Table Of ContentPLATO ON JUSTICE AND POWER
By the same author
ART AND REALITY: John Anderson on Literature and Aesthetics (editor with
janet Anderson and Graham Cullum)
Plato on Justice and
Power
Reading Book I of Plato's Republic
Kimon Lycos
Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
© Kimon Lycos 1987
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1987 978-0-333-40663-2
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First published 1987 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
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and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
ISBN 978-1-349-08487-6 ISBN 978-1-349-08485-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-08485-2
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
Reprinted 1993
To the memory of Mari Kuttna
and John Lycos
Contents
Preface viii
I Introduction: 'T uming the Soul Around' I
PART ONE: DRAMA TIC CHARACTERISATION
2 Old Recipes about Justice 2I
3 Thrasymachus on Justice and Power 40
4 The Function of 'Thrasymachus' in Plato's Text 54
PART TWO: THE ARGUMENT
5 Defining Justice 73
6 Limits on the Just 93
7 Power, Skill and Ruling 106
8 Excellence and the Motivational Structure of the Just 120
9 Socrates Sketches the 'Power' of Justice 137
10 Conclusion: the Socratic Vision I 54
Notes and References I75
Bibliography I94
Index I98
Preface
The idea for this book would not have occurred to me if I had not been
confronted over a number of years with generations of puzzled, resisting, and,
even, irritated students. Though these were not the only responses to being
introduced to Plato's Republic, they were the most fruitful for me. For the probing
criticisms and imaginative suggestions of such students I am deeply grateful.
They made me realise that though the basic ideas in the Republic are clear enough,
what a modern audience finds somewhat difficult to grasp is the intellectual
motivation underlying the perspective on justice that inspires the work. It
gradually dawned on me that the best way of making this clear was through a
particular way of reading Book l-one which sought to bring forth its positive
force as a philosophical intervention in the socio-political climate of Plato's time.
Existing commentaries on the Republic, though sound and sometimes
outstanding, read Book I as consisting of a set of negative arguments against
existing views of justice, thus emphasising the argumentative aspect of Socrates'
philosophising. These arguments are often found to be implausible and
inconclusive. As a consequence the deeper, reflective, aspects of Socrates'
philosophising remain unexposed, especially to students. The task. I thought. was
to try to remedy this, hoping to achieve two interconnected objectives: to render
intelligible and plausible the reasons why Socrates and Plato were critical of the
state of thinking about justice in their culture; and to introduce a style of reading
Plato's text that elicited the value and import of the questions it led to, rather than
assessing the merit of the theories found in it. This method of reading could, of
course, have been applied to the whole of the Republic, as well as to other
dialogues. My decision to confine myself to Book I was dictated by the idea that,
being a record of how Plato chose to introduce his major thought on justice, it
would contain traces of what enlivened that thought as a reflective response to
features of his own culture. My hope, in concentrating on that Book, was to
revive in contemporary readers a sense of how relevant to our present situation is
that type of response. I was concerned to make manifest the type of thinking and
attitude that led to Socratic questioning; I was less concerned with Plato's
positive theory of justice which, in any case, has been the subject of much
excellent comment in recent times.
My considerable intellectual debt to such comment, in particular to that of
Irwin, Annas and White, will be evident to all those who consult the notes. I am
also grateful for the comments and criticisms of all those colleagues, in Australia
and elsewhere, who heard different versions of some of the chapters and who
viii
Preface ix
forced me to reconsider my views. A great debt of gratitude is also due to
anonymous readers whose meticulous suggestions about many aspects of the
book I wish I had been better able to follow. I owe a very special debt to my
colleague Dr Genevieve Lloyd who kindly read the first draft of the book and
who made comments which have been invaluable; without her encouragement I
doubt whether I would have completed the work.
Finally, my warmest thanks go to Jean Ryan for the enormous patience and
understanding with which she approached the daunting task of converting my
scribble into clear typing, and to Catriona MacKenzie and Petra Gilfedder for
invaluable assistance with proof-reading and general help with the book.
K.L.
1
Introduction: 'Turning the Soul
Around'
THE OBJECTIVES
The subject-matter of the Republic is the nature of justice (dikaiosyne), and its
relation to human well-being (eudaimonia).1 It is widely recognised that the work
belongs to the 'middle' period of Plato's writing career, even though Book I, the
concern of this study, bears all the characteristics of an 'early' or 'Socratic'
dialogue. Indeed, some scholars in the past thought it was an early dialogue, the
'Thrasymachus', which Plato had tacked on to the rest of the Republic as it has
come down to us.2 Whatever the vicissitudes of the composition of Book I, it
cannot be denied that it differs markedly in style from the rest of the Republic.
Though the dialogue form is retained throughout, it is only Book I which presents
strongly characterised interlocutors and elaborate dramatic setting. From Book II
until the end, Socrates, the principal character of the dialogue, presents a positive
account of justice, showing why, understood in the way he proposes, justice must
benefit the individuals and communities which possess it. By contrast, Book I is
fundamentally 'Socratic': it contains highly dramatic characterisation of Socrates'
interlocutors as they react to his method of critical examination (the elenchos). It
ends on an inconclusive note: Socrates questions certain ways of thinking about
justice because they cannot explain why it is a mark of excellence in individuals
and communities. An understanding of the 'true' or 'real' nature of justice is
required to show its links with excellence and human well-being. Yet, in Book I
Socrates and his interlocutors fail to articulate such an understanding. The
Republic, from Book II on, may be seen as making a fresh, positive, start to deal
with this issue; resulting in a work which came to play an enormously influential
role in the moral and political thinking of the West.3
Looked at this way, the relation of Book I to the rest of the Republic is that of an
introduction or preamble to the main discussion (it is called so by Socrates at 35 7
a2). Themes, ideas and sketches of arguments are introduced which receive their
full elaboration and explanation later on; the main function of the first Book being
to clear the ground of mistaken or inadequate accounts of justice in order to make
room for the new theory.4 This fits in well with standard estimations of Socrates'
I
