Power in the global information age: from realism to globalization

240 Pages·2004·0.96 MB·English

by  Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Power in the Global
Information Age
“Astheseessaysdemonstrate,JosephS.Nyecombinesclear-sightedrealismabout
powerwithanuncannysenseforemergingglobaltrends–frominterdependence
to ‘soft power.’ His insights on turning theory into ethically purposeful practice
makethisbooka‘must’forstudentsofworldpolitics.”
RobertO.Keohane,DukeUniversity,USA
JosephS.NyeJr. hasbeenoneofthemostbrilliantandinfluentialinternational
relationsscholarsofhisgenerationandoneofthefewacademicstohaveserved
at the very highest levels of US government. This book collects together many
ofhiskeywritingsforthefirsttimeaswellassomeimportantnewmaterialand
a concluding essay, which examines the relevance of international relations in
practicalpolicymaking.Itcontainsessaysoncoreissuessuchas:
• America’spost-ColdWarroleininternationalaffairs
• hardandsoftpower
• theethicsofforeignpolicy
• interdependence
• theinformationrevolution
• globalization
• governance
• terrorism
ThisuniquevolumeisessentialreadingforallthosewithaninterestinAmerican
foreignpolicyandinternationalrelations.
Joseph S. Nye Jr. is Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government.
ProfessorNyehasbeenonthefacultyatHarvardsince1964,duringwhichtime
healsoservedasAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforInternationalSecurityAffairs,
Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Assistant Secretary of State for
SecurityAssistance,ScienceandTechnology.

