Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action

263 Pages·2003·1.2 MB·English

by  William G. Howell

POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION

POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION
THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION
William G. Howell
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD
Copyright (cid:2) 2003 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press,
3 Market Place, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1SY
All Rights Reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Howell, William G.
Power without persuasion : the politics of direct presidential action / William G.
Howell.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-691-10269-4 (acid-free paper) — ISBN 0-691-10270-8 (pbk. : acid-free paper)
1. Executive orders—United States. 2. Executive power—United States.
3. Presidents—United States. I. Title.
KF5053.H68 2003
352.23(cid:3)5(cid:3)0973—dc21 2003048607
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
This book has been composed in Palatino
Printed on acid-free paper. (cid:2)
www.pupress.princeton.edu
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
ISBN-13: 978-0-691-10270-2 (pbk.)
ISBN-10: 0-691-10270-8 (pbk.)
For Marcy

Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Preface xiii
1. Presidential Power in the Modern Era 1
2. A Formal Representation of Unilateral Action 24
3. Bridge Building 55
4. Theory Testing 76
5. Congressional Constraints on Presidential Power 101
6. The Institutional Foundations of Judicial Deference 136
7. Conclusion 175
Appendixes
1. Coding of Executive Orders 189
2. Proofs of Propositions in the Unilateral Politics Model 192
3. Identifying Congressional Challenges to Executive Orders 196
4. Federal Court Challenges to Executive Orders 198
Notes 203
Bibliography 219
Index 231

List of Figures
2.1 Sequence of Play in the Unilateral Politics Model 29
2.2 Median Legislator’s Ability to Shift the Status Quo 34
2.3 Equilibrium Outcomes, Fixing Discretionary
Parameter 36
2.4 Equilibrium Outcomes, Allowing the Discretionary
Parameter to Vary 38
2.5 Divergent Preferences of Current and
Enacting Congresses 39
2.6 Interval II Strategies 44
3.1A Gridlock Politics Scenario 56
3.1B Preemptive Politics Scenario 58
3.1C Deadlock Politics Scenario 61
3.1D Presidential Forfeiture Scenario 63
3.2A Expansion of Gridlock Interval 66
3.2B Calculating the Effects of an Expanding Gridlock
Inverval on Presidential Policy Making 67
3.3 Impact of Divided and Unified Government on
Presidential Policy Making 72
4.1 Executive Order Time-Series 84
4.2 Number of Significant Executive Orders Issued in
Post-War Era 88
6.1 Court Challenges by Policy Area, 1942–1998 153
6.2 Frequency of Order Challenges, 1942–1998 154
6.3 Challenge Outcomes by Administration Defending
Order, 1942–1998 156