Philosophy and the law : how judges reason

58 Pages·2008·1.837 MB·English

by  Stephen E Mathis, Recorded Books, Inc

P
HILOSOPHY
L :
AND THE AW
HOW JUDGES REASON
COURSE GUIDE
Professor Stephen Mathis
WHEATONCOLLEGE
Philosophy and the Law:
How Judges Reason
Professor Stephen Mathis
Wheaton College
RecordedBooks™isatrademarkof
RecordedBooks,LLC.Allrightsreserved.
PhilosophyandtheLaw:
HowJudgesReason
ProfessorStephenMathis
(cid:1)
ExecutiveProducer
JohnJ.Alexander
ExecutiveEditor
DonnaF.Carnahan
RECORDING
Producer-DavidMarkowitz
Director-MatthewCavnar
COURSEGUIDE
Editor-JamesGallagher
Design-EdwardWhite
Lecturecontent©2008byStephenMathis
Courseguide©2008byRecordedBooks,LLC
7
2008byRecordedBooks,LLC
Coverimage©ChristianHesse/shutterstock.com
#UT120ISBN:978-1-4361-2909-1
Allbeliefsandopinionsexpressedinthisaudio/videoprogramandaccompanyingcourseguide
arethoseoftheauthorandnotofRecordedBooks,LLC,oritsemployees.
CourseSyllabus
PhilosophyandtheLaw:
HowJudgesReason
AboutYourProfessor...................................................................................................4
Introduction...................................................................................................................5
Lecture1 LegalRealism........................................................................................6
Lecture2 LegalPositivism,PartI..........................................................................9
Lecture3 LegalPositivism,PartII.......................................................................12
Lecture4 TheoreticalDisagreementinLaw........................................................15
Lecture5 TheoriesofInterpretation....................................................................19
Lecture6 LegalConservatism.............................................................................23
Lecture7 JudicialActivism..................................................................................26
Lecture8 LawasIntegrity...................................................................................29
Lecture9 CommonLawandStatutes.................................................................32
Lecture10 ConstitutionalLaw...............................................................................36
Lecture11 DualistDemocracy...............................................................................40
Lecture12 RegimePerspective.............................................................................44
Lecture13 InterpretiveSynthesis..........................................................................48
Lecture14 JudicialPoliticsversusInterpretation..................................................52
CourseMaterials........................................................................................................56
3
Mathis
Stephen About Your Professor
of
courtesy Stephen Mathis
Photo
StephenMathisisanassociateprofessorandchairmanofthePhilosophy
DepartmentatWheatonCollege.Heteachesavarietyofcoursesinlegalphi-
losophyaswellasinsocial/politicalphilosophy.ProfessorMathisisalsothe
co-coordinatoroftheLegalStudiesMinorandPre-LawAdvisor.Hisprimary
researchinterestisthephilosophyofcriminallaw,buthehasalsowrittenon
topicsinpoliticalphilosophy,moraltheory,andethics.Inhissparetime,
ProfessorMathisfollowspoliticsandtheSupremeCourtverycloselyandhas
authoredop-edpiecesonconstitutionallawissues.
Thefollowingbooksprovideanexcellentsupplementtothelectures
foundinthiscourse:
Ackerman,Bruce.WethePeople:Foundations.Cambridge,MA:Belknap
Press,1993.
Dworkin,Ronald.Law’sEmpire.Newed.Oxford:HartPublishing,2003.
4
m
Hesse/shutterstock.co
Christian
©
Introduction
Dojudgesdeducetheirdecisionsfromlegalrulesandprinciples,ordothey
decidecasesbasedonwhatisfairgiventhefactsathand?Thelatterview,
heldbyLegalRealists,servesasthestartingpointforProfessorStephen
Mathis’seye-openinglookathowjudgesreason.Inthiscompellinglecture
