Table Of ContentPiercing the Fog
Intelligence and Army Air Forces
Operations in World War I1
John F. Kreis
General Editor
with contributions by
Alexander S. Cochran, Jr.
Robert C. Ehrhart
Thomas A. Fabyanic
Robert F. Futrell
John F. Kreis
Williamson Murray
Air Force History and Museums Program
Bolling Air Force Base
Washington, D.C., 1996
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Piercing the fog: intelligence and Army Air Forces operations in World War I1
I John F. Kreis, general editor; with contributions by Alexander S. Cochran
. . . [et al.].
p. cm. - (Special studies I AF History and Museums Program)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. World War, 1939-1945-Military intelligence-United States. 2.
United States. Army Air Forces-History-World War, 1939-1945. 3.
World War, 1939-1945-Aerial operations, American. I. Kreis, John F.,
1940- . 11. Series: Special studies (Air Force History and Museums
Program (U.S.))
D810.S7P49 1995
940.54'49734~20 95-1 1550
CIP
~~ ~~ ~
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402
ii
FOREWORD
WHENJ APAN ATTACKED PEARL, HARBOR on December 7,1941, and
Germany and Italy joined Japan four days later in declaring war against the
United States, intelligence essential for the Army Air Forces to conduct
effective warfare in the European and Pacific theaters did not exist. Piercing the
Fog tells the intriguing story of how airmen built intelligence organizations to
collect and process information about the enemy and to produce and dissemi-
nate intelligence to decisionmakers and warfighters in the bloody, horrific
crucible of war. Because the problems confronting and confounding air
intelligence officers, planners, and operators fifty years ago still resonate,
Piercing the Fog is particularly valuable for intelligence officers, planners, and
operators today and for anyone concerned with acquiring and exploiting
intelligence for successful air warfare. More than organizational history, this
book reveals the indispensable and necessarily secret role intelligence plays in
effectively waging war. It examines how World War I1 was a watershed period
for Air Force Intelligence and for the acquisition and use of signals intelligence,
photo reconnaissance intelligence, human resources intelligence, and scientific
and technical intelligence.
Piercing the Fog discusses the development of new sources and methods
of intelligence collection; requirements for intelligence at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of warfare; intelligence to support missions for
air superiority, interdiction, strategic bombardment, and air defense; the sharing
of intelligence in a coalition and joint service environment; the acquisition of
intelligence to assess bomb damage on a target-by-target basis and to measure
progress in achieving campaign and war objectives; and the ability of military
leaders to understand the intentions and capabilities of the enemy and to
appreciate the pressures on intelligence officers to sometimes tell commanders
what they think the commanders want to hear instead of what the intelligence
discloses. The complex problems associated with intelligence to support
strategic bombardment in the 1940s will strike some readers as uncannily
prescient to global Air Force operations in the 1990s.
A half century ago, accurate, timely intelligence contributed significantly
to victory and hastened the end of World War 11. Such a legacy is worth reading
and thinking about by all those responsible for building, maintaining, and
employing air power. How well intelligence is integrated with air operations is
...
111
Foreword
even more important today than it was in the past. It will continue to prove as
critical in the next century as it has been in this one.
RICHARD P. HALLION
Air Force Historian
iv
PREFACE
THE
MILITARY CALAMITY IN EUROPE in mid- 1940 called into serious
question the ability of Great Britain to survive before the Geman onslaught.
The near collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1941 after Germany’s invasion
prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to conclude he would eventually
have no choice but to take up active, declared participation in the conflict.
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, followed by Hitler’s declaration
of war on the United States, decided the how and when. The Japanese attack not
only plunged America into the war; the surprise of that attack underscored the
woeful state of American military intelligence. Unable to meet the demands of
field commanders and planners, military intelligence deficiencies imperiled
efforts of the Army and Navy to defeat the enemies ranged against them
worldwide.
The Army Air Forces (AAF) were particularly deficient in information
about enemy air forces and targets, a situation prompted by the AAF’s
subsidiary position within the Army and by the limited understanding of the
new art of air warfare. Improvements in that understanding and in the
relationships between intelligence analysis and the use of its product in
preparing first-rate offensive and defensive air and joint air-land-sea operations
are the subject of this history.
This volume treats the wartime period between 1941 and 1945, although
preliminary discussion explores the interwar era, a time when the U.S. Army
Air Corps developed an air doctrine that would place such strenuous demands
on air intelligence during World War 11. For the wartime period, the study
weighs the impact of air intelligence on doctrine, planning, strategy, tactics,
resources, and joint and combined operations. This history addresses the various
tools of intelligence including ULTRA,M AGIC, photointelligence, and Y
intelligence. Human intelligence, the information from agents knowledgeable
about enemy areas, is addressed in those geographical regions where it
influenced air operations. In recounting events of the Pacific war, place names
are spelled as they were at the time, and Japanese personal names are presented
with the family name preceding the given name.
Works of this nature and magnitude are possible only with the generous
assistance of a variety of institutions and individuals. The authors are indebted
to the Yale University Library for permission to cite and quote from the Henry
L. Stimson Diaries and to the helpful staffs at the Library of Congress,
V
Preface
Manuscript Division; the National Archives, Military Reference Branch, and the
Washington National Records Center; The U.S. Army Military History
Institute; the Air Force Historical Research Center; Air University Library; and
the Reference Branch at the Air Force History Support Office. A special thanks
is offered to those historians at the Air Force History Support Office who
diligently read and critiqued the numerous early drafts and the publication
division for turning draft work into final form.
