Postprint - University of Warwick

16 Pages·2011·0.14 MB·English

The Soviet Economy in the 1920s and 1930s*
MarkHarrison**
InthehistoryofSovietstudiesinBritain,Marxistideasandinfluenceshavealways
beenanundercurrent.Thisundercurrenthassometimesactedasapositiveforce;
sometimesithasbeenmerelyargumentativeandfactitious.Butithasnever
escapeditssubordinacy.
IndividualMarxistshaveworkedinisolation,reliantupontheresearch,the
formulationsandthegoodwillofnon-Marxistcolleagues.Forthemostpartthe
influenceofMarxismhasbeendeflected,absorbedorcontained.
Thus,inexaminingtheBritishfieldtoday,amongthemostimportantquestions
arethehealthandstrengthofbourgeoisscholarship,andtheprospectsfor
developingacreativeMarxisttendencycapableoftranscendingitspast“moraland
intellectual”encirclement.
Hereoneclarificationisnecessary.IhavereferredtothepositioninBritain,but
thelinksbetweenEnglishandAmericanscholarshiparemanyandobvious.Isthere,
infact,aspecifically“British”Sovietstudies?TheinternationalisationofSoviet
studieshasproceededalongway,butitisfarfromcomplete.Whilelanguage
barriers,whichseparateBritishfromItalian,FrenchorGermanwork,donotinhibit
theemergenceofan“Anglo-American”enterprise,theverydifferentpolitical
conjuncturescontinuetodistinguishthebalanceoftendenciesinBritainandNorth
America.AndImustmakeitclearthatformeBritainis“here”andNorthAmericais
“overthere”.Icanonlywriteaboutthisrelationshipfrommyownexperienceand
knowledge,andinevitablymyperceptionoftheinfluencesemanatingfrom“over
there”willbeincomplete.
Finally,Ishallseektoexamineanumberofpositivedevelopmentsinthestudy
oftheinter-warSovieteconomyanditssocialisttransformation,andIshallcover
thedecadewhichbeganin1966.Thisdecadehasaspecialsignificance.Itbegan
withthepublicationofthelast,sixtheditionofMauriceDobb’sSovietEconomic
Developmentsince1917,andfinishedwithhisdeath.If,asIshallargue,thelast
decadehasbeenoneoftransition,Dobbwasacentralfigureinthatprocess.
*ThispaperwaseventuallypublishedinItaliantranslationas“L’economia
sovieticaneglianni’20e’30”inStudiStorici18:3(1977),pp.25-40,and
subsequentlyinEnglishinCapital&Class2:2(1978),pp.78-94.
**LecturerinEconomics,UniversityofWarwick,Coventry,England.Theauthor
isamemberoftheCommitteeforStudyoftheEuropeanSocialistCountriesofthe
CommunistPartyofGreatBritain.Heisgratefultoanumberofscholarswhohave
kindlyallowedhimtorefertotheirunpublishedwork.Theviewsexpressedbythe
authorarehispersonalresponsibility,asareanyerrorsoffact,interpretationor
omission.
2
Thesocialisttransformationoftheeconomy
Thequestionof“primaryaccumulation”
FormanyyearsitwasconsideredthattheOctoberrevolution,indestroyingthe
economyofthegreatlandlordsandkulaksin1917-1918,haddestroyedtheability
ofagriculturetoproduceasurplus.Theredistributionoflandtotheruralpoor,and
theconsequentre-emergenceofamassive“middle”peasantry,meantthattherural
populationconsumedmoreofitsownproduction,andsoldlesstothetowns.The
authorityforthisviewwasnolessthanStalin.1Intheconditionsofthe1920s,Soviet
industrycouldnotgrowbeyondthelimitsofitspre-revolutionarydevelopment
withoutre-establishinganenlargedflowoffoodstuffs(especiallygrain)and
industrialcropsfromagriculturetofeedexpandingindustrialproductionand
employment.
Accordingtotheconventionalview,thisenlargedflow,or“tribute”,wasre-
establishedthroughthecollectivisationofagriculturein1929-1930,andthe
enforceddeliveryofcollective-farm“surpluses”tothestateatverylowprices.2In
thisway,itwasheld,Stalinhadcarriedoutthestrategyofprimarysocialist
accumulationadvocatedbytheTrotskyisteconomistPreobrazhensky(althoughby
meansofacoerciveforcenotenvisagedbyPreobrazhenskyhimself).3.
