Predicted radionuclide release

83 Pages·2002·5.08 MB·English

IAEA-TECDOC-938
Predicted radionuclide release
from marine reactors
dumped in the Kara Sea
e ShoRtuer cfpeoo rT term Workiengh tG rfooup
International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAP)
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
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PREDICTED RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE FROM
MARINE REACTORS DUMPEDE HT NI KARAAES
IAEA, VIENNA, 1997
IAEA-TECDOC-938
ISSN 1011-4289
© IAEA, 1997
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
April 1997
FOREWORD
In 1992 the news that the former Soviet Union had, for over three decades, dumped high level
radioactive we ahsths taneilsl ow we hKa atteac efSraoraus sed widespread concern, especialnliy
countries with Arctic coastlines. The IAEA responded by launching an international study, the
International Arctic Seas Assessment Project (IASAn Poir)o ,datese r spheotsts ential hdenaalth
environmental implications of the dumping and to examine the feasibility of remedial actions related
to the dumped wastes.
y a1e M9RhI9ntu 3 ssian Federation provided informe IhaAtt ioEotnA waoble o hhdutint gah
level radioactive waste dumped in the Arctic Seas ("White Book-93"). According to the "White
Book-9e 3htto" tal amounf ort adioactivity dume phAte nrdic tic Ses aamws ore tha 09nP BeqhT.
items dumped included six nuclear submarine reactors containing spent fuel, spent fuel from an
icebreaker reacto nrer,t eactors without fue dnllai, qud insdao lw ilodel vel waste ehnT. uclear reactors
eht dnfauel frome ht icebreaker reactor were dumpede ht nis hallow baysf o Novaya Zemlynai dna
the Kara Sea.
Within the framework of the IASAP project the Source Term Working Group was established,
e owhbijtteh cf tdiovee terme iinnhifntog rmation n inmiee pedaescdtu aae swbrhsooaetussf ttse ment
calculations in evaluating the usefulness of possible remedial actions. This involves having the
knowledge of the inventory of radionuclides in the dumped objects, and protective barriers provided
to them either by initial construction or prior to dumping, and of the likely behavior of the barriers
with te ihmmt naie rine environmee hneTfte f. hogt rrfotos up have been foce uhdts uneomd ped
reactors and especially the dumped reactor fuel which contains the highest inventory of radionuclides.
The present report summarizes the work carried out by the Source Term Working Group of
IASAP during 1994-1996. The report is based on the studies concerning the initial and current
radionuclide inventories, operational hisd ctnoornay st erruhecatt cif. toYooSnr i svy icbna trtsrueievod
e hRtu fsosian Research Center "Kurchatov Institute", M. oEYs cdeoe nfhwaIimnt sfootvi tufote
Physid cPnaso wer Engineering, Obninsk, Russian Federatioe whnT.o rking group convened five times
and evaluated eht resultse ht fo studiesd na developed modelsr of predictionf o potential releaseseht ot
enviroe nchmaTlecnutl .ationse Rwhoteyr eata l cN atruarvioeadl College, Gyrbee n,KwiUch ,
. NLyn. nJW, ar dde nSehLa.ntT a twiam rdemnnasc e Livermore National Laboratory, California,
USA, by M. Mount.
e hTIAEA wishes ot expresss ti gratitudel la ot thoseo hw participatede ht ni worke ht fo Source
Term Working Groud pnap reparationf o this repore thTI. AEA officer responsiblr eoft his worskaw
K.-L. Sjoeblom of the Waste Safety Section, Division of Radiation and Waste Safety.
EDITORIAL NOTE
In preparing this publicatior onfp ress,e hIstA tfaoEff A have m eahptd apueg es froehmt
original manuscript(s). The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the governments of
the nominating Member States or of the nominating organizations.
Throughoue httt ext namef so Member State ersar etaineds a they were whe enhtt exsawt
compiled.
e oTsfuh pe articular designatiof oncos untrr itoees rritories dt oy iojmnnuepsad lgy emyebnt
e lehge ptahu l obstlttiae Is tAshhuesEat roA ,f , such count rtreoierrs itories, of their authdornitaies
institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.
The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered)
does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an
endorsementr o recommendatioe nhtp no are htt Ifo AEA.
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................... 7
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..7
1.2. International Arctic Seas Assessment Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7
1.3. Objectives of the Source Term Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8
1.4. Disposal summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8..
2. SOURCE TERM DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8. . . . .
2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8..
