Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will (Minnesota Publications in the Humanities, V. 4)

316 Pages·1984·18.12 MB·English

by  Norman O. Dahl

Practical Reason, Aristotle,
and Weakness of the Will
Minnesota Publications in the Humanities, Volume Four
A series of books published with
the financial assistance of the Graduate School
and the College of Liberal Arts of
the University of Minnesota.
Practical Reason,
Aristotle,
and Weakness
of the Will
Norman O. Dahl
University of Minnesota Peress Minneapolis
Copyright © 1984 by the University of Minnesota
All rights reserved.
Published by the University of Minnesota Press,
2037 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, MN 55414
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Dahl, Norman O.
Practical reason, Aristotle, and weakness of the
will.
(Minnesota publications in humanities; v. 4)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Aristotle — Ethics. 2. Ethics —History.
3. Reason-History. I. Title.
B491.E7D33 1984 171'.3 83-14845
ISBN 0-8166-1245-5
ISBN 0-8166-1246-3 (pbk.)
The University of Minnesota is an equal-opportunity educator and employer.
To my father,
and in memory of
my mother
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Contents
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 3
Part One Practical Reason and Aristotle
Chapter 1 A Statement of the Problem 11
Section I The Nature of Practical Reason 11
Section II The Scope of Practical Reason 17
Section HI Does Aristotle's Ethics
Rest on Practical Reason? 20
Chapter 2 Aristotle and Hume: A Preliminary Contrast 23
Section I Action as a Result of Appetite 25
Section II Action as a Result of Desire and Deliberation 25
Section III The Practical Syllogism 26
Section IV A Preliminary Contrast 29
Chapter 3 Reason and General Ends 35
Section I Reason Apprehends the Ends of Action 37
Section II Universal Ends Acquired by Induction:
The Role of Nous in Practical Affairs 41
Section HI Apprehending vs. Acquiring Ends 45
Section IV A Sketch of a Theory 48
Section V Objections 50
vii
viii CONTENTS
Chapter 4 The Pervasiveness of Aristotle's Views on
Practical Reason 61
Section I Practical Wisdom and Virtue 62
Section II Excellence in Deliberation 66
Section III Nature and the End of Action (NE 1114bl6-25) 68
Section IV Aristotle's Methodology in Ethics and Politics 70
Chapter 5 The Apparent Support for the Humean Position 74
Section I Deliberation Is about Means 74
Section II Virtue Preserves First Principles 82
Section III Phronesis Provides One with
the Right Means, Arete with the Right Ends 85
Chapter 6 A Summary of the Argument 93
Chapter 7 The Interest of Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason:
Happiness and the Good Relative to Human Beings 100
Section I Happiness as the End of Action 101
Section II The Good as Fulfilling the Ergon of
Human Beings Well 107
Section III The Good for Human Beings and the Good
Human Being: Their Connection 113
Chapter 8 Does Aristotle's Position on Practical Reason Provide
an Adequate Basis for Ethics? 119
Section I Initial Objections 120
Section II The Incompleteness of Aristotle's Position 123
Section III Objectivity Once More 135
Part Two Aristotle and Weakness of the Will
Chapter 9 The Traditional Interpretation:
Some Problems and Preliminaries 139
Section I The Traditional Interpretation 140
Section II Some Problems for the Traditional Interpretation 142
Part A A Minor Worry and Its Solution 142
Part B Three Apparently Incompatible Passages 144
Part C Practical Reason and Weakness of the Will:
Another Problem 146
Section HI The Seriousness of These Problems 149
Section IV Variations of the Traditional Interpretation 150
Section V A Methodological Problem 154
CONTENTS ix
Chapter 10 An Argument for the Traditional Interpretation 156
Section I A Thesis about Knowledge and Action 157
Section II Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia 162
Section III The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia 165
Part A The Details According to the Traditional
Interpretation 166
Part B Objections to the Traditional Interpretation 168
Part C Replies to the Objections 172
Part D The Greatest Stumbling Block for Anyone Denying the
Traditional Interpretation 179
Section IV Solutions to the Problems Raised for the Traditional
Interpretation 181
Section V A Summary of the Argument 185
Chapter 11 An Argument for an Alternative Interpretation 188
Section I Conflicts of Motive and Akrasia 189
Section II The Thesis about Knowledge and Action
Reconsidered 194
Section III Aristotle's General Approach to Akrasia 201
Section IV The Details of Aristotle's Explanation of Akrasia 204
Section V Two Final Objections 212
Section VIA Summary 215
Concluding Remarks 219
Appendix I NE 1143a35-b5 227
Appendix II De Anima 434al2-15 237
Part A Difficulties in Translation and Interpretation 238
Part B Alternative Interpretations 240
Part C Akrasia as Involving a Conflict of Motives 243
Notes 249
Bibliography 287
General Index 295
Index of Aristotelian Passages 298