Table Of ContentRoutledge Revivals
Problems of Mind
First published in 1972, Problems of Mind begins with a consideration of the
view that the human mind is an immaterial thing that does not require cor-
poreal embodiment for its operations. It takes up the conception that “inner
experiences” are “strictly identical” with brain processes. The book also deals
exclusively with the doctrine called “Logical Behaviourism”, which will
always possess a compelling attraction for anyone who is perplexed by the
psychological concepts, who has become aware of the worthlessness of an
appeal to introspection as an account of how we learn those concepts, and who
has no inclination to identify mind with brain. The three most plausible
theories of mind-body dualism, mind-brain monism, and behaviourism are all
rejected, and nothing is set forth as the true theory. Norman Malcolm states
that this is ‘only a drop in the bucket. It will serve its purpose if it leads the
reader into the writings of Wittgenstein, who is easily the most important
figure in the philosophy of mind.’
Problems of Mind will be an essential read for scholars and researchers of
philosophy of mind, ethics, logic, and philosophy in general.
Problems of Mind
Descartes to Wittgenstein
by Norman Malcolm
FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin1972
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©1971NormanMalcolm
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Problems o f Mind
Descartes to Wittgenstein
Norman Malcolm
London
GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
Ruskin House Museum Street
First published in Great Britain in 1972
Second impression 1976
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. All rights
are reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of
private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under
the Copyright Act, 1956, no part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in
any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical,
mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries
should be addressed to the publishers.
© 1971 Norman Malcolm
ISBN 0 04 130015 7
The Essays in Philosophy series was originally published in the
United States of America as the Harper Essays in Philosophy.
The British edition is a photographic copy and American
spelling and usage have been retained.
Printed in Great Britain by
Biddles Ltd, Guildford, Surrey
Preface
This essay was originally planned as one in a
volume of essays by several authors. It was com-
pleted and delivered in September 1965. During sub-
sequent years, while it languished in the hands of the
publisher, there appeared a number of works that
treat some of the topics discussed in this essay. I
regret that it contains no reference to them.
Part I (Mind and Body) begins with a considera-
tion of the view that the human mind is an im-
material thing that does not require corporeal
embodiment for its operations. The assumptions that
nourish this conception are studied, and some of the
typical turns and twists of objection and reply are
traced out. My conclusion is that the undermining,
by Wittgenstein, of the notion that we obtain our psy-
chological concepts (thinking, perception, memory,
belief, will and so on) by “inward observation”
(Locke’s “inner sense”), removes the main tempta-
tion to believe that a human mind could exist in
separation from a living, corporeal, human being.
viii Preface
Part II (Materialism) takes up the conception that
“inner experiences” are, or might turn out to be,
“strictly identical” with brain processes. I concen-
trate on the presentation of this view by J. J. C.
Smart, according to whom our “immediate” or
“inner” experiences take place “inside our skulls”
((Journal of Philosophy 60, 1963, p. 654) or “in our
brains” (Philosophy and Scientific Realism, p. 96).
Against the possibility of an empirical verification
of the claimed identity of an “inner experience”
with a correlated brain process, I urge what has
been called “the location problem.” To a previous
presentation of this criticism, it has been objected
that a mind-brain materialist could contend that the
putative identity holds between the event that con-
sists in a person’s having a certain experience and
the event that consists in his brain’s being in a cer-
tain state. Since neither of these events has location
in any clear sense, the location disparity is removed.
(See Jaegwon Kim, “On the Psycho-Physical Iden-
tity Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly
3, 1966, pp. 227-35.) It is true that someone could
adopt this view; and this shows that “the psycho-
physical identity theory” is not one theory, but a
collection of different theories or possible theories.
I have used the location argument solely against
Smart’s version of identity theory, to which it re-
mains a decisive objection. With regard to the dif-
ferent theory just mentioned, I should think two
things: first, that it is more artificial than Smart’s
theory, in the sense that it fails to embody the strong
Preface ix
temptation to think of experiences and mental phe-
nomena as “inner.” This temptation is a motive
force behind Smart’s theory and is, I believe, the
main source of its philosophical interest. Second, as
Kim points out {supra), this suggested version of
identity theory, for which location is not a problem,
would be faced with the equally severe difficulty of
explaining how it could be verified that the property
of, say, having an orange after-image, is (or is not)
contingently identical (that is, not logically equiva-
lent and not merely coextensive) with the property
of having a certain brain-state. The notion that these
two properties might turn out to be one and the same
property, despite their not being logically equiva-
lent, would seem to be as meaningless as is the
notion, in Smart’s theory, of verifying that an ex-
perience and a brain process have the same location
inside the skull.
In a recent book (A Materialist Theory of the
Mind, New York: Humanities Press, 1968) David
Armstrong argues in support of psycho-physical
identity theory by claiming (1) that the concept of
a mental state is the concept of an “ inner cause ’ ’ of
“outward behavior”; (2) that the inner cause of this
behavior is in fact a brain state; (3) that, therefore,
mental states are brain states. Unfortunately, I do
not have the space in this preface to explore these
contentions.
If I were writing Part II again, I should fix my
attention on the assumption called “The Principle
of Psycho-Physical Correspondence” or “The Prin-