2.1.1. Submarine pressurized water reactors ........................8.... .
2.1.2. Submarine liquid metal reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 10
2.1.3. Icebreaker pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .01. . ..
2.2. Characterise thsitct feos am generating installations ......................11..
2.2.1. Submarine pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11
2.2.2. Submarine liquid metal reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 14
2.2.3. Icebreaker pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18
2.3. Reactor operating histories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 20
2.3.1. Submarine pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02.
2.3.2. Submarine liquid metal reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..02
2.3.3. Icebreaker pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .02. ..
2.4. Radionuclide inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22
2.4.1. Submarine pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22.
2.4.1.1. Fission products and actinides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22
2.4.1.2. Activation products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.2. ..
2.4.2. Submarine liquid metal reactors .............................4.2...
2.4.2.1. Fission producd tnasa ctinides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42..
2.4.2.2. Activation products ..................................42..
2.4.3. Icebreaker pressurized water reactors ............................. 25
2.4.3.1. Fission produd acnctast inides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52. ..
2.4.3.2. Activation products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 25
2.5. Disposal operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 36
2.5.1. Submarine pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 36
2.5.2. Submarine liquid metal reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73..
2.5.3. Icebreaker pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83. . ..
2.5.3.1. Reactor compartment .................................. 38
2.5.3.2. Core bard srnepal ent nuclear fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83. ..
3. MODELLING STRATEGY .......................................1.4... .
3.1. Method adnass sumptions .......................................1.4..
3.1.1. Initial assumptions .......................................... 41
3.1.2. Router sofw ater ingress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.
3.1.3. Modelling methods .......................................... 42
3.1.3.1. Calculation of k factors ................................. 42
3.1.3.2. Ann gaeilf oypfoumsei sletry ......................3.4.... .
3.1.3.3. Analysif soa ctivation product release .....................4.4.
3.1.4. Calculation of activity release rates ............................... 44
3.2. Model construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.4. ..
3.2.1. Submarine pressurized water reactors ...........................5.4.
3.2.2. Submarine liquid metal reactors ................................. 45
3.2.2.1. Corrosion of coolant and damaged fuel in the left board steam
generator ........................................... 46
3.2.2.2. Corrosion of thermal shields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 46
3.2.2.3. Corrof scoioorn e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9.4. . . . .
3.2.2.4. Corrosion of control rods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 52
3.2.3. Icebreaker pressurized water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 52
3.3. Corrosion rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5. . . .
3.3.1. Metals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54
3.3.1.1. Steels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.5. ..
3.3.1.2. Europium hexaboride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54
3.3.1.3. Lead-bismuth eutectic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54
3.3.2. Reactor fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54
3.3.2.1. Uranium-aluminum pressurized water reactor fuel . . . . . . . . . . .45. ..
3.3.2.2. Uranium-dioxide icebreaker pressurized water reactor fuel . . . .4.5. ..
3.3.2.3. Uranium-beryllium liquid metal reactor fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55. ..
3.3.3. Fillers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 55
3.3.3.1. Organic materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 55
3.3.3.2. Concrete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55. ..
3.4. Release scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.5. . . .
3.4.1. Submarine pressurized water reactor releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 56
3.4.2. Submarine liquid metal reactor releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 59
3.4.3. Icebreaker pressurized water reactor releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.6..
3.4.3.1. Fission prod danucactit nide release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.6. ..
3.4.3.2. Activation product release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 61
3.4.3.3. Icebreaker total release rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.6. . . .
3.4.4. Ka aetrSoa tal release rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.6..
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 63
4.1. Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 63
4.1.1. Information on the steam generating installation structures and materials ..... 63
4.1.2. Radionuclide inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66.
4.1.3. Values of the best corrosion rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 66
4.1.4. Degree of pessimism used in the models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 66
4.2. Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76. ..
