Table Of ContentPICTURES, IMAGES, AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Florida State University
Editors:
DONALD DAVIDSON, University of Chicago
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University ofL eyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, University ofA rizona
VOLUME 151
JOSEPH C. PITT
Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
PICTURES, IMAGES,
AND
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
An Analysis of Wilfrid Sellars' Philosophy of Science
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT: HOLLAND / BOSTON: U.S.A.
LONDON: ENGLAND
library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Pitt, Joseph C.
Pictures, images, and conceptual change.
(Synthese library ; v. 151)
Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.
1. Sci.,mce-Philosophy. 2. Change. 3. Sellars,
Wilfrid. I. Title.
Q175.P55 501 81-8705
ISBN-13: 978-90-277-1277-6 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-009-8482-0
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-8482-0
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T ABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x
CHAPTER 1/ PICTURES AND TELEOLOGY
1. Science, Philosophy, and Change 1
2. Images 5
3. Pictures and Coherent Images 10
4. Truth and Explanation 14
5. Explanationism 15
CHAPTER II / RULES OF INFERENCE, INDUCTION, AND
AMPLIATIVE FRAMEWORKS 23
1. Ampliative Inference 23
2. Sellarsian Rules of Inference 25
3. Goodman on Induction and the Scientific Framework 32
4. Quine, Induction, and Natural Kinds 43
5. Conclusion 51
CHAPTER III / INDUCTION AND JUSTIFICATION 52
1. Introduction 52
2. Rules, Theories, and Conceptual Frameworks 53
3. Justification, Probability, and Acceptance 56
4. The Meaning of 'Probable' 59
5. 'Probable' Versus the Ground-Consequence Relation 64
6. The Purpose of Probability Arguments 68
7. Practical Reasoning 70
8. Modes of Probability 76
CHAPTER IV / THEORIES 91
1. Introduction 91
2. The Sellarsian View of a Theory; an Introduction 94
3. Sellars and Nagel on the Formal Structure of Theories 95
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vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. The Observation Framework 103
5. Correspondence Rules (C-Ru1es) 104
6. Explanation 109
7. Ontological Preliminaries 113
8. Explanation and Existence 115
9. Explanation and Two Senses of 'About' 117
10. Explanation Versus Derivation 119
11. The Theoretician's Dilemma and the Levels Theory of Theories 122
12. Sellarsian Systematization 125
13. Explanation and Existence: The Role of C-Rules 127
CHAPTER V I CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 136
I. Introduction 136
2. The Scientific Image: a Reconsideration 137
3. Ontological Necessity 142
4. Reasonableness and Rationality 144
5. Conceptual Change 146
6. Rationality Versus Reasonableness 151
NOTES 154
BIBLIOGRAPHY 156
INDEX OF NAMES 159
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 161
PREFACE
In this essay I am concerned with the problem of conceptual change. There
are, needless to say, many ways to approach the issue. But, as I see it, the
problem reduces to showing how present and future systems of thought are
the rational extensions of prior ones. This goal may not be attainable. Kuhn,
for example, suggests that change is mainly a function of socio-economic
pressures (taken broadly). But there are some who believe that a case can be
made for the rationality of change, especially in science. Wilfrid Sellars is one
of those.
While Sellars has developed a full account of the issues involved in solving
the problem of conceptual change, he is also a very difficult philosopher to
discuss. The difficulty stems from the fact that he is a philosopher in the very
best sense of the word. First, he performs the tasks of analyzing alternative
views with both finesse and insight, dialectically laying bare the essentials
of problems and the inadequacies of previous proposals. Secondly, he is a
systematic philosopher. That is, he is concerned to elaborate a system of
philosophical thought in the grand tradition stretching from Plato to White
head. Now with all of this to his credit, it would appear that there is no
difficulty at all, one should simply treat him like all the others, if he indeed
follows in the footsteps of past builders of philosophic systems. Yes, but that
is precisely the problem, for how do you treat the great philosophers of the
past? You either examine the systems for consistency, evaluate the merits of
the presuppositions utilized and conclusions derived, or attempt to fit the
views into the developing history of philosophy.
Trying to determine the consistency with which Sellars works out his ideas
presents a set of problems of its own. To begin with, he argues to his own
conclusions dialectically, subtly playing off real and imagined points as they
meet his needs. The matter is complicated by the often frustrating promissory
notes. It is not that he fails to eventually make good on them, it is just dif
ficult to put all the pieces together at anyone time, since they emerge in
apparent random order.
Given those difficulties, we can try a different approach and attempt an
evaluation of his presuppositions and conclusions. But given the piecemeal
fashion by which the system is played out, the exact force of the presup-
vii
viii PREFACE
positions is hard to determine. Furthermore, the system is incomplete and
premature judgment tends to lead to unhappy results when you pick up the
next issue of some journal.
Finally there is the option of seeing Sellars in historical garments. This is
well nigh impossible for a man who is deeply indebted to Kant, Wittgenstein
(early and late), Carnap, Pritchard, Aristotle and Peirce. If we try to label
him in terms of schools of philosophical thought - even limited to the
twentieth century - we are somewhat stymied, for he is a systematic analytic
Wittgensteinian who is also a pragmatic scientific realist.