Thustheprimaryaccumulationofthesocialistsectorinthe1930shadbeenat
theexpenseofthepeasantry.Thecrude—buteffective—methodofforced
collectivisationhadfinancedSovietindustrialgrowth.
Recentworkhaslargelydiscreditedthissystemofviews.Intermsofagricultural
productionitisnowacceptedthatthe1920shadseenacon-siderableimprovement
incropyields,andindiversificationawayfromagrainmonoculture.AmongSoviet
historiansbothMoshkovandBarsovhavearguedthattherevolutionaryland
distribution,andtherevivalofthemiddlepeasantry,mayhavedestroyedthesemi-
feudalestatesandthemoredevelopedsmall-capitalistfarms—buttheyalsomade
possibleamoreproductivepeasantagriculture.(Moshkov1966,pp.19-24;Barsov
1Hisspeech“OntheGrainFront”of1928wastranslated,forexample,inStalin
1940,oneofanumberofselectionsthroughwhichhiswritingsbecameknownto
theBritishpublic.Morerecentlythisviewhasbeensupported,withvarying
reservations,byDobb1966,pp.216-217,Lewin1968,pp.176-177,Strauss1969,
p.84.CarrandDavies1974,p.971.
2AmongCommunistsasomewhatcriticalacceptanceofthisthesishasbecome
thenorm.SeeforexamplePollit1972,Dunman1975,p.123.
3Millar,n.d.suggeststhatthepopularisationofthisvieworiginatedwithErlich
1950.SeealsoErlich1960,Spulber1964,Dobb1965.Preobrazhensky’s1926was
publishedatthistimeinEnglishtranslation(byBrianPearce)asTheNewEconomics.
OneofthemostcriticalanalysesofthetraditionaltypewasthatofMandel1968,
pp.553-554.
3
1969,pp.22-3).4ThisviewisreflectedinthemostrecentEnglishwork(Cooper,
DaviesandWheatcroft,n.d.).
Intermsofagriculturemarketingstothestateandtheurban-industrialsector,
therehasbeensomecontroversy.Didthepeasantagricultureofthe1920sreally
marketmuchlesstothetownsthanthepre-revolutionaryagrarianstructure?Or
wasthisaStalinistfalsification?Wouldithavebeensodifficulttoraisethelevelof
marketingsthroughasystemofpriceincentivesofthetypeadvocatedbyBukharin
(Karcz1967;Davies1970;Karcz1970)?Fromtoday’sstandpointitispossibleto
suggestanumberoftentativeconclusions.
Firstly,theSovietpeasantrybeforecollectivisationprobablywasmarketingless
grain(CarrandDavies1974).Butitwasmarketingmoreofotheragricultural
products,becauseitwasproducingmore.Thedeclineingrainmarketing,although
serious,wasprobablynotcausedbythediminishedroleofkulakandlarge-scale
farming;forexample,lessfavourablepriceincentivesmayhavehadsomethingtodo
withit.5
HowevertherealbombshellwasthepublicationintheSovietUnionofawork
byBarsovwhichexaminedthequestionoftheagriculturalsurplusonthebasisof
previouslyneglectedstatisticalandarchivalmaterials.Ifwedefinethissurplus,
roughly,asagriculture’ssalestoindustryminusagriculture’spurchasesfrom
industry,andmeasurethissuminrealorconstant-priceterms,thentheagricultural
surplusdidnotincreaseasaresultofcollectivisation.Overtheperiodofthefirst
FiveYearPlan(1928/29-1932)theagriculturalsurpluswasnogreaterthanin1928,
nordiditapparentlyincreasesubsequently.6Therehasbeencontroversyoverthe
correctvaluemeasurementofthesurplus.Butnearlyeveryonenowacceptsthat
Barsovhasprovedthatcollectivisationdidnotenabletheextractionofanincreased
surplusfromagriculture,andthatagriculturedidnotfinancetheincreasein
industrialaccumulationinthe1930s.7
Thereasonforthiswasthatthelivestocksectordeclineddramaticallyafter
collectivisation(someanimalsdiedforlackoffodder,otherswereslaughteredinthe
4InBritainfurtherworkisbeingcontinuedonthedynamicsandefficiencyof
agriculturalproductionbyS.G.Wheatcroftn.d.(a),(b),(c)).