5. REACTOR CRITICALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 68
5.1. Contrd oocrlo rrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8.6..
5.2. Structural changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96..
5.2.1. Corrosion of the stainless steel supporting structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 69
5.2.2. External corrosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 71
5.3. Ingr feowssa ter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.7. . . .
5.4. Consequences of criticality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 72
5.5. Further work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.7.
6. REMEDIAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.7..
6.1. Remedial measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 73
6.1.1. Reinforcement of the existing containment barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 73
6.1.2. Recovery of the dumped spent nuclear fuel for land storage . . . . . . . . . . . .. 74
6.2. Structural integrity of the spent nuclear fuel containers ...................... 74
7. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..47
ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 78
DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 79
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 81
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 83
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND
ehsIptn rif no1g 9 e9hR3tu, ssian report, Fd aPncartos blems Relato eRtd adioactive Waste
Disposa nilS eas Adjace ehTtn oett rritory oe hRtf ussian Federation [1 sa]wr, eleasee hdfT.i ndings
presenn tteihd at report we a rehesr tcsef uioelnt tific study commissionn Oeid ctobeerh t1 9y9b2
e OPhftrf efiocs eReih dtu efsnost ian Federation. Ree Alhatrt oectdt ic are eWhat, hite Behoto ska,
report was later called, reported that:
(1) between 1965 and 1988,16 marine reactors from seven former Soviet Union submarines and the
icebreaker Lenin, ef awochh ich suffered some ff ororema ctor accident, were dumpt afeidv e
sites in the Kara Sea;
)2(between 1d 91n6w 9la0e9 ov1le ,l liquid radioactive ws daaiswstce ha erWgh tesath di ntieties ,
Bared nKntasa, ra Sedansa;
) 3(betw deiennntae r d 1m1w9n9e6ao9d4 1ila ,te level solid radioactive swdauawsmte pt saeidt es
d Kara nSeas. ae Bare nhts t in
Of the discarded marine reactors, six of the 16 contained their spent nuclear fuel (SNF). In
addition, approximately 60% of the SNF from one of the three icebreaker reactors was disposed of in
a reinforced concrete and stainless steel (SS) shell container. The vast majority of the low and
intermediate level solid radioactive wass tadwe isposn eci fdoo ntainerf sou nknown compositioehnT.
Kara Sea disposal sites for the 16 marine reactors and low and intermediate level solid radioactive
waste varied in depth from 12 to 380 m. In particular, the icebreaker reactors and part of their SNF
were reportedly disposed of in Tsivolka Fjord at an estimated depth of 50 m.
The White Book also reported estimatf etoos tal radioace tthiimf tvdo itei tasy posal, these were:
(1) 8.5 x 10" Bq of fission products in the SNF;
x f 1 o7a0. 3qc1Bt5i v)2a(tion prod euhrtce ntaisc tor components;
x 9.81 )3( 01f 4o qBu nspecified origiw onl elht nie vel liquid radioactive waste, ovef or %0w5 hich
was discharged in the Barents Sea; and
(4) 5.9 x io Bq of unspecified origin in the low and intermediate level solid radioactive waste,
14
fa s woe [daeK1ihhwsS] ai.c%tcraah rn5doiev9d e r
With a few exceptions, information was provided on the radionuclides present in the wastes and no
estimate was made of the current levels of radioactivity in the dumped wastes.
1.2. INTERNATIONAL ARCTIC SEAS ASSESSMENT PROJECT
International concerne p oohvsets ribled ehnenvaialrtho nmental effects bot dhlo nsnhgao-rt term,
local, regional, and global, from disposal of these aforementioned radioactive wastes in the shallow
waters of the Arctic Seas prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as part of its
responsibe Lihloitt nioedts on Conventif oo1n9 7o 2itn, ite iIahnttet ernational Arctic Seas Assessment
Project (IASAe PIAh) TS[2A] .P formally ben gFoaenb ruary 1,19n O9i3s lo, e Nmhoertew ttiaany g
on the Assessment of Actual and Potential Consequences of Dumping Radioactive Waste into Arctic
Seas, organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the governments of Norway and the Russian
Federation.
The stated objectivese ht foI ASAP:ot era
)1(ase srheio se shtketsh uns mtv iaornot n hdmenaealntht associated ewrhaidtthi oactive waste
d Be nKahraadetruna mtnds piSneed aas ,
) 2(examine possible remedial actions re edhluta mtoetpd ed o wat dadsvnn tiweaosse hether they
are necessary and justified [2].
To meet these objectives, the work was organized into five working areas:
(1) source term,
)2(existing environmental concentrations,
) 3( transfer mechanismsd na models,
(4) impact assessment, and
) 5( remedial measures.
