Populism Around the World: A Comparative Perspective

140 Pages·2019·2.2 MB·English

by  Daniel Stockemer

Daniel Stockemer E ditor
Populism
Around the
World
A Comparative Perspective
Populism Around the World
Daniel Stockemer
Editor
Populism Around the World
A Comparative Perspective
Editor
DanielStockemer
SchoolofPoliticalStudies
UniversityofOttawa
Ottawa,Ontario,Canada
ISBN978-3-319-96757-8 ISBN978-3-319-96758-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96758-5
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Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
DanielStockemer
PopulisminArgentina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
WolfgangMuno
PopulisminFrance. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 27
GillesIvaldi
PopulisminthePhilippines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
AdeleWebbandNicoleCurato
PopulisminPoland. . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . 67
BenStanleyandMikołajCześnik
PopulisminTurkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
S.ErdemAytaçandEzgiElçi
PopulismintheUnitedStates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
MatthewGreenandJohnKennethWhite
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
DanielStockemer
v
Introduction
DanielStockemer
Idon’tthinkthereisawaypoliticallytobeatthe“Insurgent
MovementOfPopulism”(TonyBlair2016)
Populism is on the rise. In the twenty-first century, we have been experiencing a
populisttide.Populistleadersareubiquitous.Theyareinpowerintheworld’smost
powerfulcountry,theUnitedStates;theyformgovernmentsinregionalhubssuchas
Poland, the Philippines, as well as Venezuela, and they threaten some of the most
established Western democracies including France and Italy. As a very serious
challengetomodernliberaldemocracy,populismisalsooneofthemostresearched
topics in modern political science. Among others, researchers try to tackle the
following research questions: What is populism? Is it a rhetorical strategy, tactic,
orideology?Howcanwe measure populism?Whyareweexperiencing apopulist
zeitgeistnow?Whoarethesupportersofpopulistmovements?Whatdopopulistsdo
to appeal to the masses? Integrating itself within this growing research, this edited
volume aims at comparing populism in various national contexts. Does populism
manifestitselfdifferentlyoralikeincountriesasdiverseasthePhilippines,Turkey,
and the United States? Answering this question, this book compares populism in
Argentina,France,thePhilippines,Poland,Turkey,andtheUnitedStatesacrossfour
dimensions:(1)Whatisthehistoryanddevelopmentofpopulistpartiesandmove-
ments in the respective country? (2) Who are the type of contemporary populist
actors and movements in our sample countries? (3) What are the (rhetorical)
strategies and tactics they use? (4) Who are the voters and supporters of these
populistpartiesandmovements?
This introduction will situate the book within the broader populist literature. It
will shortly retrace the main definitional debates and provide a short history of
populisminsomeoftheworld’sregions.
D.Stockemer(*)
UniversityofOttawa,Ottawa,ON,Canada
e-mail:[email protected]
©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2019 1
D.Stockemer(ed.),PopulismAroundtheWorld,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96758-5_1
2 D.Stockemer
1 Defining Populism
Populismisoneofthemostedgytermsinthesocialsciences.InthewordsofMudde
(2017, 1), it is an “essentially contested concept” where the “proper use of which
involves endless disputes about their proper uses.” For Weyland (2017, 1), “it
threatens to escape any analytical grasp. As soon as scholars are confident that
theyhaveencircleditwiththeirdefinitionalsnares,itresurfacesinadifferentform
in another corner of the impenetrable jungle of politics.” The main definitional
controversy is between populism as a discourse or strategy and populism as a
(thin)ideology.Followingthediscursivetradition,Kasin(2016,18)treatspopulism
as“acreed,astyle,apoliticalstrategy,amarketingploy,orsomecombinationofthe
above.”Throughsuchalens,populistdiscourseisaframeofanalysisthroughwhich
meaningisconstructedbasedaroundthefamiliarpreceptsofanti-elitismandpeople-
centrism(Aslanidis2016,93).