5ThisquestionisapproachedinHarrison,n.d.butworkinthisareaisstill
continuing.Adiametricallyoppositeviewpoint—thatexcessivelyfavourableterms
oftradewereatwork—issuggestedbyMillar1970.
6Barsov1969,considerstheyears1928-1932.Inalaterarticle,Barsov1974,he
developsthistheme,introducingdatafor1937and1938.
7ThisdiscussionfollowedontheheelsofthatinvolvingKarczandDavies.See
Millar1970,Nove1971a,Millar1971,Nove1971b.Thefirstfullpresentationofthe
BarsovdataawaitedMillar1974,andEllman1975.Whatwasatstake?Nove
disputedthattheagriculturalsurpluscouldbemeasuredatall;Millardisputedthe
usebyEllman(followingBarsov)ofrouble-valuestransformedintoMarxianlabour-
valuesasameasureofthetransferofsurplus-product.
4
collectivisationdriveitself).Thisnecessitatedmassiveindustrialinvestmentin
agriculturetoreplacelostanimaldraught-powerandfertiliser.Inaddition,however
unfavourabletoagriculturewastradeatstateprices,peasantswerestillabletosell
foodandbuymanufacturesathighlyfavourable(ifoftensemi-legal)termsoftrade
intownbazaars.
InEllman’sview,therefore,theundoubtedsufferingsexperiencedbythe
peasantryintheearlyyearsofcollectivefarmingdidnotreflectanycontribution
theyweremakingtofeedandfuelindustrialdevelopment,butresultedfroma
seriesof“purelosses”(inbothhumanandanimalterms).Thecostsofindustrial
growthwerebornbytheindustrialworkingclass,inparticularbythemillionswhich
itrecruitedfromthecountrysideasindustrialemploymentexpanded(Ellman1975).
Whywascollectivisationsocostly?Inthe1920stheagrarianstrategyofthe
Bolshevikswastorelyonthepoorpeasants,towin(oratleastneutralise)the
middlepeasants,andtoisolateandsqueezeouttheresurgentclassofkulaks.Inthe
upshotclasslinesbecameinextricablyconfused.Thereevenarosetheconceptof
the“ideological”kulak:weareagainstthekulak,andhewhoisnotakulakbutisnot
“forus”isjustasbadasakulak.Thecampaigntoliquidatethekulaksasaclass
becameoneofhumanliquidation,andcollectivisationbecameanarbitrary,even
terroristicprocessimposedonthewholeofthepeasantry.
SomescholarshaveconcludedthattheBolshevikagrarianstrategywas
misconceivedbecauseitmisunderstoodtheclassstructureofthecountryside.8They
couldnotisolatethekulaksbecausethekulaksdidnotpossessalltheobjective
attributesofasocialclass,forexamplestabilityofmembershipandposition.Some
misgivingsaboutthelatterviewhavefocusedupontherelationshipbetweensocial
mobilityandtheformationofanewclass(Harrison1977).Aseparateareafor
furtherworkistheformationofaStalinistconceptionandpracticeinthefieldof
classalliancesandtheirpolitics—notonlyasifaffectedintheprocessof
collectivisation,butalsoasithasaffectedanddogmatisedourperceptionofit.
Perhapswehavealsomovedtowardsanewassessmentofthestrategyof
“primarysocialistaccumulation”.Firstly,theperformanceofpeasantagriculturein
thetwentieswasbetterthanwehadpreviouslyassumed.Secondly,the
performanceofcollectiveagriculturewasratherworse.Theaccelerationofsocialist
accumulationinthethirtieswasnotfinancedbyagriculture.
Thisraisestwofundamentalquestions.Firstly,giventheneedforextremely
rapidindustrialgrowth,couldasmallpeasantagriculturehavemettheimplied
needs?Probablythedominantviewwouldstillanswerthisquestioninthenegative,
andiscorrecttodoso(Cooper,DaviesandWheatcroft,n.d.).Secondly,wastherean
alternativestrategyforthewholeeconomy,basedonBukharinistlines—alonger
8ThisviewtendstounderlietheinterestingandimportantworkofLewin1968.
