Provisional Measures Issued by International Courts and Tribunals

365 Pages·2021·4.045 MB·English

by  Fulvio Maria Palombino, Roberto Virzo, Giovanni Zarra

Provisional
Measures Issued by
International Courts
and Tribunals
Fulvio Maria Palombino
Roberto Virzo
Giovanni Zarra Editors
Provisional Measures Issued by International Courts
and Tribunals
Fulvio Maria Palombino Roberto Virzo
(cid:129) (cid:129)
Giovanni Zarra
Editors
Provisional Measures Issued
by International Courts
and Tribunals
123
Editors
Fulvio Maria Palombino RobertoVirzo
Department ofLaw DEMM
University of Naples FedericoII University of Sannio
Naples, Italy Benevento,Italy
GiovanniZarra
Department ofLaw
University of Naples FedericoII
Naples, Italy
ISBN978-94-6265-410-5 ISBN978-94-6265-411-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-411-2
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Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Roberto Virzo
Part I General Features of Provisional Measures in International
Adjudication
2 Provisional Measures: How “Provisional” Is “Provisional”?. . . . . . 9
Hugh Thirlway
3 Requirements for the Issuance of Provisional Measures . . . . . . . . . 19
Guillaume Le Floch
4 Autonomy of Provisional Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Eva Rieter
5 The Humanisation of Provisional Measures?—Plausibility
and the Interim Protection of Rights Before the ICJ . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Tom Sparks and Mark Somos
Part II Provisional Measures Issued by Universal Courts and
Inter-State Arbitral Tribunals
6 Opposites Attract? Provisional Measures in the International
Court of Justice Oscillating Between the Judicial Function
and Party Autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Stephan Wittich
7 A “Game of Give and Take”: The ITLOS, the ICJ
and Provisional Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Loris Marotti
v
vi Contents
8 Interim Measures in the Practice of the International
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. . . . . . . . . . 147
Péter Kovács
9 Reflections on Provisional Measures in Inter-state Arbitration. . . . 171
Yoshifumi Tanaka
Part III Provisional Measures Issued by Regional Courts
10 The Procedural Features of Interim Relief Before
the Court of Justice of the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Massimo Francesco Orzan
11 Interim Measures at the European Court of Human Rights:
Current Practice and Future Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Andrea Saccucci
12 Provisional Measures Under the African Human Rights
System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Giuseppe Pascale
Part IV Provisional Measures Issued by Commercial and
Investments Arbitral Tribunals
13 The Functions of Provisional Measures in International
Commercial Arbitration: Between Efficacy and Innovation . . . . . . 279
Giovanni Zarra
14 The Enforcement of Provisional Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Andrea Carlevaris
15 Provisional Measures in ICSID Arbitration Proceedings:
Between the Current Legal Framework and the Proposed
Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Domenico Pauciulo
16 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Fulvio Maria Palombino
Chapter 1
Introduction
RobertoVirzo
Contents
References ..................................................................... 6
Abstract This introduction provides a critical discussion of some problematic
aspectsoftheResolutiononprovisionalmeasuresadoptedbytheInstituteofInter-
nationalLawon8September2017.Theremainderoftheintroductionpresentsthe
planandaimsofthebook.
· ·
Keywords ProvisionalMeasures InternationalCourtsandTribunals Resolution
· ·
oftheInstitutdeDroitInternational TypicalFunctionsofProvisionalMeasures
· ·
AtypicalFunctions Plausibility HumanRights
The present volume takes its cue from the recent proliferation of provisional
measures—whichwecanbrieflydefineasinterimordersissuedattheendofinci-
dentalproceedings,oftenwiththeaimofsafeguardingtheobjectoftheproceedings
ortoensurethatthesubjectiverightsinquestionaredulysafeguarded—awardedby
internationalcourtsandtribunals.Indeed,notwithstandingthecrucialrolethatthese
orders have in international proceedings, the subject has rarely been meaningfully
debatedinitsentiretyinmonographs1 orcollectedvolumes.2
Itisnotbychance,indeed,thattheseordersattractedtheattentionoftheInstitut
deDroitInternational(IDI,orInstituteofInternationalLaw),which,tryingtooffera
systematizationofthesubjectofprovisionalmeasures,on8September2017,during
itssessioninHyderabad,adoptedaResolution3(the“Resolution”).However,while,
as clarified in the report by rapporteur Lord Collins of Mapesbury, the Resolution
aims at encompassing a broad range of provisional measures—dealing not only
1AnotableexceptionisgivenbyMiles2017.