Power in the Global
Information Age
From realism to globalization
Joseph S. Nye Jr.
Firstpublished2004
byRoutledge
11NewFetterLane,LondonEC4P4EE
SimultaneouslypublishedintheUSAandCanada
byRoutledge
29West35thStreet,NewYork,NY10001
RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.
©2004JosephS.NyeJr.forselectionandeditorialmatter,
essaysasdetailedintheacknowledgements.
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereprintedorreproducedor
utilisedinanyformorbyanyelectronic,mechanical,orothermeans,now
knownorhereafterinvented,includingphotocopyingandrecording,orin
anyinformationstorageorretrievalsystem,withoutpermissioninwriting
fromthepublishers.
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Acatalogrecordforthisbookhasbeenrequested
ISBN 0-203-50729-0 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-57505-9 (Adobe eReader Format)
ISBN0–415–70016–7(hbk)
ISBN0–415–70017–5(pbk)
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
1 Hardandsoftpower 1
PART1
Thepowerandlimitsofrealism 11
2 Oldwarsandfuturewars:causationandprevention 13
1988
3 Neorealismandneoliberalism 21
1988
4 ConflictsaftertheColdWar 35
1995
PART2
America’shardandsoftpower 51
5 Thechangingnatureofworldpower 53
1990
6 Softpower 68
1990
7 TheinformationrevolutionandAmericansoftpower 81
2002
8 ThenewRomemeetsthenewbarbarians 97
2002
vi Contents
PART3
Ideasandmorality 103
9 Nationalism,statesmen,andthesizeofAfricanstates 105
1975
10 Theethicsofforeignpolicy 115
1985
11 NPT:thelogicofinequality 145
1985
PART4
Interdependence,globalization,andgovernance 151
12 Independenceandinterdependence 153
1976
13 Transgovernmentalrelationsandinternationalorganizations 171
WITH ROBERTO.KEOHANE,1975
14 Globalization:what’snew?what’snot?(andsowhat?) 191
WITH ROBERTO.KEOHANE,2000
15 Globalization’sdemocraticdeficit:howtomake
internationalinstitutionsmoreaccountable 201
2001
16 Terrorism 206
2003
PART5
Praxisandtheory 215
17 Essayoncareerchoice 217
Index 225
Acknowledgments
Theauthorandpublisherswouldliketothankthefollowingforgrantingpermission
toreproducematerialinthiswork:
MassachusettsInstituteofTechnologyPressJournalsforpermissiontoreproduce
Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘Old wars and future wars: causation and prevention’, The
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (Spring 1988). Copyright 1988 by
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of
InterdisciplinaryHistory.
Johns Hopkins University Press for permission to reproduce ‘Neorealism and
neoliberalism’ by Joseph S. Nye Jr., World Politics vol. XL, no. 2 (January
1988).
MassachusettsInstituteofTechnologyPressJournalsforpermissiontoreproduce
Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘Conflicts after the Cold War’, The Washington Quarterly
19:1(Winter1996).Copyright1995bytheCenterforStrategicandInternational
Studies(CSIS)andtheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘The changing nature of power in world politics’ reproduced
withpermissionfromPoliticalScienceQuarterly105:2(Summer1990).
JosephS.NyeJr.,‘Softpower’reproducedwithpermissionfromForeignPolicy
#80 (Fall 1990). Copyright 1990 by Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
TaylorandFrancis(www.tandf.co.uk/journals)forpermissiontoreproduce‘The
information revolution and American soft power’ by Joseph S. Nye Jr., Asia-
PacificReview(2002)vol.9no.1.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘The new Rome meets the new barbarians’ reproduced with
permissionfromTheEconomist,March2002.
Harvard University Press for permission to reproduce ‘Nationalism, statesmen,
andthesizeofAfricanStates’NewStatesintheModernWorld,MartinKilson
ed.(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1975).
Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘Ethics and foreign policy’ reproduced with permission from
TheAspenQuarterly,1985.
JosephS.NyeJr.,‘NPT:thelogicofinequality’reproducedwithpermissionfrom
ForeignPolicy#59(Summer1985).Copyright1985byCarnegieEndowment
forInternationalPeace.
viii Acknowledgments
JosephS.NyeJr.,‘Independenceandinterdependence’reproducedwithpermis-
sion from Foreign Policy #22 (Spring 1976). Copyright 1976 by Carnegie
EndowmentforInternationalPeace.
JohnsHopkinsUniversityPressforpermissiontoreproduce‘Transgovernmental
relationsandinternationalorganizations’byRobertO.KeohaneandJosephS.
NyeJr.,WorldPolitics(October1974).
RobertO.KeohaneandJosephS.NyeJr.,‘Globalization:what’snew?what’snot?
(andsowhat?)’reproducedwithpermissionfromForeignPolicy#118(Spring
2000).Copyright2000byCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace.
JosephS.NyeJr.,‘Globalization’sdemocraticdeficit’reproducedwithpermission
fromForeignAffairs80:4(July/August2001).Copyright2001bytheCouncil
onForeignRelations.
1 Hard and soft power
Internationalpoliticshaslongbeendescribedintermsofstatesseekingpowerand
securityinananarchicworld.Statesformalliancesandbalancethepowerofothers
inordertopreservetheirindependence.Traditionally,wespokeofstatesasunitary
rationalactors.“FrancealliedwithBritainbecauseitfearedGermany.”Therewas
littleroomformoralityoridealism–orforactorsotherthanstates.WhenIfirst
studiedthesubject, toweringfigureslikeE.H.CarrandHansMorgenthauwere
warningagainstthemisguidedidealismthathadhelpedproducethecatastrophes
ofthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury.1
Asafirstapproximationinmostsituations,thesimplepropositionsofrealismare
stillthebestmodelswehavetoguideourthinking.ThatiswhyIstartthiscollection
of essays with three essays on the power and limits of realism. Realist models
are parsimonious, intuitive, sometimes historically grounded, and often provide
useful rules of thumb for policy makers. For example, when I was responsible
forEastAsianpolicyintheClintonAdministrationDefenseDepartment,Irelied
partlyonrealismtohelpredesignaflounderingpolicy.Atthattime,manypeople
consideredtheUS–JapansecuritytreatytobeanobsoleterelicoftheColdWar.
Unlike Europe, where a web of institutions had knit previous enemies together,
EastAsianstateshadnevercomefullytotermswiththepoliticsofthe1930s,and
mistrustwasstrong. SomeAmericansfearedJapanasaneconomicrival; others
fearedtheriseofChinesepower,andfeltthattheUnitedStatesshouldplaythetwo
againsteachother. StillothersurgedthecontainmentofChinabeforeitbecame
toostrong.
AsIlookedatthethree-countryEastAsianbalanceofpower,itseemedlikely
that it would eventually evolve into two against one. By reinforcing rather than
discarding the US–Japan security alliance, the United States could ensure that
it was part of the pair rather than be isolated. From that position of strength,
the Americans could afford to engage China economically and socially and see
whether such forces would eventually transform China. Rather than turning to
militarycontainment, whichwouldconfirmChinaasanenemy, theUSpursued
engagementwhileitconsolidateditsalliancewithJapaninthetriangularbalance,
secure in the knowledge that if engagement failed to work, there was a strong
fallback position.2 This strategy involved elements of liberal theory about the