Seealso,inthisconnection,Lewin1966.Thisviewwasstatedmorestronglyand
explicitlybyShanin1971and1972.Aconsiderableimpetushasbeengiventothis
lineofworkbytheappearanceofChayanov1966,atranslationintoEnglishof
Chayanov’s1925.FordiscussionoftheChayanovphenomenonseefootnote5
above,andalsoHarrison1975.
5
butlesscostlyroutetothegoalofadevelopedsocialisteconomy?Thislatter
questionisconsideredseparatelybelow.
Wearealsoledtoanotherquestion.AsSzamuely(ofHungary)andMillarhave
separatelypointedout,theMarxiannotionofprimaryaccumulationconcernsthe
transformationofrelationsofproduction,notjusttheaccumulationbyonemodeof
productionofthesurplusproductofanother.9Thecollectivisationofagriculturewas
atransformationofsocialrelations,asindeedwasthehistoryofthewholeeconomy
betweenthewars.Thequestionofalternativetransformationscannotbeanswered
withoutapoliticaleconomyofthesesocialrelations.Tothisquestion,also,we
returnbelow.
IIPlanningtheindustrialtransformation
Despitemanydifficultiesandsetbacks,theUSSRachievedinonegenerationa
massiveindustrialtransformation,onascalewhichhadrequiredthreeormore
generationsfortheadvancedcapitalistcountries.Thiswasachievedbya
centralised,hierarchicalplanningsystemwhichpiledresourcesintotheheavy
industrialsectors.Thiswastheworld’sfirstplannedeconomy(anditlaterbecamea
modelformorethanoneothersocialistcountry).
Theconventionalpost-warwisdomproducedacuriouslydualisticassessmentof
thisrecord.Ononesidewerethosewhoemphasisedaboveallthechaos,
arbitrarinessandinefficiencyoftheprocess,oftenbycomparisonwithamythically
functionalequilibriummodelofcapitalistgrowth;oftentoapointwherevirtuallyall
Sovietstatisticalclaimshadtobedisbelievedbecausetheywereinconsistentwith
theunderlyinganalysis-oneexampleofthisapproachbeingthatofJasny1961.On
theothersidewerethosefewsuchasDobbwho,partlyoutofascrupulousand
latervindicateddefenceofsome(thoughnotall)Sovietstatisticalclaims,partlyout
ofafundamentalposition,emphasisedtheregularitiesofSovietindustrialisation
andtheunprecedentedadvances(Dobb1966;onthequestionofSovietstudiessee
especiallypp.261-8).
Thefundamentalproblemwhichremained,however,washowtounderstand
thegainsinrelationtothesetbacks,andtounderstandtheSovieteconomy,inits
worldcontext,asasystemwhichproducedparticulartypesandmodesofadvance,
butwhichfailedtoproduceothers.
Intheearly1960sbothHunter(intheStates)andKaserdevelopedaconceptof
planningpriority.Intheeconomythereareprioritysectors(heavyindustry)and
non-prioritysectors.Theoperationalplanassignshighergrowthratestopriority
sectors.Howevertheplanisalso“taut”,thatis,takenasawholeitsgoalsexceed
theproductivepossibilitiesoftheeconomy.Thereasonforthisisinorderto
stimulatethemobilisationofallpossibleresources,andtoensurethattheeconomy
9Szamuely1974,p.41.HereinfactSzamuelyreferstotheviewsofBukharinin
1920,whenthelatterwasstillcloselyassociatedwithPreobrazhenskyandtheleft.
ToonenotfamiliarwiththestateofHungariansciencesSzamuely’sworkcontainsa
surprisingoriginalityandrichness;itstranslationfromtheHungariandeservesabig
welcome.SeealsoMillar,n.d.
