Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion

285 Pages·1985·10.26 MB·English

by  James DeNardo

Power in Numbers

JAMES DENARDO
Power in Numbers
The Political Strategy of Protest
and Rebellion
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
Copyright © 1985 by Princeton University Press
Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey
All Rights Reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last
printed page of this book
ISBN 0-691-07682-0
Publication of this book has been aided by the Whitney Darrow Fund
of Princeton University Press
This book has been composed in Monotype Times Roman
Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper,
and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability
Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey
For Dad and Carol

CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS IX
FOREWORD, BY PHILIP CONVERSE XI
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XV
INTRODUCTION 3
ONE. History and Strategy in Theories of Revolution 8
TWO. A Formal Model o'f Protest and Rebellion 33
Appendix A. A Note on the Free-Rider Problem 52
THREE. The Logic of Peaceful Protest 58
Appendix B. Strategy-Potential Curves 83
FOUR. Pragmatists and Purists 87
FIVE. Reformers and Revolutionaries 106
six. Moderates and Radicals 124
SEVEN. Organization and Strategy 144
EIGHT. Repression 154
NINE. The Political Strategy of Violent Disruption 188
TEN. The Logic of Terrorism 229
ELEVEN. Violence and Factionalism 243
INDEX 265

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Fig. 2.1 A Typical Regime's Responsiveness Map 38
Fig. 2.2 Responsive and Unresponsive Regimes 40
Fig. 2.3 Ideological Recruiting 44
Fig. 2.4 Organizational Recruiting 46
Fig. 2.5 The Political Environment Confronting Dissident
Leaders 48
Fig. 2.6 Construction of Mobilization Curves 49
Fig. 2.7 Outcomes under Sincere and Compromising Strategies 50
Fig. 3.1 The Logic of Withdrawing from the Streets 64
Fig. 3.2 Radical Demands Never Outmobilize Moderate
Demands 70
Fig. 3.3 A Family of Mobilization Curves 70
Fig. 3.4 When a Strategy Succeeds, So Do More Moderate
Strategies 71
Fig. 3.5 The Moderation Rule 73
Fig. 3.6 Locating the Optimal Demand 75
Fig. 3.7 The Boundary Strategy 77
Fig. 3.8 The Advantage of Flexible Strategies 78
Fig. 3.9 The Optimal Peaceful Strategy 80
Fig. 3.10 Flexible Strategies Outperform Steadfast Strategies 81
Fig. 3.11 Strategy-Potential Curves 85
Fig. 4.1 The Purist Pattern of Preference 91
Fig. 4.2 The Pragmatist Pattern of Preference 92
Fig. 4.3a The Purist's Evaluation of Strategies 94
Fig. 4.3b The Pragmatist's Evaluation of Strategies 95
Fig. 4.4 Strategic Disputes between Pragmatists and Purists 96
Fig. 4.5 Dynamics of Factional Discord 97
Fig. 5.1 The Revolutionary Threshold 107
Fig. 5.2 The Revolutionary Outlook 108
Fig. 5.3 The Dangers of Using Reformist Means to Pursue
Revolutionary Ends 118
Fig. 6.1 The Moderate's Evaluation of Strategies 126
Fig. 6.2 Factional Alignments between Moderates and Radicals 132
Fig. 8.1 Cardinal Utility Functions for Pragmatists and Purists 157
Fig. 8.2 Attractive Sets 160
Fig. 8.3 The Eifects of Escalating Repression 164
Fig. 8.4 Calculating Spans of Support 167
Fig. 8.5a Ideological Recruiting under Repression (Pragmatists) 170