Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy)

217 Pages·1993·3.4 MB·English

by  Nicholas Rescher

PLURALISM
Against the Demand for Consensus
NICHOLAS RESCHER
CLARENDON PRESS . OXFORD
CLARENDON LIBRARY OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
General Editor: L. Jonathan Cohen, The Queen's College, Oxford
PLURALISM
The Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy brings together books, by new as
well as by established authors, that combine originality of theme with rigour
of statement. Its aim is to encourage new research of a professional standard
into problems that are of current or perennial interest.
General Editor: L. Jonathan Cohen, The Queen's College, Oxford.
Also published in this series
Philosophy without Ambiguity by Jay David Atlas
Quality and Concept by George Bealer
Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms by Austen Clark
. Sensory Qualities by Austen Clark
The Diversity of Moral Thinking by Neil Cooper
The Logic of Aspect: An Axiomatic Approach by Anthony Galton
Ontological Econo"!'JI by Dale Gottlieb
Experiences: An Inquiry into some Ambiguities by J. M. Hinton
The Fortunes of Inquiry by N. Jardine
Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure by Eva Feder Kittay
The Gement of the Universe: A Study of Causation by J. L. Mackie
The Nature of Necessity by Alvin Plantinga
Divine Commands and Moral Requirements by P. L. Quinn
Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason
by Nicholas Rescher
Simplicity by Elliot Sober
Blindspots by Roy N. Sorensen
The Coherence of Theism by Richard Swinburne
Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal by Neil Tennant
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism by Peter Unger
The Scientific Image by Bas C. van Fraassen
The Matter of Minds by Zeno Vendler
Chance and Structure: An Essay on the Logical Foundations ·of Probability
by John M. Vickers
Slippery Slope Arguments by Douglas Walton
What Is Existence? by C. J. F. Williams
Works and Worlds of Arts by Nicholas Wolterstorff
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in order to ensure its continuing availability
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© Nicholas Rescher 1993
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ISBN 0-19-823601-8
Preface
This book was conceived in early 1990 and sketched out
during the summer of that year while I was visiting Oxford. It
was then written in Pittsburgh during the ensuing academic
year and polished in Oxford in the summer of 1991. However
despite the Anglo-American setting of its production, the
themes it deals with are primarily Continental, seeing that its
primary target is the consensual ism ofJiirgen Habermas. The
appeal of his canonization of consensus is strong but
nevertheless so fraught with negative potential that it seems to
me to deserve a forceful contradiction.
I am very grateful to Marian Kowatch and Annamarie
Morrow for their patience in seeing the project take form on
the word-processor through the course of numerous revisions.
Jon Mandie read an early version of the manuscript and
offered useful comments and suggestions. I am also indebted
to Beth Preston for stimulating discussions of the issues, and
for constructive criticism to L. Jonathan Cohen, John Kekes,
and Tom Rockmore, as well as to an anonymous reader for
the OUP.
N. R.
Pittsburgh, P A
September, 1992
For (though also against) Jurgen Habermas
Philosophers do not write books to agree
with their colleagues. The best compliment
that they pay them is to take their work
seriously enough to react against it.
Contents
Introduction
I. CONSENSUS, RATIONALITY, AND EPISTEMIC MORALITY
1.1 The Problem ofC onsensus 5
1.2 Is Consensus a Rational Imperative? 7
1.3 Do the Limitations ofR eason Demand Consensus? 14
1.4 Is Consensus a Moral Imperative? 16
2. IS CONSENSUS REQUIRED IN THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH?
2.1 The Philosophical Partisans ofC ognitive Consensus 21
2.2 The Critics ofC ognitive Consensus 28
2. 3 Modem Limited Defences of Consensus 33