6
growsatthemaximumrate—thatis,thereisno“slack”.Butincarryingoutthe
plan,difficultieswillarisebecausetheplanasawholecannotbeachieved:for
example,therewillbeashortageofsteel.Inthiscaseavailablesteelisallocatedto
theprioritysector,whichfulfilsoroverfulfilsitstargets,whilenon-prioritysectors
failtofulfiltheirtargets(Hunter1961,Kaser1962.Kaser’sarticleisareviewof)asny
1961).Thusplanunderfulfilmentdoesoccur,butina“planned”way.
AsHunterpointedout,itwasalsopossibleforexcessively“taut”planstoresult
inacompletebreakdownoftheeconomy(Hunter1961).
TowhatextentcouldthisexplainthesuccessesandfailuresoftheearlyFive
YearPlans?MorerecentlyHunterreturnedtothistopicwithafreshanalysisofthe
firstFiveYearPlan(1928/9-32)(Hunter1973).10Employingthetechniquesoflinear
programming,hetriedtoestablishwhether,onthebasisoftheknowneconomic
situationin1928,andtheassumptionsconcerningtechnicalandexternalconditions
embodiedintheplanadopted,itwaspossibletoachievetheconsumptionand
capital-stocktargetsenvisagedfor1932.Hefoundthattoachievethesetargets,
evenwiththeunrealisticallyfavourableassumptionsoftheplan,wouldhave
requireda26%declineinpersonalconsumptionin1929over1928;alternatively,
witha9%cutinconsumption,theplantargetscouldhavebeenmetby1936.
Withoutareductioninconsumptiontheeconomycouldnothavegrownatall.
InspiteofsomesignificantcriticismofHunter’sownassumptions(Daviesand
Wheatcroft1975),thereislittledisputeoverhisbroadconclusion,thatevenonthe
grosslyoptimisticassumptionsoftheplanners,thefirstFiveYearPlantargetswere
infeasible.
Wasthissimplyacaseofa“taut”plan,designedtomobiliseresourcesandto
incitetheSovietpopulationtoheroicefforts?SimultaneouslywithHunter’sarticle
appearedavariedandinterestingdiscussion(Campbell1973;Cohen1973;Lewin
1973;Hunter1973).Mostofthecontributorsconcernedthemselveswiththe
historicalrecordof1928-1932(indisregardofHunter’sperfectlycorrectassertion
thathehadexaminedthefirstFiveYearPlan,notthePlanperiod).Fromthissome
importantpointswereclarified.
Firstly,thetargetsoftheplandocumentwereinfeasiblenotbecausethe
plannerswerecalmlyorganisinga“planaspropaganda”campaigntomobilise
resources,butbecausesomethoughtthatabsurdlyhightargetswerereallyfeasible,
whileothersfearedarrestiftheydidnotagree.
Secondly,suchover-ambitiousplanninghadseveralconsequences.Onewasa
tendencytowardsdisintegrationoftheplanningsystemitself.Theplanningoffices
andMinistriesconcernedwithprioritysectorshivedthemselvesofffromtheothers,
whowerelefttosinkorswimasbesttheycould(Lewin1973).11Thiswasfarfrom
10Thisarticlehasbeenreprintedwithsomerevision(Hunter1976).Hunter’s
workiscontinuinginthefieldofcomputersimulationofSovieteconomicgrowthin
the1930s.
11Thisdevelopmentofsectoralautarchymayexplainpartofthecontrast
betweenimpressionsofoverallchaos,andoftherationalorganisationofrapid
7
anyprocessesofrationalandconsecutive“plannedunderfulfilment”ofthetype
previouslydescribedbyHunter.Onthecontraryitwasabitterstruggleforsurvival
inapoliticalarenawherethecostsoffailurewereextremelysevere.
Inaddition,thematerialachievementsofthisplanningprocessmustbeseenin
theproperlight.By1932theheavyindustrialtargetshadbyandlargebeenmet.But
theplanwascurtailedattheendofthisyearnotasareflectionofitstotalsuccess,
butbecausetheeconomywasinseriousdifficulty.12
Planningisasocialrelationshipwhichinvolvesnotonlyplannersandpoliticians
butalsotechnicalandmanagerialspecialists,workers(both“free”and“forced”)and
peasants.Therehasbeenfreshworkontheuneasypositionofthetechnical
intelligentsia,caughtbetweentheclasspowerwhichhadcreateditandtheclass
whichithadtoorganiseinproduction(Lampertn.d).Butlittlehasbeenaddedto
ourunderstandingofthedevelopmentoftheworkingclassorof,say,theStakhanov
movementofthemiddlethirtieswhichonewriterhasdescribedasafirst“economic
andtechnical”popularmovementofthenewworkingclass(Spours1976),13and
whichinDobb’sviewhadcontributedtoboththesuccessanddisruptionofthe
secondFiveYearPlan.
