Phronesis After Situationism (My Dissertation)

176 Pages·2013·0.86 MB·English

PHRONESIS AFTER SITUATIONISM
by
Edward C. DuBois
A Dissertation
Submitted to the University at Albany, State University of New York
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
College of Arts & Sciences
Department of Philosophy
2013
Abstract
Situationism, as put forward by John Doris' Lack of Character (2002) and several
short articles by Gilbert Harman (2003, 2000, 1999), is the philosophical position that is
skeptical of the existence of robust character traits of the kind that Aristotle described.
Situationism posits that human beings lack robust character traits and are too easily
made overconfident in their own behavioral abilities. Reams of social psychological data
suggest that such 'thick' character traits do not exist. Doris and Harman suggest that
subtle and potentially irrelevant situational cues may easily influence behavior.
Moreover, situational pressures may cause people to deviate from expected and self-
reported predictions of behavior. I claim that situationists like Doris and Harman move
too quickly in drawing conclusions about experimental data and generalizing them to the
rest of the population. Concerns exist regarding the methodology of such experiments,
and how situationism understands the term 'character trait.' Because of these
considerations, the challenge fails and AVE may retain talk of character traits in moral
psychology. Further, I argue that AVE must embrace the psychological fragility of
character traits, but not the psychological fragmentation of traits posited by
situationists. This prompts theoretical development of the concept of phronesis
(Aristotelian 'practical wisdom') as encompassing not only right reason applied to action,
but a kind of sensitivity or awareness of social cues that may influence our behavior.
Finally, I end the dissertation with a sketch of the moral imagination and its role in
deliberation and this revised understanding of Aristotelian phronesis.
ii
Contents
Abstract...............................................................................................................................ii
Contents.............................................................................................................................iii
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................v
Chapter One.......................................................................................................................1
1.Ia Preface....................................................................................................................1
1.Ib Why Aristotle?.........................................................................................................3
1.I Teleology, Excellence, and Virtue..........................................................................10
1.II Metaphysics, Ontology, and Psychology of the Virtues.........................................15
1.III Virtue, Desire, and Voluntary Action.....................................................................18
1.IV Character and Habit..............................................................................................22
1.V Practical Reason (Phronesis) and Action...............................................................25
1.VI The Explanatory and Predictive Power of Character.............................................28
Chapter
Two...................................................................................................................................32
2.I Situationism's Dispute with Aristotelian Characterology......................................32
2.II The Specific Challenges to Character: Doris' Situationism....................................42
2.III The Specific Challenges to Character: Harman's View..........................................47
Chapter Three...................................................................................................................55
3.1a The Rara Avis Reply to Situationism......................................................................56
3.I Critique of Harman................................................................................................58
3.II Lack of Character, Critiqued..................................................................................77
3.III Lessons from the Situationist Challenge...............................................................90
3.IV The Road Ahead....................................................................................................92
Chapter Four.....................................................................................................................94
4.I An Alternative Response to Situationism: Maria Merritt's HVE............................94
4.II Objections and Analysis......................................................................................100
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4.III A Phronesis of Fragility: Preliminary Remarks.....................................................111
4.IVa A Refinement of Phronesis as Sensitivity............................................................114
4.IVb Objections to Sensitivity and Perception?..........................................................122
4.V Phronesis and Social Embeddedness..................................................................125
4.VI Contemplation and Self-Knowledge....................................................................131
4.VII A Final Hurdle: Answering the Postscriptum to Lack of Character......................135
Chapter Five...................................................................................................................143
5.I The Aspects of Moral Imagination......................................................................144
5.II MI as Empathetic Engagement...........................................................................145
5.III MI as 'Acrobat'....................................................................................................147
5.IV MI as Counterfactual Prediction.........................................................................152
5.V MI as Retrospective Insight.................................................................................153
5.VI MI as Acknowledgment of Complexity................................................................155
5.VII Relationships and Interdependencies of the Aspects of MI................................159
5.VIII Concluding Remarks About the Aspects of MI....................................................161
5.IX Final Conclusions.................................................................................................163
Bibliography....................................................................................................................166
iv
Acknowledgments
To Cynthia:
The essence of all beautiful art,
of all great art, is gratitude.
- Nietzsche
To Kathi, Ed, Mary, and Mildred:
γηράσκω δ᾽ αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.
I grow old, always learning many things.
- Solon
To Jason, Rachel, and Dave:
Education is not the filling of a pail,
But the lighting of a fire.
- W.B. Yeats
To Pal:
Meeowrgh.
v
Chapter One
Surely what a man does when he is taken off his guard
is the best evidence for what sort of man he is...
If there are rats in a cellar you are most likely to see them if you go in very suddenly.
But the suddenness does not create the rats: it only prevents them from hiding.
- C.S. Lewis
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I lay out three central motivations for adopting the Aristotelian
way of doing ethics. Having done this, I then provide a contextual summary of Aristotle
which focuses heavily on two concepts, prohairesis and phronesis. I discuss a 'shallow'
reading of each, and then dismiss such a reading in favor of a 'deeper' interpretation
which is not only more philosophically accurate, but also will better allow me to confront
the 'situationist challenge' to Aristotelian virtue ethics (hereafter, AVE), which is
delineated in the next chapter.
Ia – Preface
Ethical disagreements typically begin with two (or more) people whose minds are
1
already made up as to what they feel is 'right' or 'good', and why that is. Trying to
dislodge one's cherished belief system in favor of a foreign one is hard to do. Many
people, though not all, are ethical xenophobes.
