Physicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind-Body Problem

275 Pages·2019·1.182 MB·English

by  Kevin Morris

PHysICAlIsM DeConsTrUCTeD
How should thought and consciousness be understood within a
view of the world as being through-and-through physical? Many
philosophers have proposed nonreductive, levels-based positions,
according to which the physical domain is fundamental, while
thought and consciousness are higher-level processes, dependent on
and determined by physical processes. In this book, Kevin Morris’s
careful philosophical and historical critique shows that it is very dif-
ficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea – notions such
as supervenience, physical realization, and metaphysical grounding
all fail to articulate a viable nonreductive, levels-based physical-
ism. Challenging assumptions about the mind–body problem and
providing new perspectives on the debate over physicalism, this
accessible and comprehensive book will interest scholars working in
metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science.
Kevin Morris is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Tulane
University. His work on the metaphysics of physicalism and the
mind–body problem has appeared in journals including The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,
Erkenntnis, and Philosophical Studies.

PHysICAlIsM
DeConsTrUCTeD
Levels of Reality and the Mind–Body Problem
KevIn MorrIs
Tulane University, Louisiana
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First published 2019
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Contents
List of Figures page vii
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
I.1 nonreductive Physicalism and the Mind–Body Problem 1
I.2 one-level Physicalism 8
I.3 Preliminaries 14
1 supervenience and nonreductive Physicalism 21
1.1 Introduction 21
1.2 The rise and Fall of the supervenience Approach to Physicalism 22
1.3 What is Wrong with Brute supervenience? 27
1.4 Physicalism, supervenience, and supervenient Dualism 37
1.5 The real Problem with supervenience-Based Definitions 48
1.6 Conclusion 51
2 nonreductive Physicalism and the exclusion Problem 52
2.1 Introduction 52
2.2 The exclusion Problem: Ideas and Articulation 53
2.3 The exclusion Problem and the Close Connection
Between Mental and Physical Causes 68
2.4 The exclusion Problem and the Theory of Causation 76
2.5 Conclusion 90
3 Functional realization 92
3.1 Introduction 92
3.2 realization and Physicalism 94
3.3 Functional realization and nonreductive Physicalism 97
3.4 Functional reduction as logical reduction? 103
3.5 A Better logic for Functional reduction 107
3.6 nonreductive Functional realization 118
3.7 Functional realization and Dimensioned realization 121
3.8 Conclusion 126
v
vi Contents
4 subset realization 127
4.1 Introduction 127
4.2 subset realization, Physical Properties, and Physical Powers 132
4.3 subset realization and the Causal Theory of Properties 141
4.4 The subset relation Between Powers and the exclusion Problem 147
4.5 Conclusion 154
5 Grounding and Physicalism 156
5.1 Introduction 156
5.2 Too Many Primitive Grounding relations? 160
5.3 recent Critiques of Grounding-Based Physicalism 163
5.4 Grounding, one-level Physicalism, and
nonskeptical Antirealism 172
5.5 Conclusion 182
6 The rise of nonreductive Physicalism 184
6.1 Introduction 184
6.2 Heil on levels of reality and the Picture Theory 188
6.3 The Unity of science and Intertheoretical
reduction in logical empiricism 191
6.4 logical empiricism and the rise of nonreductive Physicalism 199
6.5 Conclusion 213
7 The Physicalist Problematic reconsidered 214
7.1 Introduction 214
7.2 A relations-Based Diagnosis of the rise and
Fall of nonreductive Physicalism 215
7.3 one-level Physicalism and nonskeptical Antirealism 224
7.4 The Physicalist Problematic 235
7.5 Conclusion 244
Conclusion 246
References 249
Index 261
Figures
I.1 levels of reality page 4
1.1 supervenience and levels 25
2.1 The causal exclusion problem 54
2.2 same-level higher-level causation 55
2.3 Textbook overdetermination 58
3.1 Common cause structures 109
3.2 Common cause structures and exclusionist intuitions 110
4.1 The standard picture of higher-level causation 151
4.2 The one causing picture of higher-level causation 152
6.1 Fodor’s picture of the special sciences 201
7.1 Physical properties pointing at higher-level properties 218
7.2 Higher-level properties emanating from within the physical 219
7.3 Higher-level properties carved out from the physical 220
7.4 Truthmaking and levels of reality 225
vii

