Politics as a Sphere of Wealth Accumulation

220 Pages·2017·1.13 MB·English

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Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects CUNY Graduate Center
10-2014
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Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer
Graduate Center, City University of New York
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POLITICS AS A SPHERE OF WEALTH ACCUMULATION:
CASES OF GILDED AGE NEW YORK, 1855-1888

by

Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York.

2014
© 2014
JEFFREY D. BROXMEYER
All Rights Reserved

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for
the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of
the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

PROFESSOR FRANCES FOX PIVEN

___________ ________________________________
Date Chair of Examining Committee

PROFESSOR ALYSON COLE

___________ ________________________________
Date Executive Officer

PROFESSOR JOE ROLLINS

__________________________________
Supervisory Committee

PROFESSOR JOSHUA FREEMAN

__________________________________
Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

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Abstract

POLITICS AS A SHPERE OF WEALTH ACCUMULATION:
CASES OF GILDED AGE NEW YORK, 1855-1888

by

Jeffrey D. Broxmeyer

Adviser: Professor Frances Fox Piven

This dissertation examines political wealth accumulation in American political
development. Scholars have long understood the political system selects for “progressive
ambition” for higher office. My research shows that officeseekers have also engaged in
“progressive greed” for greater wealth. I compare the career trajectories of four
prominent New York political figures during the Gilded Age: William Tweed, Fernando
Wood, Roscoe Conkling, and Chester Arthur. Using correspondence, census, tax and land
records, government reports, investigations, and newspaper coverage, I explain why each
political figure chose to either seize or pass up opportunities for political wealth
accumulation. I also examine the principal sources of fortunes and the types of political
practices that generated them.
Profit-maximizing behavior during the late nineteenth century was central to the
consolidation of politics as a vocation. Career-altering events such as an election loss, or
alternatively, the opportunity to join a dominant party faction, often recalibrated a
politician’s strategic calculation in the tradeoff between power and wealth. Furthermore,
the dominant view of self-aggrandizement is that public officials either steal or extract
rents, for example, in the form of bribes or loans. However, none of the large fortunes
examined among my cases were built through conventional rent seeking, and peculation

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was only a minor source of income. Instead, the great fortunes were built through
marketing-making activities. Tweed, Wood, Conkling, and Arthur accumulated political
wealth by securing dominant market positions, or by creating new markets altogether.
These figures accumulated productive personal property, or political capital, through
control over political institutions, most notably by speculating in real estate, railroads,
and finance, and by the establishment of politically dependent businesses, such as banks,
lotteries, newspapers, and law firms.

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Acknowledgements
Portions of this dissertation first appeared as “The Boss’s Brains: Political
Capital, Democratic Commerce, and the New York Tweed Ring, 1868-1871” in the
Journal of Historical Sociology. I want to thank the journal editors and anonymous
referees for their comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of some chapters were also
presented at the Midwestern Political Science Association and the Western Political
Science Association. I wish to express my appreciation to the Graduate Center for
providing financial support in the form of two Doctoral Student Research Grants, an
Advanced Research Collaborative Grant, a Travel and Research Grant, and a two-year
Teaching Fellowship at Hunter College.
Scholarly projects are truly social labors, and this dissertation is no exception. I
want to thank Frances Piven, my adviser, for her tremendous support throughout the
many iterations of this dissertation project. Her scholarly rigor and generosity have
shaped not only this dissertation, but also the kind of academic I strive to be. My
sincerest thanks are due to Joe Rollins. For years I have been the beneficiary of his
support, insights, and sage advice. I also want to express my gratitude to Joshua Freeman
for his willingness to serve on the dissertation committee and for graciously offering his
time, comments, and critiques. I want to thank Alyson Cole for her support, and for her
energy in building our program. Thanks are also due to Thomas Kessner for joining my
proposal committee and providing several early suggestions about where to look in the
archives. At the Graduate Center, Alex Zamalin has been a true friend, always willing to
share stories and listen to my half-baked ideas. Jonathan Keller read and critiqued my
original proposal, and his thoughtful suggestions helped me pass muster to Level III. Dan

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Skinner coached many of us through the program with his hardscrabble and frank
wisdom. To everyone: thank you!
My family deserve special acknowledgement for their unwavering support
throughout this long ordeal. Their patience and guidance throughout this intellectual
adventure has sustained me through many highs and lows. To Mom, Dad, Eric, and my
grandfather, Bill; to the memory of my grandparents Fran, Ann, and Dave; and also to
Pam, Allan, and Orlee: please know that acknowledgement pages do not run long enough
to fully express my thanks for your love and support. Finally, and most important, I want
to thank Shira, who has endured with matchless grace a partner in academic purgatory for
so long. You are the best.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………..vi
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………..ix
Chapter 1 – Introduction: Political Fortunes in American Political Development……….1
Chapter 2 – William Tweed’s Political Bubble………………………………………….24
Chapter 3 – The Politician’s Many Pockets: Fernando Wood’s Gilded Age……………49
Chapter 4 – Roscoe Conkling: Republican on Retainer…………………………………90
Chapter 5 – Subordinate Ambition: Chester Arthur’s Party Accumulation……………131
Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Political Capitalism in America……………………………...168
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………193

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Tables

Table 1. William Tweed: Rise and Fall……………………………………………….....29

Table 2. Fernando Wood: Recalibrated Ambition……………………………………….59

Table 3. Roscoe Conkling: Thwarted Ambition………………..………………………..94

Table 4. Chester Arthur: Subordinate Ambitions………………………………………136

Table 5. Political Ambition and Greed Tradeoffs Across Careers…………...………...177

Table 6. Political Behavior: Wealth Accumulating Practices…………………………..183

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