Afurtherareatoreceivefreshilluminationisthatofthelabourcampswithinthe
Sovieteconomy.WritinginthemiddlesixtiesSwianiewiczhadinterpretedtheriseof
thecampsectorinthe1930sintermsoftwofactors.Thefirstwastheneedto
mobilisetheruralunderemployedintoanactiveresource,aneedmetpartly
throughthedeportationofthekulaksattheendofthe1920s.Thesecondwasthe
factthatinconditionsofacuteindustriallabourscarcityandadisorganisedlabour
market,theNKVDconstitutedaprivilegedrecruiteroflabourforitsownindustrial
andextractiveprojects—thatis,itwastheonlyemployerwiththepowerofarrest
(Swianiewicz1965).Butherefrainedfromcommentontheefficacyofthecamp
economyitself.
However,recentdisclosuresofbothMedvedevandSolzhenitsyn,whichhave
appearedintranslationinEnglish,tendtoconfirmthatthelabourcampsalso
experiencedproblemsofinfeasibleplanningand“planbreakdown”,problemsof
economiccontrolrathersimilartothoseexperiencedinothersectorsoftheplanned
economy.14
expansionandtechnicaladvanceinparticularsectors.SeeforexampleCoopern.d.
(b),particularlyinterestingforitsassessmentoftheseriouseconomicburdens
imposedbythethreatofthecomingEuropeanwar;Cooper1976,Lewisn.d.,a
recordofthecreationofasyntheticrubberindustry.
12ThisisdiscussedinrelationtoHunter’sworkbyLewin1973;asomewhatless
catastrophicpictureispresentedbyDaviesn.d.(a).
13Spour’sarticlemarksthefirstattemptinBritaintoapplyGramscianconcepts
totheevolutionoftheSovietstate.
14Medvedev1972,andmorespecificallySolzhenitsyn1975,bothcontainmany
pointsofrelevance.Howeverthelattersourceishardlyunprejudiced.Some
problemsofinterpretationareconsideredbyHarrison1976.
8
Insummarythiseconomyofthe1930s,whichhassooftenbeendescribedasa
“wareconomy”,withahighlycentralisedsystemof“commandplanning”andthe
administrativeallocationofphysicalresources,wascharacterisedbyaseriesof
contradictions.Itisnotjustanothermatterofthecontradictionbetweenplanand
reality—ofcourseunforeseencircumstancesandmistakesareinevitable.There
wasalsothewayinwhichthecommandeconomyitselfgeneratedtheautarchic
operationofparticularindustrialsectors.Thiscommandeconomyalsoinduced
chaoticdisequilibriainlabourmarketsandthemarketsforconsumergoods
(especiallyfood),andcoincidedwithwidespreaddevelopmentofblackmarkets.
Moreovertheoperationoftheeconomydivertedmuchhumaningenuityfromthe
taskofeconomicconstructiontotheneedsofadministrativesurvival.
Allthisisnottodenythemajordifficulties,international,demographicand
technical,amidwhichtheSovieteconomymadestrikinggains.15Butitdoesraise
further“fundamental”questions.Firstly,wastheroutepursuedthemosteffective
oneunderthecircumstances?Barsov,forexample,hassuggestedthattherateof
plannedaccumulationintheearly1930swastoohigh;alessambitiousplanwould
haveenabledahigherrateofgrowthtohavebeenachieved(Barsov1969,p.96).
Well,letusposeitasaquestion.Firstly,couldadifferentsetoftargetshave
achievedbetterresults?Secondly,whatwastheinfluenceuponthisofthesystemof
planningwhichemerged?Aplanningsystemisasetofsocialrelationships.Therise
oftheSovietplanningsystemisalsoatransformationofsocialrelationsbothatthe
economic,andatthepoliticalandideologicalinstancesofsociety.Wecannotbegin
toaskwhytheroutewhichwasfollowedwaschosen,whyaparticularplanning
systememerged,andwhyitoperatedasitdid,withoutraising,onceagain,the
questionsofpoliticaleconomy.
