Quine (Arguments of the Philosophers)

416 Pages·2007·2.55 MB·English

by  Peter Hylton

QUINE
ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS
The purpose of this series is to provide a contemporary assessment and his-
tory of the entire course of philosophical thought. Each book contains a
detailed, critical introduction to the work of a philosopher or school of
major influence and significance.
Also available in the series:
* AQUINAS * NIETZSCHE
Eleonore Stump Richard Schacht
* DESCARTES * PLATO
Margaret D. Wilson Justin Gosling
* HEGEL * PLOTINUS
M.J. Inwood Lloyd P. Gerson
* HUME * ROUSSEAU
Barry Stroud Timothy O’Hagan
KANT * THE PRESOCRATIC
Ralph C.S. Walker PHILOSOPHERS
Jonathan Barnes
KIERKEGAARD
Alastair Hannay * SANTAYANA
Timothy L.S. Sprigge
* LOCKE
Michael Ayers * THE SCEPTICS
R.J. Hankinson
* MALEBRANCHE
Andrew Pyle * WITTGENSTEIN,
2nd edition
* KARL MARX Robert Fogelin
Allen Wood
* MERLEAU-PONTY * also available in paperback
Stephen Priest
QUINE
Peter Hylton
FOR SALLY
Firstpublished2007
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements viii
Abbreviations ix
Introduction 1
1 Overview: Quine’s naturalism 6
I Fundamentals 6
II Stimulations and science 12
III Realism, instrumentalism, pragmatism 18
IV ‘‘Our theory’’ 23
V Tasks for philosophy 26
2 Quine’s philosophical background: beginnings; logic; Carnap 32
I Early forays, logic, logicism 33
II Carnap: the Aufbau project and its failure 38
III Disposing of metaphysics: language-relativity, tolerance,
and conventionalism 43
IV The analytic–synthetic distinction 48
3 The analytic–synthetic distinction 51
I Doubts about meanings 53
II Artificial languages 60
III Quinean analyticity and the issue of scope 65
IVAn epistemological distinction? 68
V The putatively a priori 74
4 Reconceiving epistemology 81
I Input: observations, evidence, and stimulations 85
II The genetic project 91
III Clarification of the genetic project 96
IV Language, meaning, and behaviour 100
V Methods of the project: dispositions 103
VI Approaches to language: working backwards 108
v
CONTENTS
5 The beginnings of cognitive language: shared
responses to stimulation and observation sentences 114
I Responses to stimulation; perceptual similarity 116
II Sharing our responses 122
III Learning 129
IV Observation sentences 135
V The Janus-faced character of observation sentences: evidence,
reference 140
6 Beyond the observation sentences 149
I Extending the project: learning, evidence, and holism 151
II Language-dependent learning; more on holism 155
III Reference 164
IV Reference and identity 172
7 Theory and evidence 177
I Evidence; observation categoricals 179
II Observation categoricals and empirical content 186
III Underdetermination 189
8 Radical translation and its indeterminacy 197
I Indeterminacy of translation 200
II Indeterminacy of reference 205
III The threat of incoherence 209
IVArguing for indeterminacy 215
VArguing against indeterminacy 221
VI The significance of indeterminacy 225
9 Quinean metaphysics: limning the structure of reality 231
I Theory, language, and reality 234
II Regimentation 238
III Ontological reduction: definition, explication,
and elimination 245
10 A framework for theory: the role of logic 251
I The syntax of logic; ontological commitment 254
II Bivalence 259
III First-order logic 263
IV The bearers of truth-values: eternal sentences 269
V Truth 274
11 Extensionality, reference, and singular terms 280
I Singular terms 281
II Extensionality 288
vi
CONTENTS
III Extensionality and reference 291
Appendix 296
12 Ontology, physicalism, realism 298
I Ontology: general principles; bodies and objects 298
II Sets, hyper-Pythagoreanism and the role of ontology 304
III Physicalism 310
IV Realism 317
13 Minds, beliefs, and modality 324
I The mind and the attitudes 326
II The de dicto attitudes: syntax and ontology 329
III The de dicto attitudes: semantics 334
IVAttitudes and facts 338
V The de re attitudes: a blind alley 343
VI Modality 349
VII Causality, counterfactuals, and natural necessity 355
Conclusion 363
Notes 370
Bibliography 388
Index 397
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to record my gratitude to all who have assisted and encouraged me in
the writing of this book. First among them is Andrew Lugg. For the last
five or six years, as I have written and rewritten, he has been my intellectual
companion and chief interlocutor, always ready to discuss difficulties of
understanding or of exposition. He has subjected my drafts to a careful,
sympathetic, yet critical reading, from which I have greatly benefitted. I
owe a crucial debt also to Tom Ricketts; a number of conversations with
him over the years have decisively influenced the book. I am indebted to the
publisher’s readers, especially to Dagfinn Føllesdal whose comments led me
to rethink one section completely. Others who have read and commented on
parts of the book in preparation include Walter Edelberg, Juliet Floyd, Bob
Fogelin, Warren Goldfarb, Bill Hart, Gary Kemp, Matt Moore, Sally
Sedgwick, and Roge´rio Severo. I may well have omitted some who ought to
be on this list; I can only beg their forgiveness.
I am indebted in a rather different way to Sean Morris, who prepared the
index for the book, and to Bill Hart (again) who first introduced me to Ted
Honderich, then editor of the series in which the book appears.
I have received generous institutional support. I gratefully acknowledge
the UIC Institute for the Humanities, the NEH, and the ACLS; also the
UIC College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, under successive deans. Without
the time free from teaching which those institutions made possible, this
book would, at best, have taken much longer. The UIC department of phi-
losophy has provided a supportive and encouraging environment; Bill Hart
was its Chair for almost the entire period during which the book was writ-
ten and I owe him (yet again) particular thanks.
viii
ABBREVIATIONS
To reduce clutter, I use abbreviations for works which are referred to
repeatedly in the text. I divide them into three categories: books by Quine,
essays by Quine,and volumesof essays about Quine which contain responses or
comments by Quine. Detailed references may be found in the Bibliography.
Books by Quine
FLPV From a Logical Point of View
FSS From Stimulus to Science
OR Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
PL Philosophy of Logic
PT Pursuit of Truth
RR Roots of Reference
TT Theories and Things
WO Word and Object
WP Ways of Paradox
Essays by Quine
C&LT ‘‘Carnap and Logical Truth’’, in WP
EC ‘‘Empirical Content’’, in TT
EESW ‘‘Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World’’
EN ‘‘Epistemology Naturalized’’, in OR
FM ‘‘Facts of the Matter’’
MSLT ‘‘Mr. Strawson on Logical Truth’’, in WP
MVD ‘‘Mind and Verbal Dispositions’’
NLWM ‘‘Naturalism, or Living within One’s Means’’
NNK ‘‘The Nature of Natural Knowledge’’
SLS ‘‘The Scope and Language of Science’’, in WP
TDE ‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’’, in FLPV
ix