Primitive colors. A case study in neo-pragmatist metaphysics and philosophy of perception

248 Pages·2017·1.31 MB·English

by  Joshua Gert

Primitive Colors

Primitive Colors
A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist
Metaphysics and Philosophy
of Perception
Joshua Gert
1
3
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To my wife Victoria
who brings not only color to my life
but value as well

Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1. AnUnmysteriousColorPrimitivism 9
2. ColorPrimitivismandNeo-pragmatism 38
3. ARealisticColorRealism 56
4. AHybridView 87
5. ColorConstancy 125
6. RivalViews:EndowingObjectswithManyColors 145
7. FriendlierRivals:MakingColorExperienceMoreComplex 173
8. RepresentationalismandtheTransparencyofExperience 192
SummaryandConclusion 218
References 227
Index 233

Acknowledgments
A number of chapters of this book are modified versions of papers that have
appearedelsewhere.ChapterOneislargelytakenfrom“WhatColorsCouldNot
Be:AnArgumentforColorPrimitivism,”whichappearedinJournalofPhiloso-
phy 105, 3 (2008), 128–57. ChapterThree is a modified version of “A Realistic
ColorRealism,”whichwaspublishedinAustralasianJournalofPhilosophy84,4
(2006),565–89.ChapterFivewasfirstpublishedas“ColorConstancy,Complex-
ity, and Counterfactual,” in Noûs 44, 4 (2010), 669–90. And the first part of
ChapterSix is a modified version of “Crazy Relations,” which appeared in the
CroatianJournalofPhilosophy12,36(2012),315–30.Iamgratefultotheeditors
ofallthesejournalsforpermissiontoreusethismaterialhere.
Many of the chapters—including those mentioned above—benefitted greatly
from comments I received at conferences, from referees, and from other people
who did me the favor of reading drafts. With apologies to those who I am
forgetting, thanks to: Alex Byrne, Jonathan Cohen, Victoria Costa, Heather
Gert, C. L. Hardin, David Hilbert, Mark Kalderon, Mohan Matthen, Michael
McKenna,PaulKay,andMichaelWatkins.SpecialthankstoDerekBrownandto
KeithAllen,whosegenerousandcharitablecommentsonthewholemanuscript
significantly improved the final version. And thanks to Angela Mele, the artist
responsibleforthecover,forputtingupwithmyfussiness.
I am very grateful for the generous financial support I received from the
National Endowment for the Humanities. And, finally, I want to thank Joseph
Plumeriforhisremarkablecommitmentto,andencouragementof,thefacultyof
WilliamandMary.