Thequestionofhistoricalalternatives
ThrougheveryupsurgeandfalteringoftheSovieteconomy,andthrougheverycrisis
withinthehistoricalsciences,elementsoftriumphalismwithinSoviethistoriography
havepersistentlyre-emerged.BycontrastthedominantWesternassessmenthas
experiencedseveralmetamorphosessincethewar.
Thesharedexperienceofthewar-timeallianceagainstmilitaryfascismlentits
owntriumphalismtohistoricalwork(especiallyofapopularcharacter)inBritain.
Stalinwasseenastheleaderwhowasclear-sightedandruthlessenoughtohave
done“whathadtobedone”topreservesocialisminonecountry.Tohispersonal
dominationwasascribedthesuccessesofcollectivisationinagriculture,andthe
rapidityof“forced”industrialisation.The“forcingofthepace”wasseenasan
integralandfunctionalelementinsocialisteconomicdevelopment.
15Thereareinterestingdevelopmentsintheattempttoanalyseexactlywhich
difficultieswereexogenous,andbeyondthecontroloftheSovietstate;seeonce
againCooper,DaviesandWheatcroft,n.d.TheabilityoftheSovieteconomyto
benefitfromtheimportofWesterntechnologyinthetwentieshasbeen
documentedbySutton1968.Ontherealityofexternalconstraintsinthe
subsequentcollapseoftraderelationsandtechnicalagreementsseeDohan1976.
9
TheinaugurationoftheColdWartranslatedthisviewintoitsmirrorimage—
thepreservationofsocialismrequiresaStalinistdictatorship,andapermanent“war
economy”.IfStalinhaddone“whathadtobedone”,itwasinordertopreservea
totalitarianpoliticalsystemakintoNazifascism.
Theresimplydidnotexistanyproblematicwhichcouldhaveenabledusto
examinethepossibilityofhistoricalalternatives.TowhatextentwastheStalinist
economicandpoliticalsystemintegraltosocialism,ingeneral—orinonecountry?In
whatsensecouldonespeakofdifferentpoliticalandhistoricaloptionsopentothe
Sovietstateanditspeopleinthe1920sand1930s?
Sincethenmanynewdoorshaveopened.IntheUSSRthe20thand22nd
CongressesoftheCPSU,andthediscussionsofthe1960sonthereformofthe
economicmechanism,havegreatlyinfluencedMarxistthoughtinthesocialist
countriesandintheWest.Sohavethedifferentadvancesandfalsestartsinthe
othersocialistcountries.Theemergenceofpowerfultendenciestowardsamilitary
detentebetweenthesuperpowershasalsoservedtoweakenmanybourgeois
ideologicaldogmas.Allthishasmadepossiblenewhistoricalwork,andnew
assessments.
Today,relativelyfewwriterssustaintheinevitabilitythesis.Amuchmore
commonpositionisthestandpointofpragmatism:onemaydrawupalistofthe
costsandbenefitsaccruingtotheStaliniststrategyofeconomicdevelopment,and
leaveassessmenttothereader.16Incharacterisingthispragmatism,Idonotdispute
theverygreatcontributiontohistoricalunderstandingmadebymanywhoadoptit.
Neverthelessthispragmatismreflectsafailureofbourgeoiseconomicsinthepost
warperiod.
Firstly,suchpragmatismisinherentlyrelativistic.Todefinethecostsand
benefitsoftheStalinisteconomicstrategy,itisnecessarytodefineanalternative
“scenario”ofdevelopment.Butwhichalternative?SupposetheOctoberrevolution
hadneverhappened:wouldRussiatodaybeanotherperipheralagrarian-fascist
regime—orwoulditbeEurope’seconomicmiracle?SupposenotStalinbut
Bukharin,orTrotsky,hadsucceededtotheBolshevikleadership:wouldtheyhave
beencompelledtofollowthesameroad—perhapswithamoreorlesshuman
face?Werethere,infact,realpoliticaloptions?
