Table Of ContentPrecautionary Principle, Pluralism and Deliberation
Responsible Research and Innovation Set
coordinated by
Bernard Reber
Volume 4
Precautionary Principle,
Pluralism and Deliberation
Science and Ethics
Bernard Reber
First published 2016 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
Part 1. Pluralism between Ethics and Politics
in the Context of Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction to Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 1. Burdens of Judgment and Ethical
Pluralism of Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.1. The “burdens of judgment” at the root of the
“fact of reasonable pluralism” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2. Burdens of judgment: a critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2.1. Burdens of judgment: a starting point,
not an obstacle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2.2. The variable geometry of pluralisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3. Ethical pluralism of values, from relativism
to monism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4. Relativisms and commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4.1. Three types of relativism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.4.2. Commitments in response to values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5. Opposing monism: conditionality, incompatibility
and incommensurability of values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6. Conclusion: decompartmentalizing conflicts of values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
vi Precautionary Principle, Pluralism and Deliberation
Chapter 2. Ethical Pluralism of Ethical Theories
at the Heart of Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.1. Ordinary morality, anti-theory and skepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2. What is an ethical theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3. Main ethical theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4. Pluralism in practical reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4.1. Formal practical reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.2. Substantial practical reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5. Interactions between normative factors and
foundational normative theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.6. Conclusion: conflicts and deliberation in the
context of ethical theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Chapter 3. Deliberative Democracy Put to
the Test of Ethical Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.1. Participatory exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2. Rawls and Habermas: opposing views in
support of deliberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.1. Rawls: restricted ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2.2. Habermas: reliance on undefined arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3. Deliberating in a democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.4. Desperately seeking arguments… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.5. Conclusion: pluralism of moral and
political philosophers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Conclusion to Part 1: Mapping the “Should-be”
of the Public Sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Part 2. Ethical and Political Pluralism in a
Context of Precaution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Introduction to Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Chapter 4. Deciding on, and in, Uncertainty
Using the Precautionary Meta-principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.1. Careless criticisms of the precautionary principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.2. Precautionary principle: components and trigger factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.3. To act, or not to act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.4. Clashing scenarios and “grammars” of the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.5. Typology of political decisions in the context of uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.6. Conclusion: the deliberative as genre for uncertain futures . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Contents vii
Chapter 5. Between Sciences and Ethics:
A New Quarrel of Faculties? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.1. Scientists between attachment and independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.2. Politics of nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.3. The prominent role of values in paradigm changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.4. Relationships between scientific facts, epistemic
values and ethical values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.5. Conclusion: a Republic of Letters dealing
with facts and values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Chapter 6. Co-argumentation in a Context
of Disciplinary Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.1. Epistemic pluralism and competitive positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.2. Tensions and cooperation due to pluralism
internal and external to disciplines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.3. Types of argumentation and dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.4. Co-dependence between ethical argumentation
and scientific investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.5. Confrontation of hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.6. Conclusion: structuring of inter- and intra-disciplinary
pluralisms thanks to the precautionary meta-principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Preface
Responsibility should be central to the design of Responsible Research and
Innovation (RRI) strategies; in practice, however, this is not always the case.
Research work and practical applications often focus on separate elements or
constraints involved in RRI, or tracking projects prefiguring it, rather than
considering inquiries and solutions built upon the richness of moral responsibility.
Inquiry in this area may be empirical or normative or, better still, combine the best
elements from both reciprocal approaches.
Previous volumes in the Responsible Research and Innovation series have
addressed, seriously and confidently, the issue of responsibility from a variety of
angles, demonstrating the breadth and power of this concept. This diversity should not
be seen as a form of lazy ethical relativism, which is often implicit and makes the
concept of responsibility appear inaccessible. Like La Fontaine’s fox1, who scorned
the grapes hanging just out of reach, this appearance of inaccessibility may lead us to
disdain the notion of responsibility, the key element of RRI. In addition to obscuring
the very raison d’être of a research project, this type of cognitive dissonance uses
the existence of multiple interpretations of responsibility as a pretext to dismiss
the concept entirely, or for arbitrary adoption of a single viewpoint. In reality, the
diversity of interpretations demonstrates a high level of innovation in ethical terms.