Forothers,suchasMudde(2004,543),populismis“anideologythatconsiders
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,
‘thepurepeople’versusthecorruptelite,andwhicharguesthatpoliticsshouldbean
expression of thegeneral will ofthe people.”Threeessential conceptsexist within
this definition: the people, the elite, and the general will (Mudde 2017, 4). The
people are imagined as pure and authentic and reflect an idealized self-perception,
i.e.,AmericaasChristian (Mudde2017,6–7).Theeliteisregisteredasthecorrupt
andevilremainder,whichfrustratesthepeoplebecauseoffavoringspecialinterests
or foreign/immoral ideals (Mudde 2017, 3–7). The general will is drawn from the
desireforacongruencebetweenthepureandhomogenouspeoples’commonsense
and government policy (Mudde 2004, 546–547). All institutions, rules, and pro-
cedures that stand in the way of such direct expression of the general will are
conceivedasliabilities(Rooduijn2016).Insuchaworldview,thepoliticalsystem
isviewedasinherentlyopposedtothewillofthepeople;itisinherentlytiedtothe
whims of the elites and must be challenged to once again work in service to the
commonman(Canovan1999,3).
Throughsuchathinideologicaldefinition,populismisilliberalandanti-pluralist
asitclaims“exclusivemoralrepresentation.”Itrepresentsaformofidentitypolitics
insofar as it defines an exclusive people that dismiss an immoral or spurious
remainder to be excluded (Müller 2017, 1–6, 101–103). Two additional features
characterize this ideational definition: (1) the populist leader becomes the bridge
betweentheunsatisfieddemandsandtheprocessofrepresentationwhichcoalesces
the demands (Valdivielso 2017, 299–300) and (2) the “people” who become a
political subject as framing uncovers their exploitation and/or antagonism with the
corruptelite.1
1Similarly,Ostiguy(2017,1–5)advancestheideaofscriptpopulism:thescriptreadsasfollows:
“There is a majority of ‘the people’ (the pueblo), in the majority ‘Typically from here,’ whose
authenticvoiceisnotheard,andwhosetrueinterestsarenotsafeguarded.Theyfaceathree-way
coalition,comprisedofanefarious,resentedminority(theobjectofgreatesthatred),atoddswith
Introduction 3
2 A Short History of Populism
Anystudyofpoliticalhistorywillshowthatpopulismhasalwaysbeenthere(Mudde
2004,548).AccordingtoHawkinsetal.(2017),thehistoryofpopulismdatesback
to the late Roman Republic with its political polarization between the Populares,
whofavoredthepeople,andtheOptimates,whofavoredthearistocrats.Thecradle
of modern populism lies in three separate movements: the US People’s Party,
Russia’s Narodniki, and French’s Boulangism. The US People’s Parties in the
1890swasathird-partyforceattemptingtopryapartUSpoliticsbycastigatingthe
DemocraticandRepublicanpartiesastooclosetoeachotherandtootiedtospecial
interests(Kaltwasseretal.2017,3).Inparticular,thefarmersintheAmericanWest
andSouth,who wereindire economicstraits,wereresponsive tothemessage that
thepoliticalestablishmentwasnotlookingaftertheirinterestsbecauseithaditsown
agenda. To populists, the answer was plain. “Get rid of ‘the plutocrats, the aristo-
crats, and all the other rats’ install the people in power, and all would be well”
(Canovan 1999, 3–4). In the 1860s, the Russian Narodniki movement emphasized
“going to the people” to foment the overturning of the establishment and an anti-
tsarist revolution (Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 4). French Boulangism during the 1890s
championed theworkers and thenation.It was hostile oftheparliamentary regime
and campaigned for the installation of a radical plebiscitary republicanism. What
unites these “historic” examples is the celebration of and legitimation of the “true
common people”: a direct appeal to the virtuous people to oppose an entrenched
establishment and a belief that democratic politics needed to be conducted differ-
entlyandclosertothepeople(Kaltwasseretal.2017,5).
