Post Sovereign Constitutional Making: Learning and Legitimacy

311 Pages·2016·2.326 MB·English

by  Andrew Arato

OXFORDCONSTITUTIONALTHEORY
SeriesEditors:
MartinLoughlin,JohnP.McCormick,andNeilWalker
Post Sovereign Constitution Making
OXFORDCONSTITUTIONALTHEORY
SeriesEditors:
MartinLoughlin,JohnP.McCormick,andNeilWalker
OxfordConstitutionalTheoryhasrapidlyestablisheditself astheprimarypointof ref-
erencefortheoreticalreflectionsonthegrowinginterestinconstitutionsandconstitu-
tional law in domestic, regional and global contexts. The majority of the works
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ALSOAVAILABLEINTHESERIES
PopularSovereigntyinEarlyModern TheThreeBranches
ConstitutionalThought AComparativeModelofSeparation
DanielLee ofPowers
ChristophMöllers
TheCulturalDefenseofNations
ALiberalTheoryofMajorityRights TheGlobalModelofConstitutionalRights
LiavOrgad KaiMöller
TheCosmopolitanConstitution TheTwilightofConstitutionalism?
AlexanderSomek EditedbyPetraDobnerandMartinLoughlin
TheStructureofPluralism BeyondConstitutionalism
VictorM.Muniz-Fraticelli ThePluralistStructureofPostnationalLaw
NicoKrisch
ConstitutionalCourtsandDeliberative
Democracy ConstitutingEconomicandSocialRights
ConradoHübnerMendes KatharineG.Young
FaultLinesofGlobalization ConstitutionalReferendums
LegalOrderandthePoliticsofA-Legality TheTheoryandPracticeofRepublican
HansLindahl Deliberation
StephenTierney
TheCosmopolitanState
H.PatrickGlenn ConstitutionalFragments
SocietalConstitutionalismand
AfterPublicLaw
Globalization
EditedbyCormacMacAmhlaigh,Claudio
GuntherTeubner
Michelon,andNeilWalker
Post Sovereign
Constitution Making
Learning and Legitimacy
AndrewArato
DorothyHartHirshonProfessorof Political
andSocialTheory,TheNewSchool
(cid:2)(cid:3)
1
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ForJeanandJulian

