Table Of ContentPHYSICAL SCIENCE AND
PHYSICAL REALITY
PHYSICAL SCIENCE
AND
PHYSICAL REALITY
by
LOUIS O. KATTSOFF
Harpur College
State University of N.Y .
•
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
1957
ISBN 978-94-017-5709-6 ISBN 978-94-017-6048-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-6048-5
Copyright I957 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Martinus NiJhof/, The Hague, Netherlands in I957
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition I957
Alt right reserveă, incluăing the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
INTRODUCTION
Any attempt to give a complete bibliography is doomed to
failure. There are therefore undoubtedly many fine pieces not
mentioned anywhere in this book. To their authors I apologize
and plead the restrictions of time and the demands of exposition.
What did not fit immediately and obviously into the points
under discussion was not cited.
The book is intended both as a text and as an expression of
personal opinions. It is hoped that it will be useful to those who
seek an introduction to the philosophy of science as well as those
who seek insight into the nature of science and its contributions
to our knowledge of the external world. No attempt is made,
however, to pander to those whose ignorance of the results of
science make an appreciation of science impossible. I have,
therefore, assumed that my readers will know something about
science and its history. The examples and illustrations have,
however, been taken from elementary physics as far as possible.
I have tried to avoid both popular science and entertaining
history of science. This book is concerned with philosophical
questions and issues and not with science proper or popular.
I wish to express my indebtedness to Professor C. Hempel,
whose influence will be evident even where I disagree with
him. The earlier half of the manuscript was written while I was
on sabbatical as a Research Fellow at Yale University (1954)
and I attended Hempel's lectures.
Mr. John Parker, Jr. very kindly helped read the proofs and
made many valuable suggestions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction v
PART I
INTRODUCTORY - THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
I. Introduction to the Philosophy of Physical Science 3
II. Science as a Language 13
III. What Physical Science Talks about 26
PART II
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
IV. The Nature of Explanation 41
V. The Nature of Scientific Statements, Laws 57
VI. The Origination and Confirmation of Laws: The
Principle of Induction 72
VII. Truth and Probability of Laws 88
VIII. Causal and Non-Causal Laws 103
IX. The Nature of Hypotheses 117
X. Confirmation by Experimentation 132
XI. The Structure of Theories 148
PART III
SEMANTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
XII. The Vocabulary of Physical Science 165
XIII. Meaning of Scientific Terms 180
XIV. The Semantics of 'Space' 196
XV. The Semantics of 'Time' 212
XVI. Relativity-Motion 225
XVII. Matter-Quantum Theory 241
VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART IV
META-PHYSICAL CONSIDERATIONS
XVIII. Causality 259
XIX. Presuppositions of Science 274
XX. Physics, Reality, and Perception 290
Indices 306
PART I
INTRODUCTORY
*
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PHYSICAL SCIENCE 1
All attempts to write on the philosophy of science threaten to
be wrecked on one or another now prominent hazards. A phi
losophy of science may meet its doom either on the arid desert of
a recapitulation of the development of science or in the ethereal
swift flood waters of the efforts to harmonize religion and
science. Yet both of these threats to a philosophy of science
contain certain passages that must be kept clear if any philosophy
of science is to be achieved at all. The history of science, from the
philosopher's point of view, is important not because it gives
credit where credit is due, which is the historian's task, but
because it offers examples and paradigms of what science is like
and what it is about. Compare the great and valuable histories of
science by Thorndike and Sarton, carefully documented and
exact in all details, with that of the equally valuable one by
Dampier and the insights of Whitehead in Adventures of Ideas. A
philosophy of science can easily get lost in the chronology of
science while all it needs is the history of the development of
science. The basis of both the conflicts between and the attempts
to harmonize religion and science lies in the fact that the two are
world-views and no matter how one glosses over their divergences
they do differ. Science offers a way of looking at the world; so
does religion. Traditionally, philosophy has concerned itself with
world-views. "Atomism" is not a scientific term but a meta
physical one as are "naturalism", "idealism", and the other
school names.
In some quarters in recent years philosophy has come to be not
so much this as, rather, an analysis of the language used by
people who talk about anything whatsoever. I do not wish to take
issue with linguistic analysis in this book. I am indeed very
tolerant. If there are those who desire to spend their days on
1 Unless otherwise indicated, when I speak of science I mean physical science.
4 THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
linguistic problems connected with the sciences, I would not
interfere even if I could. What they are doing is important and I
intend to use their techniques and their results wherever it is
appropriate to do so. But so far as I am concerned, philosophy
ultimately busies itself with the construction of world-views and
with their critical evaluation. What we call 'science' has many
facets and many aspects. All of them are important but we do not
want to pin the tail on anyone part and shout 'science.' One
thing, however, seems perfectly clear to me at least: science does
involve a way of looking at things and indeed a way of talking
about that which concerns it-physical nature, in our case. It
should be evident that at least this philosophy of science does not
intend to restrict itself to methodological discussion alone or
simply to linguistic analysis of the language of science. To me
the 'philosophy of science' uses the term 'philosophy' in this
more traditional sense of world-view. In other words, I believe
that the philosophy of science is the metaphysics (comprising
ontology, cosmology) and epistemology of science. Only by some
such definition can the term 'philosophy of science' be given a
meaning that will differentiate it from 'science' proper. From
this point of view, moreover, the philosophy of science can enter
into reciprocal relations - amicable, I hope - with science. It
must absorb the results of science and it can offer methodological
suggestions to science. But it does not need to be a postulate set
for science from which specific matters of fact are to be derivable.
Nor should one expect that philosophical issues are to be solved
by going into the laboratory and setting up an experiment. The
philosophical issues connected with science are about science, not
in science. In the modern vernacular philosophical issues about
science are meta-scientific and not scientific. Yet it remains true
that the development of science is always the touchstone in
terms of which to verify statements about science. In this sense
the philosophy of science must be empirical and not merely
tautological.
The philosophy of science asks questions about science. It is
therefore an attempt to understand it. But how do we know when
we understand science?
Let me hasten to say in what sense science is "based" on
philosophy for in this way I can tell what I mean by under-