Responsibility implies a certain freedom2, open to contingency and efficient3, which
should be used creatively in order to respond to new situations, contexts and technical
innovations transforming them. Moral responsibility should not be considered
synonymous with obedience, compliance, repetition or indiscriminate application.
1 In La Fontaine’s fable, The Fox and the Grapes, a hungry fox attempts to eat grapes from a
vine, but cannot reach them. Not wishing to admit defeat, he declares the grapes to be under-
ripe, “good only for fools”. This is the source of the English phrase “sour grapes”.
2 See Robert Gianni [GIA 16].
3 See Virgil Cristian Lenoir [LEN 15].
x Precautionary Principle, Pluralism and Deliberation
The intrinsic nature of responsibility has not always been so easily forgotten, and
was not (as so often happens) limited to faulty and impotent rhetoric expressed in
programs, platforms or the media. Responsibility has been used as a principle for
political action, as original and promising with its potential displayed on the
international stage. Promoted and defended by the European Union, this notion of
responsibility was embodied in the form of the precautionary principle. This meta-
principle, encapsulating several other principles, presents a significant advantage, in
that it can be applied to, and used to connect, a wide variety of domains such as the
sciences, ethics, politics and economics. As the principle took off, it was subject to a
variety of interpretative controversies and attacks, due to the way in which it disrupted
existing modes of operation and, in some cases, established a new order. Enemies of
the precautionary principle included a number of states, who attacked it in arenas such
as the World Trade Organization; philosophers, opposed to a caricatured version of the
principle; and, ironically, certain thurifers of the precautionary principle, who damaged
its reputation by indiscriminate and unsuitable applications.
The purpose of this book is to provide a thorough and balanced examination of the
precautionary principle, considering its huge potential to express responsibility in the
fields of research and innovation. The precautionary principle has a key part to play in
the face of the most disruptive innovations. It is one of the most creative innovations
for implementing responsibility in response to new fears surrounding environmental
resilience or emerging technologies. It also constitutes one of the most original and
well-received proposals of the European Union. RRI owes a certain debt to this
institution, and still has a lot to learn from the precautionary principle4. In this work,
we shall consider the ethics of the principle of responsibility.
The goal of this work is not simply to improve this meta-principle. We shall
consider its interactions with ethical pluralism and with ethical and political
deliberations, argumentation in context, and the challenges presented by the
interdisciplinary approach5 in an uncertain climate. Taken separately, each problem
extends the intention of this book outside of the sphere of RRI. Similarly, these
problems need to be solved theoretically before any relevant practical application can
be envisaged. A beneficial interplay also exists between practical and theoretical
considerations; however, if these problems are not carefully considered from a
theoretical perspective at the outset, application and, subsequently, standardization are
impossible, whether in the field of research or innovation.
4 Another work, soon to be published, that will come back and take a different approach to
the precautionary principle is Dratwa [DRA XX].
5 In this series, Armin Grunwald [GRU 17], will provide a different approach to the problem
of interdisciplinarity in conjunction with ethical dimensions. The problem was also mentioned
and discussed in Virgil Cristian Lenoir [LEN 15].
Preface xi
In this book, we shall consider a number of issues, centering on the collaborative
choice of innovations and technologies, which will define the future of our world,
and the way in which these worlds are to be evaluated in a context of scientific
uncertainty and ethical indetermination, due to the existence of ethical pluralism.
We shall begin by considering the famous Valladolid controversy concerning
colonization of the New World. At present, we must consider a different form of
“colonization of new worlds”, not in terms of occupying territories, but rather in
terms of a variety of possible futures for our shared planet. An alternative title for
this book might be Deliberations on the Best Possible Worlds.