Building on these earlier movements, modern populism remerged after World
WarIIindifferentpartsoftheworldatdifferentpointsintime.InWesternEurope,
populism emerged in its right-wing form with neo-fascist elements in the afterwar
period.Forexample,inFrance,PierrePoujade’santi-tax,pro-businessowner,anti-
state, and pro-French Algerian movement emerged as a successful political con-
tenderinthe1950s[e.g.,inthe1956firstroundoftheFrenchpresidentialelection
PierrePoujadegained11.5%ofthepopularvote(Kitschelt1995;Stockemer2017,
7–8)].InItaly,theNationalSocialMovement,stressingnationalism,law,andorder,
aswellashostilityagainstminorities,emergedinthe1950s,establishingitselfasthe
fourthlargestpartyinthe1960s.Bythe1980s,mostEuropeancountrieshadsome
right-wing gadfly party, all of which exposed strong populist elements such as the
rejection of the mainstream elite, hostility toward foreigners and the European
Union,aswellassomeformofnativism.Whiletheprecisecausesoftheirubiquity
are disputed, plausible explanations for their rise include the degrading economic
conditions on the European continent, the “silent revolution” of values favoring
multiculturalism, and the erosion of national sovereignty triggered by European
integration, thus provoking economic and cultural fear, as well as insecurity
‘thepeople’;hostile(andverypowerful)global/internationalforces;andagovernmentinlinewith
thatminority.Thissituationisasourceofmoralindignation”(Ostiguy2017,5).
4 D.Stockemer
(Kaltwasseretal.2017,8).Inthetwenty-firstcentury,theradicalpopulistrighthas
becomeamajorplayerinpoliticallifeinWesternEurope,garneringupwardof20%
ofthevoteincountriesasdiverseasAustria,France,andSwitzerland.
The1970sand1980ssawanothertypeofpopulismemerginginWesternEurope,
left-wing populism. Focusing on economic parity, the Panhellenic Socialist Move-
ment(PASOK)notonlyrepresentedthedebutofsocialistpopulismbutalsothefirst
time inEuropeanpost-WorldWarIIhistory thataleft-wing populist forcebecame
majoritarian in a Western European country. In fact, the charismatic leadership of
AndreasPapandreoudominatedpoliticsinAthensinthe1970sand1980s,fortwo
decades after the dictatorship. In other Western European countries, the political
landscapesawanexplosionofnewgreenandnewpoliticspartiesintheearly1980s.
These parties “despised politics and the political elite and claimed to represent the
peopleasawhole”andtheir“commonsenseanddecentvalues”(Mudde2004,548).
Yet,inthe1990sand2000s,thesegreenandprogressivepartiesbecamepolitically
mainstream, embracing political and sometimes economic liberalism and entering
coalition governments with traditional center-left and center-right governments.
This,inturn,providedanopportunityforthecreationandbreakthroughofasecond
generationofleftistpopulistmovements,leftistgrassrootsmovementspushedbythe
younger generations. In fact, in countries suffering from economic and social
hardshipsuchasSpainandItaly,partiessuchasPodemosortheFiveStarMovement
emergedasstrongforces inthesecond decade ofthetwenty-first century,winning
upward of 20% of the vote in elections. In other countries, such as France, this
renewed left-wing populism, while also supported by young people, manifested
itself more in its traditional form pushed by traditional elites (i.e., Jean Luc
MelanchoninFrance).
InEasternEurope,populistforcesonlyemergedafterthefalloftheBerlinWall.
The rise of these forces strongly aligned with general dissatisfaction with the
political elite and anti-corruption in the aftermath of democratization in the early
1990s. In particular, in the 1990s and 2000, in a context of rampant corruption,
populist forces positioned themselves as defenders of the revolution. They argued
that therevolution had been stolen from the people by a corrupt political class. As
such, these populist forces have argued that “against the political class stand the
peoplewhointhetraditionofbothpoliticalpopulismandantipoliticshaveahigher
moralstaturethantheamoralpoliticians”(Mudde2000,47).Overtheyears,populist
parties in Eastern Europe added nationalism, an anti-immigration platform, and
(soft) Euroscepticism to their agenda, thus creating a winning formula: a formula
that the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party
embracedtogainandconsolidatepower.