Onecannotdenytheendlessdemagogicpossibilitiesofthisorthatalternative.
AsCarrremindedus,thosewhoaskwhatmighthavehappenedintheabsenceof
theOctoberrevolutionusuallydosobecausetheyregretitsfailurenottohave
happened(Carr1964,pp.96-7).
Secondly,however,suchquestionscannotbedeniedmeaning.Whatis
importantistosituatethempolitically.Thefailureofpragmatism,inthissenseisto
seetheevolutionofthestateandofplanningintermsof“economicpolicy”,rather
thanofpoliticaleconomy.Thevictoryofoneeconomicstrategyoveranotherisnot
16ForexampleWilber1969,pp.109-133,GregoryandStuart1974,pp.442-446,
Nove1975,pp.109-113.Inotherrespectsalltheseareexcellentandinteresting
works,thoughWilber’sisnowverydated.GregoryandStuart’sisoneofthebest
moderntextbooks.
10
justtheoutcomeofaprocessofpolicychoice.Italsomeansthepoliticaldefeatof
oneblocofforces,thedefeatofitsprogramme,itsideologyandconsciousness,at
thehandsofthevictors.Theconceptofhistoricalalternativesmustthereforebe
foundedinanalysisofthematerialforceswhichwereinfactcontendingforpower.
Atthesametimethismustalwaysbealogicalexerciseratherthananattempt
torewriteanalternativehistory.Fromthispointofview,oneofthemostsignificant
developmentsrecentlyhasbeentheattempttorecoverhistoricallythe
programmaticalternativesassociatedwithBukharin.AswellasCohen’spolitical
biography,thereisalsoLewin’sattempttotracethecontinuitiesfromBukharin,
defeatedinthe1920s,totherevivalofalternativeeconomicconceptsinthe1960s
(Cohen1974;Lewin1974).Thesignificanceofthiswork(aswellasofhisown)is
bestsummedupbySzamuelyintheconclusiontohismonograph:
Thefamiliarcourseofhistoryhasnotproceededalongthis(Bukharin’s:MH)
lengthierwayofsocialistconstructionbuthasimplementedashorterthough
moreexpensivesolution.Latergenerationsarenolongerinapositiontorevise
orinvalidatetheoncerealisedchoiceofhistoricalalternatives:theseare
unalterablefacts.But,simplybecausetheyhappenedthus,becauseoftheir
beingfacts,thesedecisionsarefixedintheconsciousnessoflatergenerationsas
necessary,evenastheonlypossiblesolutions;andwhen,innewsituations,
somesimilaralternativeshavetobedecidedbetween,ready-madesolutions
mayhaveapowerfulretrogradeimpact—ifwedonotexactlyknowthe
substanceoftheoriginalalternativesandthedecisivecircumstancesofthe
historicalchoice(Szamuely1974,p.109).
Politicaleconomyand thefetishismofforms
OneofthemostfamousMarxistconceptionsisthatthefetishismofcommodities,
arisingwithincapitalistproduction,makesnecessarythepoliticaleconomyof
capitalism.Inthecapitalistmodeofproductionsocialrelationsbetweenpeople
appearasexchangerelationsbetweenthings.Topenetratethissurfacelayerof
socialrealityrequiresascientific,materialistapproach,theapproachofMarxist
politicaleconomy.
Acorollary,generallyacceptedbySovietMarxistsinthe1920s,wasthatunder
socialismsocialrelationswouldforthefirsttimebenakedlyvisibletohuman
experience.Socialismwouldbringtheabolitionofmoneyforms,ofcommodity
productionandtrade;thelawofvaluewouldbedisplacedbyplanning.Theneedfor
ascientificpoliticaleconomywoulddisappear,itsplacetakenbypoliticsand
politicalchoice.17
Lookingback,thisviewcannowbeseenasanidealisationofwhatEngels
termed“barracksocialism”,ofanaturalised,militarisedandautarkiceconomy,
whichwillinglyfounditsfirstmodelintheSovieteconomyofWarCommunism—
17Curiouslyenough,Marxistswereaidedandabettedinthistheoretical
abstractionbysomebourgeoiseconomistswhochosetocontinueworkintheSoviet
Union.SeeforexampleA.V.Chayanov1921.