2Exceptionmadeforworksfocusingonspecifictribunals,seee.g.Rosenne2005.
3ForacommentontheResolution,seeRuozzi2018,pp.1182etseq.
B
R.Virzo( )
DEMM,UniversityofSannio,PiazzaArechiII1,82100Benevento,Italy
e-mail:[email protected]
©T.M.C.AsserPressandtheauthors2021 1
F.M.Palombinoetal.(eds.),ProvisionalMeasuresIssuedbyInternational
CourtsandTribunals,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-411-2_1
2 R.Virzo
with “public international law, private international law, international commercial
arbitrationandsomeuniversalprinciplesofprivatelaw”,4 butalsowithprovisional
measures issued by domestic courts—itfails totake intoaccount important trends
aswellasanumberofproblematicissuesemergingfromtheabundantinternational
caselawonthematter.
Asignificantexampleofthereasonsleadingtotheabovecriticismsisgivenbythe
approachthattheResolutionassumeswithrespecttothefunctionsandpurposesof
provisionalmeasures.Morespecifically,guidingprinciple1mentionstheobjective
of“maintain[ing]thestatusquopendingdeterminationofdisputes”or“preserv[ing]
the ability to grant final effective relief”; guiding principle 2 refers to the purpose
ofavoiding“irreparableinjury[…]causedtotherightsindisputebeforefinaljudg-
ment”;andguidingprinciple4alludestotheneedto“[prevent]theaggravationof
thedispute”.Inthisregard,itisarguablethattheIDIhasoversimplifiedthematter,
without taking into account both the peculiarities of provisional measures in the
differentcontexts,andthegreatnumberofpurposeswhichmayleadtotheadoption
ofaprovisionalmeasure.
Hence,itseemsworthtryingtoofferanothersystematizationofthefunctionand
purposes of provisional measures. In this regard, a useful approach to this issue
maybetodistinguishbetween“typical”or“atypical”orders.Inthecaseswherethe
functionsofinterimmeasuresareenvisagedinthestatutes,constitutiveinstruments
or procedural rules of international courts and tribunals, they may be considered
astypical,whileiftheyaretheresultofachoicemadebyadjudicatorsbeyondthe
powersexpresslyattributedtothem,provisionalmeasuresmaybedefinedasatypical.
Theworthinessoftheissuanceofanatypicalfunctionofprovisionalmeasuresshall
benecessarilyanalysedonacasebycasebasis.
Looking at the IDI Resolution through the lens of this distinction, we might
assume that the purpose referred to in guiding principle 2 usually falls within the
first category—i.e., it is a typical function—because provisional measures aimed
at preserving the rights of the parties pending the dispute are usually recognized
bylegalsourcesregulatinginternationalcourtsandtribunals.Sufficeittorecall,in
this connection, that the International Court of Justice (ICJ), under Article 41 of
itsStatute,5 has“thepowertoindicate(…)anyprovisionalmeasureswhichought
tobetakentopreservetherespectiverightsoftheparties”.Alsofallingwithinthis
categoryistheability“tograntfinaleffectiverelief”mentionedinguidingprinciple1,
sinceArticle57(3)(e)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)allows
thePre-TrialChamber“totakeprotectivemeasuresforthepurposeofforfeiture,in
particularfortheultimatebenefitofvictims”.6Finally,thepurposeof“maintain[ing]
or restor[ing] the status quo pending determination of the dispute” is laid down in
Article26(2)(a)oftheArbitrationRules2012ofthePermanentCourtofArbitration
(PCA).