The purported 'roots' of morality are up for vigorous debate. Reasonable and
defensible arguments are put forward by numerous thinkers, from the theological to the
evolutionary. But, what I want to highlight in this brief preface is my contention that a
large component of choosing an ethical theory is essentially preference. One or another
theory resonates with us because, I think, we already have decided on certain normative
views, even if we lack the sophistication to express them systematically.1 Ethical theories
are ways to formalize and justify those same views by reference to something outside of
ourselves, such as God, utility, duty, flourishing, peace of mind, etc. Ceteris paribus, we
do not examine theories and then choose one which is most rational or most truthful.
Instead, I believe that we find (or create) theories that represent our own extant beliefs
and values, however nebulously we may understand them at the time.2 As Nietzsche
says in Beyond Good and Evil, “the greater part of the conscious thinking of a
philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts, and forced into definite channels”;
philosophies are the “confessions” of their authors.3 If this is plausible, then my
1 This is not to say that our ethical theories are like ice cream flavors, chosen on a whim. Rather (as Jason
D'Cruz, in a personal communication to the author puts it) “we make intuitive, holistic judgments about
the aptness of a theory rather than having a clearly articulated objective standard against which we
judge its aptness.”
2 Of course, this is all presented conversationally and by way of introduction. I cannot defend such a
metaethical and psychological position here, and I will not try to. Nevertheless, there is much profitable
work to be done in this area in the future, and the study of ethical discourse can only be improved by the
contributions that such work would make.
3 Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Zimmern, Ch. 1
2
confession is one of an Aristotelian because such a view resonates with, and articulates,
my own feelings about how to live well.
But, just because we find a theory that reflects our biases or prejudices, we are
not damned to unreflectively accept such a theory. There are better and worse
justifications out there, and we must be able to defend an ethical theory on sound
footing if it is to remain academically and personally viable. Aristotelian virtue ethics is
the theory which fits my own approach to moral philosophy, and as such, I have
examined many attempts to defend it. I will discuss a few in the next section in an
attempt to justify why I believe that Aristotelianism is worth pursuing overall, and
especially why the work in this dissertation is necessary to this ethical tradition.
And, as a final note: the focus of this work takes place within a very specific
tradition in ethics, and in many senses, this dissertation is written by an Aristotelian for
other Aristotelians who are concerned with a common problem. This doesn't exclude
others who are interested in Aristotle for whatever reasons, but it does mean that I am
assuming a certain familiarity and ethical orientation throughout this work.
Ib. Why Aristotle?
Why are Aristotle's ideas about ethics so important and so attractive? One
answer is that they occupy a prominent place in the history of Western thought. But,
still, why ought one devote time to reading the Nicomachean or Eudemian Ethics, let
alone seriously consider their contents as a prescription for living a certain kind of life?
3
In this section, I present three weighty considerations as to why one might want to be an
Aristotelian about ethics, especially in the face of many consequentialist or
deontological theories which are, prima facie, somewhat attractive.
Flexibility. Consequentialisms and deontologies, as theories, each emphasize a
different aspect of how and why we (should) act. They are concerned with outcomes
and duties, respectively. And, the reason that we have anxiety-inducing thought
experiments when considering such theories is that no one prescription will cure our
ethical ills. We cannot live a life solely fixated on outcomes, nor on duties. Indeed, we
must become competent judges of what consideration is the consideration for a certain
situation. And, this kind of broader ethical theory must also be flexible to allow for such
deliberation among key ethical principles. In my view, the theory which provides such
flexibility is AVE.
Sometimes a better consequence must take a backseat to a deeply-valued ethical
principle, and sometimes a firm and principled rule needs to be broken for a better
overall outcome. AVE understands and accepts this, and gives priority to a (wise)
person's judgment and his understanding of when and how to apply that judgment. In
that light, AVE should be seen as a balm to the potentially painful orthodoxy of
Kantianism and utilitarianism.4 Each of these stricter theories presents us with difficult,
unintuitive cases where it seems we must either forsake our given theory, or else do
something unsavory. And, each theory can face difficulties when it comes to a clashing
of intuitions.
4 Thanks to Jason D'Cruz for suggesting this apt turn of phrase.
4
For instance: should I lie to the Gestapo officer at my front door regarding the
location of the hidden refugees in the basement? Kant, holding that truth-telling is a
strict duty, would say that I should not lie. But, this clashes with our shared sense of
right and wrong. Hence, I must either give up my Kantianism or else do something I
should deeply regret. A consequentialist may encounter a similar concern (perhaps
intuition dictates that I lie to the officer, even if it leads to less-than-optimal results).5
But, a stronger concern with consequentialism is that such a theory has a hard time
explaining why we feel it actually is wrong to tell a lie, even if it were to produce the best
consequences.6
AVE does not say that either action (lying or truth-telling) is the right answer
simpliciter. Instead, we must consider many aspects of our situation in order to make a
judgment about which course of action is required. Further, AVE would remind us that
there is a right way to either lie or tell the truth, neither divulging nor withholding too
much. And, finally, we must have the right emotional response when we make our
choice – for instance, I ought to feel hesitant about telling a lie, and I ought to feel some
regret about doing so, even if the lie is morally justified, all things considered. These
considerations of circumstance and context are what I see as making AVE more flexible
than its theoretical rivals. It allows us to find solutions which correspond to our
intuitions, but which do not force us to surrender our theory in the process. As Steven
Fesmire (2003: 57) remarks, “seeing [one's] situations solely through the lens of one
5 Perhaps the officer skips a door-to-door search of my town, and simply rolls grenades into everyone's
basements which kill many more people than would have been killed had I told the truth.
6 We might think of a paternalistic kind of lie for this scenario, like Plato's “Noble Lie”
5