Eagle Aviation Services and Technology, Inc. (EAST, Inc.), of Chantilly,
Virginia, researched and wrote this book while under contract to the U.S. Air
Force. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters,
USAF, provided the funding, while the Air Force History and Museums Pro-
gram served as executive agent for project oversight.
Special thanks are owed Maj. Gen. James C. Pfautz (USAF, Ret.), who
sponsored and fully supported this project while serving as Assistant Chief of
Air Staff, Intelligence, and to Richard H. Kohn, former Air Force Historian,
who saw the work undertaken. It fell to the members of the final review panel
to read the manuscript in its entirety, and to these people the authors owe
special appreciation for their insights and advice. Richard G. Davis, Diane T.
Putney, Herman Wolk, R. Cargill Hall, Eduard Mark, and Col. David Tretler
represented the Office of Air Force History on the panel, while Richard Wolf
participated from the Air Force Intelligence Agency. The panel’s outside
scholars included General Pfautz, who long believed that a historical analysis
of this nature would be of interest to the informed public, B. Franklin Cooling
of the Department of Energy, Ray Cline, formerly of the Office of Strategic
Serviczs and the Central Intelligence Agency, Capt. Roger Pineau (USN, Ret.),
who served as an intelligence officer in the Pacific during World War 11,
Kenneth McDonald of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Edward J. Drea of
the U.S. Army Center for Military History. The suggestions and perspective
offered by the outside scholars were especially helpful.
The authors are indebted to Frank W. Anderson, former NASA deputy
historian and an Air Force intelligence officer during World War 11, for the
substantive editorial support he brought to this project and to Barbara Wittig,
project editor for this volume.
vi
AUTHORS
ALEXANDER
S. COCHRAN, Jr., teaches military history and strategy as a
Professor of Military History at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama. He received a B.A. in history from Yale University and a Ph.D. in
history from the University of Kansas. His publications include The MAGIC
Diplomatic Summaries and Lemnitzer: His Life and Times, as well as numerous
book chapters and articles on World War I1 strategy and intelligence.
Professor ROBERT C. EHRHART is editor and principal author of Modern
Warfare and Society, coeditor of Air Power and Warfare, and author of several
articles on military history and airpower doctrine. A twenty-year veteran of the
U.S. Air Force, he holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Texas at
Austin and an M.S. in ForestryIRange Management from the University of
Montana. He serves as a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of
Montana’s School of Forestry.
THOMAS A. FABYANIC is President of Eagle Aviation Services and
Technology (EAST), Inc. He is the author of Strategic Air Attack in the United
States Air Force: A Case Study and of various chapters and articles on war, air
doctrine, and military professionalism. He earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in
history at St. Louis University.
ROBERT FRANK FUTRELL holds a B.A. and an M.A. from the
University of Mississippi and a Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University. During
World War 11, he served as a historian with the U.S. Army Air Forces at the
AAF Tactical School and with the Far East Air Forces in the Philippines. He is
the author of The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953; The United
States Air Force in Southeast Asia, The Advisory Years to 1965; and Ideas,
Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force.
He is also the author of numerous articles related to air power history. Before
retirement, Futrell served for many years as aprofessor of military history at the
Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
JOHN F. KREIS, a retired U.S. Air Force officer, is a historian and military
and defense analyst as well as a Senior Fellow of the Air Force Historical
Foundation. He holds a B.A. in economics from Willamette University, Salem,
Oregon, and an M.A. in medieval history from the University of Delaware. He
is the author of Air Warjiare and Air Base Air Defense, 1914-1973, as well as
numerous articles on air power history and operations.
vii
Authors
WILLIAMSON MURRAY is Professor of History at The Ohio State
University and an Intelligence Officer in the U.S. Air Force Reserve. Among
his publications are Military Effectiveness (which he coauthored in three
volumes); Strategy for Defeat: The Lufhyaffe, 1933-1945, and the previous
edition, Lufhyaffe; and The Change in the European Balance of Power,
1938-1939: The Path to Ruin. He holds a B.A., an M.A., and a Ph.D. in history
from Yale University.
...
Vlll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD ................................................ iii
PREFACE ................................................... v
AUTHORS .................................................. vii
Introduction
John F . Kreis ................................ 1
Chapter 1 Early Intelligence Organization in the Army Air Corps
Thomas A. Fabyanic and Robert F . Futrell ....... 11
American Air Intelligence in World War I ........... 12
Air Intelligence in the 1920s ...................... 17
Air Intelligence in the Early 1930s .................2 0
The Air Corps Tactical School and Air Intelligence ....2 4
Acquisition and Evaluation of Air Intelligence:
Developments in Europe and Asia ..............2 8
The Approach of War ............................ 39
AWPD- 1: Planning an Air War .................... 46
Air Intelligence on the Eve of Pearl Harbor ...........5 1
A Tentative Assessment .......................... 54
Chapter 2 The Tools of Air Intelligence: ULTRA.M AGIC.
Photographic Assessment. and the Y -Service
Alexander S . Cochran. Jr., Robert C. Ehrhart. and
John F . Kreis ............................. 57
ULTRA. ....................................... 59
The Importance of ULTRAi n the European Theater .....7 4
Photointelligence ............................... 80
Y Intelligence .................................. 94
ULTRAa nd MAGICin the Pacific and CBI ............9 9
B Section .................................... 105
Operational SIGINT and the Far East ..............1 06
ix