4InstitutdeDroitInternational,SessionofHyderabad,ThirdCommission,ProvisionalMeasures,
FinalReport,RapporteurLordCollinsofMapesbury,p.268,para12.
5SeeChap.6byWittichinthisvolume.
6SeeChap.8byKovácsinthisvolume.
1 Introduction 3
Ontheotherhand,provisionalmeasuresissuedwiththepurposeof“preventing
theaggravationofthedispute”arenotusuallyenvisagedinthestatutesorprocedural
rulesofinternationalcourtsandtribunalsandtheymight,therefore,beconsideredas
atypical.7However,thiscircumstancehasneverrestrainedinternationaladjudicators,
whohaveusuallyissuedprovisionalmeasureswiththispurpose.Indeed,thenecessity
nottoaggravatethedisputeisafactorthattheInternationalTribunalfortheLawof
theSea(ITLOS)alwaystakesintoaccountwhenorderingprovisionalmeasures,8and
whichtheICJregardsasan“additional”purposeofinterimmeasurestobepursued
inallthecaseswhereitisnecessary.9
Furthermore,inadditiontothoseenshrinedintheResolution,ananalysisofrele-
vant instruments and international case law reveals that it is possible to envisage
other functions and purposes of provisional measures. In this regard, it is possible
tomentioninterimmeasuresissuedforthepreventionofseriousharmtotheenvi-
ronment10—apurposewhichreflectstheconsiderabledevelopmentofinternational
environmentallawinthepastdecades—aswellasprovisionalordershavingthegoal
of“provid[ing]ameansofpreservingassetsoutofwhichasubsequentawardmay
besatisfied”.11Asforthe“atypicalfunction”category,itisworthrecallingherethat
in the Arctic Sunrise and Enrica Lexie cases, the ITLOS, pending the constitution
ofanarbitraltribunalunderAnnexVIIUNCLOS,prescribedprovisionalmeasures
forthepurposeofpreventingprejudiceto“thecarryingoutofanydecisionwhich
thearbitraltribunalmayrender”.12 ThisisapurposementionedinArticle26(2)(b)
ofthePCAArbitrationRules2012,butnotintheUnitedNationsConventiononthe
LawoftheSea(UNCLOS),13 underwhichtheprovisionalmeasureswereordered.
Movingtotherequirementsfortheissuanceofprovisionalmeasures,theInstitute
of International Law did not analyse the concept of “plausibility”, a controversial
7ButseeArticle26,para1ofPCA,OptionalRulesforArbitrationofDisputesRelatingtoNatural
Resourcesand/orTheEnvironment.
8Virzo2018,pp.156–158.
9ICJ,ImmunitiesandCriminalProceedings(EquatorialGuineav.France),ProvisionalMeasures,
Orderof7December2006,para96.
10Article 26, para 1 of PCA, Optional Rules, supra note 7. Moreover, the only footnote in the
Resolution reminds us that “[t]here may be independent purposes of provisional measures that
areexpresslyprovidedforinrelevantinstruments,suchasthepreventionofseriousharmtothe
marineenvironmentunderArticle290,para(1)oftheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawof
theSeaorthepreventionofdamagetofishstocksunderArticle31,para(2),oftheAgreementon
ImplementationoftheLawoftheSeaConventionwithrespecttostraddlingandhighlymigratory
fishstocks,adoptedon4August1995”.
11Article26,para2,c)ofPCA,ArbitrationRules2012;Article17,para2,c)oftheUnitedNations
CommissiononInternationalTradeLaw(UNCITRAL)ModelLawonInternationalCommercial
Arbitration. Besides, some commercial arbitration awards have gone as far as to order Mareva
injunctions against banks or other entities so as to freeze the assets of one of the parties. See
Chap.13byZarrainthisvolume.
12The “Arctic Sunrise” Case (The Netherlands v. Russia), ITLOS Case No. 22, Provisional
Measures, Order of 22 November 2013, para 98; The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India),
ITLOSCaseNo24,ProvisionalMeasures,Orderof24August2015,para141.
