and papers with a flurry of stories detailing the un
ravelling scandal. The public also lamented the Iran-Contra epi
sode. Its previously high regard for the Reagan presidency evaporated
in the space of a few short weeks. Reagan, it seemed, might go the
same way as Richard Nixon and leave office as a disgraced and
disliked President.
Aside from superficial similarities between Watergate and Iran
Contra, several important common features stand out as worthy of
academic consideration: both Nixon and Reagan confronted a hos
tile Congress and a disbelieving public, both had to contend with a
media corps intent on uncovering as much information about the
crises as possible, and both struggled with credibility battles which
threatened the very existence of their presidencies. In Watergate
and Iran-Contra, two political episodes provide a wealth of evi
dence about how administrations seek to deal with self-inflicted
credibility crises, analysis of which answers pressing questions about
presidential credibility and damage control. How does an adminis
tration seek to alleviate public and political fears about its honesty
and competence? How should an administration deal with a na
tional media corps which seems uniformly intent on exposing con
troversial White House activity in a less than positive light? The
damage control measures employed by an administration consti
tute central components in the battle to establish presidential cred
ibility and rehabilitate the President in the eyes of the public, media
and fellow players in the American political system during times
of political scandal.