Acknowledgments
The ideas in this book trace back to my dissertation work, starting
around 2007. During this time, I have benefited from the intellectual
and personal generosity of many people.
I would like to thank the following for helpful comments on this and
related work (in alphabetical order): Paul Audi, robert Barnard, David
Bennett, nathan Biebel, Dan Burnston, Alex Gelb, John Heil, Chris Hill,
robert Howell, Jaegwon Kim, Bernie Kobes, Doug Kutach, neil Manson,
Ausonio Marras, sam Moulton, Alyssa ney, Max Pines, Jeffrey Poland,
Tom Polger, randall rose, Kevin sharpe, Jessica Wilson, Donovan Wishon,
Gene Witmer, Chiwook Won, and Tim yenter. I have also benefited from
comments and questions at conference presentations, as well as from my
many excellent graduate and undergraduate students at Tulane University. I
received helpful comments and suggestions from two anonymous reviewers
at Cambridge University Press, as well as from Hilary Gaskin at the Press.
Alyssa Walker did a superb job editing and proofreading near-final drafts of
the manuscript. I enjoyed many conversations, philosophical and otherwise,
with Jon Altschul, who unexpectedly passed away in 2016.
I would like to thank the philosophy departments at The College of
new Jersey, Brown University, northern Arizona University, and Tulane
University for providing me with engaging environments to pursue my
philosophical endeavors. I am especially grateful to roy Clouser, rick
Kamber, and Consuelo Preti at The College of new Jersey, Chris Hill and
Jaegwon Kim at Brown, George rudebusch at northern Arizona, and
Bruce Brower at Tulane. I am fortunate, even lucky, to have the opportu-
nity to live as a philosopher.
Finally, I would like to thank the following for personal support and
generosity since my start in academic philosophy around 1999 (also in
alphabetical order): ningning Du, stephanie elder, Joe Florentino, shan
Mason, Allison Morris, Michael Morris, sonia Morris, and Consuelo Preti.
Thanks to everyone!
ix
x Acknowledgments
several chapters discuss ideas and arguments from my previously
published articles. All of the material has been rewritten with the aim of
improving the arguments and clarifying the ideas. In many cases I draw
connections and pursue arguments well beyond those in the articles.
I would like to thank oxford University Press for permission to draw
from “Does Functional reduction need Bridge laws? A response
to Marras,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2009),
647–57.
I would like to thank springer Publishing for permission to draw from
“on Two Arguments for subset Inheritance,” Philosophical Studies 163
(2013), 197–211; “supervenience Physicalism, emergentism, and the
Polluted supervenience Base,” Erkenntnis 79 (2014), 351–65; “Against
Disanalogy-style responses to the exclusion Problem,” Philosophia 43
(2015), 435–53; and “Physicalism, Truthmaking, and levels of reality:
Problems and Prospects,” Topoi (2016).
I would like to thank Wiley Publishing for permission to draw from
“Guidelines for Theorizing About realization,” The Southern Journal of
Philosophy 48 (2010), 393–416; “subset realization, Parthood, and Causal
overdetermination,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011), 363–79;
“Causal Closure, Causal exclusion, and supervenience Physicalism,”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2014), 72–86; and “What’s Wrong
With Brute supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and
superdupervenience,” Analytic Philosophy 59 (2018), 256–80.
Finally, I would like to thank Taylor & Francis for permission to draw
from “subset realization and Physical Identification,” Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 41 (2011), 317–35.