2.4 Science and Consensus 37
3. THE PROBLEMS OF A CONSENSUS THEORY OF TRUTH
3.1 What Constitutes Consensus? 44
3.2 Truth, Objectivity, and Consensus 45
3.3 Ideality and Consensus 53
3.4 The Consensus Theory ofT ruth 57
3.5 A Contrast Case 62
4. THE EXPERIENTIAL BASIS OF COGNITIVE DIVERSITY
AND THE UNAVOIDABILITY OF PLURALISM
4.1 RationalJudgement and Experience
4.2 Different Experiential Modes and the Prospect of Scientific
Diversity
4.3 Empiricism Entails Pluralism
5. DOES PLURALISM LEAD TO SCEPTICISM OR
SYNCRETISM?
5.1 The Question ofP luralism 79
5.2 The Defects ofS cepticism 80
5.3 Pluralism without Scepticism 88
5.4 Syncretism and its Defects 90
5.5 Pluralism without ;,)ncretism 95
5.6 Is Pluralism Self-Refuting? 96
viii CONTENTS
6. PLURALISM WITHOUT INDIFFERENTISM
6. I Against Indifftrentist Relativism g8
6.2 A Foothold of One's Own 106
6.3 The Arbitrament of Experience 114
6.4 Some Possible Objections to an Empiricist Approach 117
6.5 Pluralism is Compatible with Rational Commitment Ilg
7. PROBLEMS OF EVALUATIVE CONSENSUS
7. I Consensus and Rvaluative Norms 127
7.2 The Issue of Axiological Consensus: Value Diversity and the
Key Role of Experience 130
7.3 Is Evaluative Disagreement Irrational? 132
7.4 Cognitive Ramifications of Value Disagreement 135
7.5 Is Value Disagreement Communally Incapacitating? 136
8. DOES COMMUNICATION REQUIRE CONSENSUS?
8.1 Is Communication Predicated on Consensus? 137
8.2 The Communicative Dispensability of Common Conception 138
8.3 The Presumption of Communicative Intent 143
8.4 Communication Can Dispense with Shared Beliefs and Values 147
8.5 Does Communication Presuppose a Pursuit of Consensus? 151
9. IS CONSENSUS REQUIRED FOR A BENIGN SOCIAL
ORDER?
g. 1 The Question of Practical Consensus
g.2 Some Examples of Productive Modes of Dissensus
9.3 Productive Versus Unproductive Modes of Conflict
9.4 Acquiescence and Controlled Conflict
g.S A Consideration ofS ome Objections
g.6 The Rationale of an Acquiescence-Oriented Approach
9.7 Is Consensus a Requisite for Co-operation?
10. PROBLEMS OF CONSENSUS AS A POI.JTICAL IDEAL
10.1 A Political Perspective ,86
10.2 Problems of Idealization and the Search for a Realistic
Middle Wa.r
'0.3 Is Consensus a Valid Ideal?
Bibliography 201
Index ofN ames 207
Introduction
For much of the history of Western philosophy, consensus
uniformity of belief and evaluation-has been viewed as a
desideratum whose ultimate realization can be taken as
assured. Aquinas, in the Middle Ages, regarded consensus on
fundamentals as a condition assured by God; Kant, in the
eighteenth century, considered it as something rooted in the
very nature of Reason; Hegel, in the nineteenth century, saw it
as guaranteed by the spirit of cultivation working through the
march of history ever enlarging its hold on human Society;
Habermas in the twentieth century sees it as inherent in the
very nature of Communication as an indispensible social praxis.
Throughout much of the tradition consensus was viewed not
just as something to be desired, but as something whose
eventual actualization is effectively assured by some principle
deep-rooted in the nature of things as we humans confront
them in this world.
By contrast, many present-day writers invest social consensus
not with confidence, but with hope. They look upon inter
personal agreement as a substitute for the assun;d verities of
an earlier era in whose realization they have lost faith. Thus
Thomas Kuhn, considering objective rationality to be an
illusion, abandons the rational mandates of logical positivism
to seek refuge in paradigms defined by community standards.
Again, the 'strong programme' in the sociology of science of
the Edinburgh school regards 'scientific progress' not as a
matter of rationally validated knowledge but simply as one of
group agreement forced under the pressure of political
constraints. Various such currently popular tendencies of
thought see rational standards as notable for their absence,
with consensual opinion called upon to stand in their stead.