13MontegoBay,10December1982;entryintoforce:16November1994.
4 R.Virzo
andvaguecriterion,whichinthepastfewyearshastakenonincreasingimportance
inprovisionalmeasuresdecisions,especiallyinthecaselawoftheICJ.14
SomeothercriticismmaybemovedtotheResolution,ifwespecificallylookatthe
disputesettlementmechanismsetforthbytheUNCLOSand,precisely,inlightofthe
ITLOS’competencetoprescribeprovisionalmeasurespendingtheconstitutionofan
arbitraltribunalpursuanttoAnnexVIIoftheConvention.Indeed,thesecondpartof
guidingprinciple6oftheResolutionstatesthat“[a]norderforprovisionalmeasures
[…]isbinding”andthatit“issubjecttomodificationordischargebythecourtor
tribunalwhichmadeit”(emphasisadded).Thismeansthatguidingprinciple6does
notadequatelytakeintoaccountthefactthat,accordingtothelastsentenceofArticle
290(5) UNCLOS, “the [arbitral] tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted
maymodify,revokeoraffirmthoseprovisionalmeasures”previouslyissuedbythe
ITLOS.ThelackofconsiderationoftheITLOSpracticebyGuidingprinciple6is
evenmoresurprisingifoneconsidersthatArticle290(5)hasbeenappliedonseveral
occasions,15andthatinthefamousSouthernBluefinTuna,MOXPlantand“Enrica
Lexie” cases, the arbitral tribunals to which the disputes were submitted revoked,
confirmedormodifiedthemeasuresorderedbytheITLOS.
Dwelling a little longer on the UNCLOS dispute settlement system, it is worth
observing that, during the IDI discussions leading to the 2017 Resolution, Judge
WolfrumdrewattentiontooneoftheaspectsonwhichtheResolutionissilent.In
his remarks on the report prepared by Lord Collins of Mapesbury, he pointed out
that“therewereanumberofcasesininternationallawwhereordersforprovisional
measuresdirectlyorindirectlysettledthedispute”.16 Indeed,inLandReclamation
bySingaporeinandaroundtheStraitofJohor andAraLibertad,theexecutionof
theprovisionalmeasuresorderedbytheITLOS(towhichnegotiations,carriedout
pendingthearbitrationproceedings,followed)ledtothetwodisputesbeingresolved
throughagreements,ratherthanadjudicatedincourt.17
Another trend which is not taken into account by the Resolution concerns the
increasingconsiderationthatinternationaljudgeshavegiventohumanrightsinthe
issuance of provisional measures. This happened in particular when it had to be
14Tanaka2018,p.194:“Thevaguenessofthetestmayentailtheriskofunderminingpredictability
ofanorderoftheCourtwithregardtoprovisionalmeasures”.
15SouthernBluefinTunacases(NewZealandv.Japan;Australiav.Japan),ITLOSCaseNos.3
and4,ProvisionalMeasures,Orderof27August1999;TheMOXPlantcase(Irelandv.United
Kingdom),ITLOSCaseNo.10,ProvisionalMeasures,Orderof3December2001;Caseconcerning
LandReclamationbySingaporeinandaroundtheStraitsofJohor(Malaysia/Singapore),ITLOS
CaseNo.12,ProvisionalMeasures,Orderof8October2003;TheARALibertadcase(Argentina
v.Ghana),ITLOSCaseNo.20,ProvisionalMeasures,Orderof15December2012;The“Arctic
Sunrise”Case,supranote10;The“EnricaLexie”Incident,supranote10;CaseConcerningthe
Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), ITLOS Case No.
26,ProvisionalMeasures,Orderof25May2019;TheM/T“SanPadrePio”Case(Switzerlandv.
Nigeria),ITLOSCaseNo.27,ProvisionalMeasures,Orderof6July2019.SeealsoChap.7by
Marottiinthisvolume.
16Institut de Droit International, Session of Hyderabad, Third Commission, Plenary Session,
ProvisionalMeasures,Report,p.108.
17Supranote14andVirzo2018,pp.160–161.