Table Of Content
ALEXANDER DUGIN
PUTIN VS PUTIN
Vladimir Putin Viewed from
the Right
ARKTOS 2014
Contents
Editor’s Note
1. The Making of Putin
2. Putin’s Ideology
3. Putin’s Test
4. Putin’s Geopolitics
5. Putin’s Eurasian Revolution
6. Putin: What Next?
7. Criticism of Putin from Above
Appendix I:The War on Russia in Its Ideological
Dimension — An Analysis from the Perspective
of the Fourth Political Theory
Appendix II: Some Suggestions Regarding the
Prospects for the Fourth Political Theory in
Europe
Editor’s Note
This book was originally compiled and published
in Russian in 2012. Some of its texts were written
after Putin’s re-election, some were written
during Medvedev’s term, and some were written
during Putin’s first presidency (between 2000 and
2002). Readers should keep this in mind as the
tense in which Prof. Dugin refers to particular
events sometimes shifts. The appendices were all
written in the first half of 2014.
Most of the footnotes to the text have been
added by me for this edition. A small number
were part of the original Russian text, and these
are denoted with an ‘AD’ following them. Where
sources in other languages have been cited, I have
attempted to replace them with existing English-
language editions. Citations to works for which I
could locate no translation are retained in their
original language. Website addresses for on-line
sources were verified as accurate and available
during the period of August and September 2014.
The appendices were translated by volunteers
from the Eurasia Movement.
JOHN B MORGAN IV
Budapest, Hungary, September 2014
1. The Making of Putin
‘Putin is the ideal ruler for the current period. He
is a tragic figure. He has a horrible entourage,
made up of exhausted people, a sea of despicable
worms who are fouling up the entire field of his
movement. And he is methodically and steadily,
bit by bit, clearing away all this dismal legacy.
He is like an alchemist turning black into white. It
is only getting grey so far but this is just the
beginning. The dawn is breaking, the dawn in
boots. I believe in Putin and I entirely support
him.’
— An extract from an interview with Alexander Dugin for
the Website Dni.ru, 19 January 2001
‘Mr Putin is a product of the Tsarist-Soviet
security system, a traditionalist who believes that
the only way to sustain order and protect the state
is through authoritarianism. Therefore his
political, legal, and military reforms are going to
impede progress’.
— Boris Berezovsky, ‘The Problem with Putin’, The
Financial Times, 28 May 2002
Introduction
Putin: The Unknown Revealed
As soon as Putin appeared, several significant
factors contributed from the outset to a positive
assessment of his personality. First, a harsh
resentment towards the new Russian leader was
expressed by ultra-liberals, the ‘democratic
schizos’, as they were called at the time,
spearheaded by the notorious Sergei Adamovich
Kovalev.[1] Their message was, ‘Putin belongs to
the murderous KGB, he is a throwback to the past.
He is a Red-Brown.’[2] The attack from their side
immediately meant for us that Putin was ‘our
man’: he was a patriot and a decent man to boot.
The ultra-’democratic schizos’ were joined, with
less gleeful abandon, by the more moderate
‘democratic schizos’ — Gusinsky,[3] Yavlinsky[4]
and the ultra-Atlanticists, as well as Primakov[5]
and Luzhkov[6] who were affiliated with them at
some point. They had the following message:
Putin is a nationalist and pro-superpower, and a
protégé of the Yeltsin family and the Berezovsky-
Abramovich-Mamut[7] clan. But it was evident
that his association with a certain clan was a
consequence of their competition with another
clan, and such criticisms also proved beneficial
for Putin.
The ‘patriots’, such as Prokhanov[8] and
Zyuganov,[9] very cautiously and almost officially
proclaimed that Putin was a ‘Yeltsinist’. But if
they had said that Putin was a hero, nobody would
understand them.
Those who were anti-Chechnya were pleased
by Putin’s tough stance. They did not understand
the rest of his policies, because they were simple
voters, who ultimately gave their collective votes
to Putin.
The oligarch Berezovsky, who was responsible
for the ‘technical support’ behind the handover of
power, crafted a patriotic image for Putin. Then
he inadvertently became a ‘corruptor’ of the
Eurasian type’ (not just a corruptor), because the
channels of the official withdrawal of capital to
the United States and NATO member states were
closed to him. ‘Now he will play with Asia’, some
thought at that point. He did not give a damn
about liberal democrats.
It is clear that corruption is a bad thing, but the
immediate eradication of corruption is
impossible. It is a good slogan but every time one
has to keep track of who benefits from it. Rooting
out certain corrupt groups at a certain point is
only beneficial to their competitors. Simple folk
will not gain a single ruble from such
manoeuvres. In order to eradicate it, a ‘mental