These core aspects of RRI must be taken seriously. Following over 30 years of
experiments in the field of Participatory Technology Assessment (PTA)6, the time
has now come to establish a more coherent version; the same may be said of RRI,
which, in some ways, follows on from PTA. The existence of the PTA concept is
laudable, and it offers perspectives on the potential offered by reasoned and careful
development of RRI.
Whilst RRI promotes the participation of interested parties or citizens,
anticipative governance7 and due consideration of ethics, a number of theoretical
and practical issues still need to be resolved. Although some of these issues have
been considered in the context of PTA, no satisfactory solutions have been found.
This set of problems, which includes scientific, ethical, political and economic
dimensions, may be summarized in the form of a question:
How can we deliberate together, on the basis of preliminary
assessments taken from a large number of actors with different
and contrasting abilities and expertise (because we include the
participation of ordinary citizens, experts and stakeholders), following
guidelines taken from democratic theories, concerning issues
centering on innovative and controversial technologies with the
potential to cause serious and/or irreversible damage?
6 See, for example, Reber [REB 11b], which provides an in-depth bibliography and an
analysis of this type of debate. The book provides methods for describing problems linked to
the implementation of PTA and for evaluating procedures and experiments, and may be seen
as a companion volume to the present work, which addresses certain theoretical problems in
relation to PTA and RRI. This work is intended to contribute to a form of institutional design,
and to provide elements of a model for ethical learning.
7 A forthcoming book by Marc Maesschalck in the same Responsible Research and
Innovation set will go into considerable detail concerning the question of governance. This
area has also been discussed by Robert Gianni [GIA 16] and [PEL 16].
xii Precautionary Principle, Pluralism and Deliberation
In more philosophical terms, the issue may be expressed as follows:
Deliberate using different ethical justifications (taking into account
elements of applied ethics, ethical theories and meta-ethical options)
and different political theories, also taking account of natural and
engineering sciences, and their associated disciplines, with their fields
of relevance (and thus their implicit exclusions), and their modalities of
producing proof and addressing uncertainty.
In this book, we shall consider the difficulties associated with the burden of
judgment and with ethical disagreements, along with the cohabitation of scientific
and ethical arguments, in order to find the best possible balance as a basis for
political decisions. Several types of agreement and disagreement shall be
considered, alongside paths to follow for conflict resolution; these paths are different
to those used by the majority of philosophers, political sociologists and economists,
who tend to take a macro-social, general approach. We aim to provide a new
contribution to the in-depth study of the precautionary principle as a tool to structure
decision in interdisciplinary contexts, in order to attain the very new world, a new
world which is very different to that described in Aldous Huxley’s dystopian novel
Brave New World8.
In Part I, we shall employ the hypothesis used by Socrates in Euthyphron that the
world of science is stable, unlike the world of ethics, which may differ from one
person to the next and change friends into enemies. This ancient hypothesis is still
applicable today, in a context where expertise in the field of ethics is often implicitly
de-legitimate. We wish to refute this objection. We aim to move beyond the
“epistemic abstinence” encountered in most contemporary political theories,
justified by arguments based on Rawlsian theories of the burdens of judgment,
because they are under-determined in relation to the argumentation requirement.
Examples of this approach include the work of Habermas and the key tenets of the
theory of deliberative democracy.
We defend an ethical pluralism, a “third way” clearly distinct from relativism
and monism. We shall provide an overview of the ethical pluralism of ethical
theories, not simply of the pluralism of values. These pluralisms will be replaced in
the context of a dialogical and interdisciplinary theory of argumentation.
In the second part of the book, moving from prevention to precaution, our
approach follows that of Le rationalisme qui vient9, in which the sciences are
considerably less “certain” than we might think. The problems discussed previously
8 [HUX 06].
9 See Saint-Sernin [SAI 07].