Preface
Thisbookisthirdinaseriesof studiesdealingwiththenewworldof constitu-
tionalpoliticsthatopenedwiththeSpanishtransitiontodemocracyandbecame
moreuniversalinthe1990s.Inthefirst,CivilSociety,ConstitutionandLegitimacy
(2000),IfocusonEastCentralEurope,whileinthesecond,ConstitutionMaking
Under Occupation (2009), I examine the perhaps unlikely case of Iraq under
Americanrule.Thepresentvolumeresumesthestudyoftheformerstatesocial-
ist countries, with the case of Hungary, as well as the Middle East with an
extendedstudyof constitutionmakinginTurkey.Itspurposeisnotonlycom-
parative,butprimarilytheoretical.Itseekstobetterunderstandthenewpara-
digm of constitution making that I call post sovereign, focusing on its
achievementsintwoareas:thegenerationof politicallegitimacyandthefacili-
tationof legalandpoliticallearning.Inordertofullyassessthesedesiderata,I
verymuchfocusontheslightlyidealizedSouthAfricancase,onewhichIcon-
siderthemostcompleteandnormativelydistinguishedrealizationof thepara-
digm organized around the institution of round table negotiations. Contrasts
withthealternativedemocraticmodels,theconstitutionalconventioninvented
inNorthAmerica,andthesovereignconstituentassemblypioneeredinFrance
helpmethematizethegainsinvolved,aswellaspossiblelossesanddifficulties.
InthisworkIalsoconsiderhowthepostsovereignprocesscanfail,asinHun-
gary,andconversely,howinsufficientlearningfromitcanleadtoaseverecon-
stitutionalcrisis,thecaseof Turkey.Asinanyproperlytheoreticalwork,Ibuild
onanddebatewiththeconceptionsof others.Mysourcesgobacktothegreat
democratic revolutions, where I find anticipations of the new paradigm in
Frenchtheory,aswellasAmericanpractice.Ifoundsomeof thelegaltheorists
of theFrenchThirdRepublicespeciallyhelpfulinevaluatingthegraveproblems
withconstitutionmakingandalteringinFrance.Intheworldof theolderGer-
mantheory,IhavebeenmostinfluencedbyHannahArendt,whilemycritical
debatewithCarlSchmittrunsthroughthewholevolume.Amongcontempo-
rarytheorists,mydebttoClaudeLefortandJürgenHabermasshouldbeobvi-
ous throughout, but the conception has been most directly influenced by the
recent work of Ulrich Preuss, Bruce Ackerman, and János Kis. There are also
theoristswhoserveasbothimportantsourcesanddebatingpartners,inparticu-
lar Stephen Holmes, Ernesto Laclau, Ran Hirschl, Tom Ginsburg, and the
authors of the collective volume The Paradox of Constitutionalism, especially
HansLindahl.
viii (cid:2) Preface
TherearealsootherdebtsIneedtomention.IamgratefultoJohanvander
WaltfororganizingtwoseminarsaroundmyworkinGlasgow(2009)andJohan-
nesburg(2010),andfortheSchoolof Lawof theUniversityof Witwaterstrand
forhavingsupportedmewiththeprestigiousBramFisherHonoraryProfessor-
ship for a period beyond the duration of the latter. Similarly, I wish to thank
PierreRosanvallonforhavinginvitedmetogivefourlecturesattheCollègede
France(2012),whichenabledmetowritematerialsincorporatedinthisvolume.
IthankseveralorganizationsforallowingmetorepeatedlycometoTurkey.In
particularIthankLeventGönencforinvitingmetotwoseminarswithTEPAV
inAnkara,duringthesecondof whichIhadachancetomeetanddiscusswith
membersof theparliamentaryConstitutionalReconciliationCommittee.Fuat
Keyman and Ayse Kadoglu have been instrumental in inviting me to two ses-
sions on the constitution at Sabanci and Koc Universities, and similarly Aysen
Candas and Ayse Bugra at Bogazici University. Giancarlo Bosetti and Nina zu
Fürstenberghavebeenkindenoughtoinvitemetoseveralconferencesof their
journalResetinIstanbul,andIthankOsmanKavalafortwoseriousseminardis-
cussions at his “public restaurant.” In Hungary my debt is not only to László
Majtényiforhavinginvitedmetoanimportantseminarontheconstitutionin
2004, but to all my discussion partners in Budapest, Miklós Haraszti, András
Bozóki,GáborHalmai,ZoltánMiklósi,KrisztaKovács,GáborA.Tóth,andof
courseJánosKis.Further,IamgratefultotheUSDepartmentof Stateforhav-
ingsponsoredmeasademocracylecturerfocusingonconstitutionmakingin
Nepal(2006)andZimbabwe(2010),andinparticulartoSharonHudson-Dean,
theofficerinchargeof PublicAffairsateachof theseUSEmbassiesatthetime
of myvisits.InbothcountriesIhadthepleasureof meetingpoliticiansaswellas
civil society activists engaged in constitutional issues. Finally, but not least, I
thankmyTurkishstudentsforteachingmeagreatdeal(neverenough)about
Turkish constitutional politics, in particular Ertug Tombus, Aysel Madra, and
Bahar Tabakoglu. I also thank another student of mine, Anna Matthiesen, for
editorialworkonthisvolume.
Asalways,Iamverygratefultomembersof myfamily,JeanCohenandJulian
Arato,whohavehelpedmewithmanytheoreticalandlegalmatters,givenmea
greatdealof emotionalsupport,andtowhomthisvolumeisdedicated.
Introduction: Beyond the Paradox
of Constitutionalism
I THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutionalism, the most important modern safeguard against tyranny, is
nowcommonlysaidtobeparadoxical.1Itskeyideaof ademocraticconstituent
power,longassumedtobethefoundationof two-trackordualisticconstitution-
alism, is often shown to be circular or self-contradictory and for two reasons.
First, the constituent power that has always been posited as the (legitimate)
sourceof theconstitutionseemstocomeintobeingonlyasitsresult.Thepos-
tulatedextra-constitutionalauthor,thepeople,gainsitsidentityaswellasability
toactonlyinthebasiclaworrathertheconstitutedregime.Yet,althoughcon-
stituted by the constitution, the constituent power is uniquely understood as
sovereigninthetraditionalsenseof beingunlimited,or“inthestateof nature.”
Thefamouscircleof constituentpowerisnotedbyHannahArendt,recognized
evenearlierbyHansKelsen,andthenmuchlaterbyJacquesDerrida,andisthus
thefirstdimensionof thisparadox.2EvenArendttriestoescapecircularityonly
byrelyingonaformof Americanexceptionalismthatimplicitlyconcededthe
more general “solution” to Kelsen, namely that (almost all) actual beginnings
arelinkedtodictatingviolenceandcanhavenonormativejustification.3
Today,interpretersseektoescapethisversionof theparadoxbyatheoryof
imputation that is itself very Kelsenian, according to which the unitary and
unifiedpeopleastheconstituentpowerisindeednottheoriginof anything,but
instead a result of the constitution, a constitué, but to whom the pouvoir
constituantcanthenbeascribed.4Butthisleadsonlytothesecond,morefateful
1 Seetheeditors’“Introduction”toM.LoughlinandN.Walker(eds),TheParadoxofConstitutionalism(Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,2007)aswellasWalker’sownessayinthesamevolume:“PostConstituentConstitu-
tionalism?TheCaseoftheEuropeanUnion.”
2 “Introduction”inLoughlinandWalker,ParadoxofConstitutionalism.SeeH.Arendt,OnRevolution(London:
Penguin,1990);HansKelsen,GeneralTheoryof LawandtheState(Cambridge,MA:Harvard,1945)261;J.Der-
rida,“DeclarationsofIndependence1”(1986)7NewPoliticalScience17–15.
3 R.CarrédeMalberg,ContributionàlagénéraleThéoriedel’État(firstpublished1920,Paris:Dalloz,2004)497.
4 TheconstituentpowerthusbecomesasubstitutefortheKelsenianGrundnorm.SeeH.Lindahl“Constituent
PowerandReflexiveIdentity:TowardsanOntologyofCollectiveSelfhood”inLoughlinandWalker,Paradox
of Constitutionalism13,19.