Table Of ContentJohn Marini
THE POLITICS of
BUDGET CONTROL
Congress, the Presidency, and the
Growth of the Administrative State
■ ^ ) Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Croup
THE POLITICS OF
BUDGET CONTROL
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THE POLITICS OF
BUDGET CONTROL:
CONGRESS,
THE PRESIDENCY
AND THE GROWTH
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE
John Marini, Ph.D.
University of Nevada, Reno
Taylor &. Francis
Taylor Si Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK
Published by Taylor & Francis
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 0X14 4RN
270 Madison Ave, New York NY 10016
Transferred to Digital Printing 2009
THE POLITICS OF BUDGET CONTROL: Congress, the Presidency and the Growth of
the Administrative State
Copyright © 1992 by Taylor & Francis New York Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United
States of America. Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part
of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form
or by any means, electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording
or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.
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This book was set in Times Roman by Hemisphere Publishing Corporation. The editors were
Lisa Speckhardt and Radhika Rao Gupta, the production supervisor was Peggy M. Rote, and the
typesetter was Laurie Strickland. Cover design by Tfcmmy Marshall.
A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
® The paper in this publication meets the requirements of the ANSI Standard Z39.48-1984 (Per
manence of Paper)
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Marini, John
The politics of budget control : Congress, the presidency, and the growth of the administrative
state / John Marini.
p. cm.
includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Budget—United States. 2. Government spending policy—United States. I. Title.
HJ2052.M368 1992
353.0072*221—dc20 91-40591
ISBN 0-8448-1716-3 (case) CIP
ISBN 0-8448-1717-1 (paper)
Publisher’s Note
The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint
but points out that some imperfections in the original may be apparent.
To my mother, Margherita Marini, the memory of my father,
Dominic A. Marini (1898-1984), and Nancy and Francesca
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Contents
Preface ix
Introduction 1
CHAPTER 1 Congress, the Presidency, and Administrative
Organization 15
CHAPTER 2 Budgeting and Reform: Executive Budgeting and the
Legacy of Progressivism 39
CHAPTER 3 Reorganization and Reform: The Institutionalized
Bureaucracy and the Legacy of Liberalism 67
CHAPTER 4 Reorganization and Reaction: The End of the
Progressive Presidency? 109
vii
viii CONTENTS
CHAPTER 5 Congress, the Presidency, and the Politics of the
Administrative State 141
CHAPTER 6 The Administrative State and the Crisis of
Constitutional Government 183
Index 205
About the Author 209
Preface
The federal budget has attained unparalleled significance at the heart of Ameri
can politics in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The modem budget
system has become the mechanism by which a distinctively American adminis
trative state was put in place and made operative. However, the administrative
state rests uneasily within the structure of the Constitution of the United States.
In terms of legitimacy, the American tradition is one of limited, constitutional
government. State theory presupposes the unlimited capacity of government to
pursue public purposes. The presence of an American administrative state has
produced a disjunction between the theoretical and practical dimension of na
tional politics, between the principles that legitimize action and the practice of
the institutions of government. The administrative state rests upon theoretical
assumptions that cannot gain constitutional legitimacy. The attempt to consoli
date an administrative apparatus within the framework of American government
has had the effect of undermining the efficient operation of the constitutional
system of separated powers. It has made it more difficult for the institutions of
government to function amicably in pursuit of a national interest. It is for this
reason that the relations between the political branches of government, Con
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