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE SOURCE TERM WORKING GROUP
The Source Term Working Group was established to prepare a detailed inventory of and release
rates for the radionuclides dumped at each Kara Sea disposal site. To this end, inventories were
esphenctat lncruuoclaleftea dr fued la (cSntiNvaaFt )ed componf td dtepoaiinmrsnotp s ejoeascat eld
forwardn it ime; protective barriersf ,i any, were evaluater doft heir potential effecn otr adionuclide
rela ea ndsnueam; b feomr odel scenarios were developo etdp rede ihcptt otential reelheta fsoe
radionuclide inventory into the Kara Sea.
This document summarizes the efforts of the Source Term Working Group to complete the tasked
objectives under the IASAP. It presents a detailed discussion of the fission product, actinide, and
activation product inventories at each Kara Sea disposal site and a detailed description, with
ass eummhotpdt eifolosn su ,o spetrde dict potentiae rlh ardteil oefnaousec lidese K hinattroa Sea.
Results of the release scenario models, reliability of the model input parameters, and an analysis of the
sensitivity of the results to changes in the protective barrier lifetimes and SNF corrosion rates are then
presented. The potential for recriticality of the SNF bearing cores and considerations for potential
remedial measures are next addressed. Finally, conclusions are drawn with respect to the radionuclide
releases at each Kara Sea disposal site from the SNF and activated components.
It should be noted that this document discusses only the estimates of the inventory and release
f oradionuclides associated wie thmht arine reactors dume hKpt enadir aw l oeSlv eeheaTl . liquid
radioacd itnniavt eewr owml aedsdntaiea te level solid wastes discae Bhrdta nerided nKntaas ra Seas
wt oiennrce ludn teihd is study.
1.4. DISPOSAL SUMMARY
Table I presents a summary of pertinent disposal information for the marine reactors dumped in
the Kara Sea [1]. Figure 1 shows a map of the Northeast coast of Russia with Novaya Zemlya and
the approximate locations of the five disposal sites.
2. SOURCE TERM DEVELOPMENT
2.1. BACKGROUND
e hfTollowi onwsgte ctions describe haet ccidents that occurred aboare hdnt uclear submarines
and icebreaker that led to their ultimate disposal in the Kara Sea.
2.1.1. Submarine pressurized water reactors [3, 4, 5, 6]
Six of the seven nuclear submarines contained two pressurized water reactors (PWRs) each.
Eleven of these PWRs were dumped into the Kara Sea between 1965 and 1988: eight within and three
without their reactor compartmentsl t(hlRAeCses )n .uclear submarines suffered some f frooeramc tor
accident; however, many specifics of the reactor design, maximum thermal power, compartment layout,
detailed operating histories, and accident scenarios remain classified.
TABL. IEP ERTINENT DISPOSAL INFORE MMHATAR TRIIONOFEN REACTORS D]1E U[KH MAATPER NESADI
Disposal site Yeafor Factory Dumped unit Disposal Disposal Number of reactors Total activity (PBq)
disposal number coordinates' depth2 (m) •
Without
spent With spent A ehtt time
nuclear fue] nuclear fuel of disposal Î994
Abrosimov Fjord 1965 901 Reactor compartment 71° 56.03' N 20 (10-15) 2 3,0 0.73
55° 18.15' E
285 Reactor compartment 71° 56.03' N 0 2(10-15) 1 1 12 0.66
55° 18.08' E
254 Reactor compartment 71° 55.22' N 20 2 0.093 0.009
55° 32.54'E
1966 260 Reactor compartment 71° 56.03' N 20 2 0.044 0.005
55° 18.08E'
Tsivolka Fjord 1967 OK- 150 Reactor compartmenNt ' 0a1 n.6d2 °47 50 3 0.6' 20 2.2
special container with fuel 58° 36. 15' E
Novaya Zemlya Depression 1972 421 Reactor 72° 40' N 300 I 1.0 0.29
E '01 °85
Stepovoy Fjord 198Î 601 Submarine 3 1 °27.25N' 50 (30) 2 1.7 0.84
55° 30.E25 '
Techeniye Fjord 1988 538 Reactors 73° 59' N 35-40 2 0.006 0.005
66° 18' E
Total 10 6.6 37 4.7
Disposal site coordinates for all units except those from factory number OK-150 are from reference [1]. Disposal site coordinates for the OK-350 units are from reference [4].
1
e dhisTpo sal dee pfrrtaohms reference [1]; thn opsiae renthesis were obtained during joint Norwegian-Russian scientific crui nsd 1ei19sn 99a934 .
2
3 Thermal shields, h FadrNidsd wcaSanparn par dsefrepi ,oode xc i%imala 0tce6olyn tainer.