While I am generally sympathetic to the types of considerations to which
Sellars attends, there are two areas in which I see problems. First, while like
Sellars, I do not believe that there is conflict between what he calls the scien
tific and the manifest images of man, I nevertheless find his account of their
relation inadequate. Second, his theory of probability, on which his account
of the development of new theories rests, suffers from several conceptual
difficulties. In dealing with these difficulties there is obvious need for know
ing how these issues bear on his general system. Such global conSiderations,
however, are beyond the scope of this work. My objective is limited. I am
concerned with Sellars' vision of the future of scientific development and the
manner in which he works out these ideas using the notion of a conceptual
framework. The view I defend in the long run owes much to Sellars' views,
but incorporates a number of ideas contrary to his concerning the relation
between these frameworks and the world. My skeptical conclusions are more
the result of my own inability to put content on the bones of conceptual
framework language than a clear rejection of Sellars' position. Also, I hope to
show that what he wants can be done in a somewhat more straightforward
fashion.
Chapter One provides an overview of Sellars' philosophy of science, touch
ing on what I take to be key areas of interest for our purposes. Specific
attention is paid to Sellars' Peircean view that science is a process which will
culminate in a complete theory at some future point.
One of Sellars' more important contributions to the discussion of change
lies in his insistence on the rationality of scientific inquiry. In Chapter Two
the sense in which inductive inference is presupposed as a rational mode of
reasoning is discussed. Sellars' views here are compared with Goodman's and
Quine's.
Utilizing the presuppositions argued for in the discussion of induction,
Chapter Three focuses on Sellars' theory of probability. It is to provide the
mechanism whereby new information is generalized and worked into the
PREFACE ix
theoretical structure of science formalized in terms of a theory. How theories
function is the topic of Chapter Four.
In the fmal chapter I argue against Sellars, not merely because of the
problems in the theory of probability, but because of complications in the
conceptual apparatus he generates to handle the sense in which science
evolves. Traditional attempts to explicate the rationality of science are based
on the idea that some steady progress is being made toward a full account of
the physical universe. Changes in theories are judged rational or not in terms
of the contribution such changes make toward achieving this end. While
Sellars disagrees with more traditional approaches on many points, he shares
this assumption and I fmd it suspect. But to deny that change is rational is
not to deny it is reasonable. My argument concludes that change in science
can be described as reasonable and, hence,justified ifit can be explained. The
broad extension of this idea asserts the non-rationality of conceptual change
in general, but likewise does not deny its intelligibility.
Various points covered in my discussions here have appeared elsewhere in
somewhat altered form. Part of Chapter III appeared in Philosophy Research
Archives, Vol. II as 'Wilfred Sellars' Theory of Probability'. A large section
of Chapter IV appeared in Diaiectica, Vol. 34 as 'Hempel versus Sellars on
Explanation'. In addition I drew liberally from the general presentation to
formulate my introduction to The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and
Rejoinders.
Needless to say, the friends, colleagues and teachers whom I must thank
for their varied assistance and encouragement are many, too many to all be
given proper acknowledgment. A special word of thanks is due Robert Butts
for his efforts to help me understand what is important; Frank Neumann
and Bob Cohen have been continuing sources of encouragement; and Betty Q.
Davis is gratefully noted for her cheerful typing and editing. But this work is
due mostly to Donna's patience and constant support, and it is to her that I
give my final thanks.
Newport, Virginia JOSEPH C. PITT
15 November 1980
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
'The Language of Theories' by Wilfrid Sellars from Current Issues in The
Philosophy of Science, edited by Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell.
Copyright © 1961 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Reprinted by per
mission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
'The Theoreticians Dilemma' by Wilfrid Sellars. Reprinted with permission
of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. from Aspects of Scientific Explanation
by Carl G. Hempel. Copyright © 1965 by The Free Press, a Division of
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
Fact, Fiction and Forecast by Nelson Goodman, published by Harvard
University Press, 1955, reprinted by permission.
'Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man' by Wilfrid Sellars, reprinted
from Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, Robert G. Colodny, editor.
Published in 1962 by the University of Pittsburgh Press. Used by per
mission.
Wilfrid Sellars, 'Theoretical Explanation', Philosophy of Science: The Dela
ware Seminar, Vol. 2, edited by Bernhard H. Baumrin (New York: John
Wiley - Interscience), pp. 329-331.
The Structure of Science by Ernest Nagel, by permission of Ernest Nagel
and Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
'Scientific Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism' by Wilfrid Sellars in Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2, edited by R. Cohen and
M. Wartofsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel), by permission of Humanities Press
Inc., New Jersey 07716, and by permission of D. Reidel Publishing Com
pany.
Science and Metaphysics by Wilfrid Sellars (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1968), reprinted by permission of Humanities Press Inc., New
Jersey, 07716, and by permission of Routledge and Kegan Paul.
'Some Reflections on Language Games' by Wilfrid Sellars, reprinted from
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 21, 1954, copyright © The Williams & Wilkins
Co., Baltimore.
'Induction as Vindication' by Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 31,
No.3, 1964. Reprinted by permission of The Philosophy of Science
Association.
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