Classical populism in Latin America stems from the onset of the Great Depres-
sionperiod(andabruptmodernization)withsignificanteconomicdeclinesparkinga
legitimacy crisis and demands for political incorporation (Knight 1998). From the
1940stothe1960s,thisledtotheemergenceofcharismaticandquasi-authoritarian
populist leaders who, through “claims for equality of political rights and universal
participationforthecommonpeople,”“articulateda‘radicaldiscourse,’constructed
a heterogeneous class alliances and mobilized excluded sectors of society”
Introduction 5
(Kaltwasser et al. 2017, 5). Leaders like Peron in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil
stressed nationalist developmentalism; the incorporation of the working class into
theeconomic,social,andpoliticalfabric; and thesuppressionof democraticoppo-
sition(Kaltwasser2012,198).Asthecontinenttransitionedoutofmilitaryruleinthe
1980s, populists like Menem in Argentina and Fujimori in Peru adapted to neolib-
eralism to attack the economic mismanagement of the state (Kaltwasser 2014). At
least in part as a response to this neoliberal turn of some populist parties on the
continent, radical leftist populism reemerged in the twenty-first century to oppose
free-market policies and international capitalist exploitation (Morales, Chavez,
Correa)(Stavrakakisetal.2016).Thisformofstate-centered,pro-peasantnational-
ist,authoritarian,andanti-Americanpopulismhasbecomemajoritarianinanumber
ofcountries,includingVenezuelaandPeru.
InNorthAmericapopulismhasmainlyfolloweditsleft-winginclusionaryform
inMexico(itwascoupledtherewithstrongindigenousmobilization).IntheUnited
States,populismhasrathermanifesteditselfinitsexclusionaryright-wingversion,
mimicking radical right-wing parties in Europe. And in Canada, populism has
largelybeenabsentfromthepoliticalscene.
InCentralAsiapopulismispresentinmanyhybridandautocraticcountries.The
twomostfamousexamplesofpopulist(semi)authoritariangovernmentsarePutin’s
Russia and Erdogan’s Turkey. In Russia, in the 2000s, Putin adopted a populist
framethatdelegitimizesactionsotherthanthosetakenbythestate.Pushingconser-
vative traditional values, Putin propagates the unity of the people against Western
aggression,multiculturalism,andthepro-Westerndomesticeconomicandintellec-
tual elites, who according to official discourse are corrupted. In Turkey, Erdogan
pushes his Islamic and autocratic revolution with the help of a populist frame that
glorifiestheTurkishpeopleandnation.Thisformofpopulismisstronglylinkedto
theappealofthe(rural)masses.
FinallyintheAsiaandPacificregion,populismhasbeenlesspronouncedthanin
Europe and Latin America but still comes up in many forms. Most existing cases
eithertaketheformofthenativistright-wingpopulismseeninEuropeortheformof
the more inclusive Latin American populism (Moffitt and Torney 2014). Yet, they
canalsotaketheformofsomereligiouslyinspiredpopulism,wherethecommunity
of believers substitutes Islamic followers for the concept of the “people.” Various
IslamistpartieshavepushedthisversionofpopulisminIndonesiasincethe1950s.A
prominentexampleofamoreleft-winginclusivepopulismisThaksinShinawatra’s
ruleinThailand.Presentinghimselfasapersonaofthecommonpeople,canvassing
rural voters, and opposing the traditional elites proved successful for this populist
leader(i.e.,in2005,hewon58.7ofthepopularvote).Incontrast,populistpartiesin
Australia and New Zealand resemble more the contemporary radical right-wing
parties found in Western Europe. For example, the charismatic leader of the
Australian One Nation party, Pauline Hanson, enjoyed some electoral success in
the 1990s and again in 2016 embracing a platform decrying multiculturalism,
indigenousrights,andAsianimmigration(Moffitt2017,124).
Thisshorthistoryofpopulismhasshownthatpopulismisubiquitous,itexistsin
all continents, and it is malleable to all political ideologies. It can exist alongside