series,theesteemedprofessoraddressessuchissuesaswhetherthelawis
distinctfrommorality.ProfessorMathisalsoattemptstoidentifyaviewthat
offersguidancetojudgesindecidingcases,andonethatwillprovidethe
toolspeopleneedtoevaluatetheinterpretationsanddecisionsjudgesmake.
5
Lecture1:
LegalRealism
TheSuggestedReadingsforthislectureareJeromeFrank’s“Legal
Realism”inJoelFeinbergandHymanGross(eds.)PhilosophyofLaw
andOliverWendellHolmes’s“ThePathoftheLaw.”
WebeginthiscoursewithLegalRealismbecauseitmarksoneoftheear-
liestattemptsattakingaphilosophicalapproachtoAmerican
Jurisprudence.AresponsetoLegalFormalism(theviewthatjudgescan
anddologicallydeducedecisionsfromapplyinglegalprinciplestothe
factsofthecase),LegalRealismfocusesinsteadonhowthingsaredonein
theactualpracticeoflaw.AlmostalloftheLegalRealistswerejuristsand
legalpractitioners,andnotacademicphilosophers.Perhapsforthisreason,
LegalRealistsdrewmorefromsociologicalapproachesthanphilosophical
ones.However,theirattentiontoempiricalclaimsabouthowjudgesactually
decidecases(andnotabouthowjudgesshoulddecidecases)ledlater
philosophersoflawtodiscountLegalRealismasadeeplyflawedapproach
tojurisprudence.
LegalRealism,especiallyasweseeitembodiedintheworkofOliver
WendellHolmesandJeromeFrank,offersastartlingaccountofwhatlawis:
itis,fundamentally,amatterofpredictinghowjudgeswillactuallydecide
cases.Thisaccountisstartlingbecauseatfirstblushitseemstosuggest
thatpriorcourtdecisions,statutes,andlegalprinciplesarealllessimportant
thanthejudge’sparticularleanings(orthan“whatthejudgehadforbreak-
fast”1).Iftrue,theRealistviewofthelawwouldbeadeeplyskepticalview,
holdingthattheprocessofadjudicationisnothingmorethananelaborate
sham,withallsortsofwindowdressingforwhatisessentiallythejudge’s
subjectivepreference.
WhileLegalRealismdoesespouseadegreeofskepticismaboutthelaw
andespeciallyaboutadjudication,itisunfairtoseeitascomingdownjustto
“whatthejudgehadforbreakfast.”Itisimportanttokeepinmindthatmost
LegalRealistswereconcernedwiththelawprimarilyfromtheperspectiveof
alawyer,notthatofajudge,aSupremeCourtJustice,oraphilosopher.
(Holmesalsousesthislawyerlypointofviewtodriveadistinctionbetween
moralityandlaw:hearguesthatthelawandmoralityarelikelytooverlapfor
thegoodman[orclient],butallthatmatterstothebadmanisthelaw.)
Treatedasanempiricalclaimaboutthelawyer’srolewithrespecttoher
client,sayingthatthelawisessentiallyamatterofpredictinghowjudgeswill
decidecasesseemsfarlessobjectionable.Afterall,ajudgeisahuman
beingwhohasbiasesandidiosyncracies,someofwhichcanleadhimaway
fromortoholdaskewedviewofparticularlegalrules,precedents,andprinci-
E
N ples.ButLegalRealistsdonotbelievethatthelawisaboutpredictionjust
O
E
R
U
T 1.Realistshavelongbeensaddledwithclaimingthat“whatthejudgehadforbreakfast”isthedeter-
C miningfactorinjudicialdecisions.However,noRealistactuallyevermadesuchaclaim.SeeBrian
E
L Leiter,“LegalRealismandLegalPositivismReconsidered,”Ethics,111:2(2001),p.281.
6
becausesomejudgeshaveprejudicesorfoibles:Realistsalsodonotbelieve
thatthevariouslegalrulesandreasonsthatbearonagivencaseactually
justifyorrequireoneparticularrightwayofdecidingthatcase.Inother
words,LegalRealismholdsthatthelawisindeterminateorundeterminedby
thelegalrulesandreasonsavailabletojudges.ItisinthiswaythatRealism
isskepticalaboutlaw.Intheend,thisskepticismleadsRealiststoseejudges
playingakeyroleindeterminingthelaw,whichinturnleadsRealiststodis-
cussthelawintermsofpredictingoutcomes.
LegalRealistsholdthatmostjudgesdonotdeducetheirdecisionsfrom
legalrulesorprinciples,butrathertheydecidecasesbasedontheirviewof
whatisfairgiventhefactsathand.Thisisnottosaythatjudgesignore
statutesorotherlegalrulesorprinciples,butratheronlythatdifferentjudges
willinevitablyinterpretorweighlegalrulesandreasonsindifferentways,
andthere’snothinginthelawthatpreventsthemfromdoingso.Itisalsoto
say,however,thatjudgessometimesdecidecasesbasedonextralegal
judgmentsaboutwhatisfairorjust,andthentheyuselegalrulesandrea-
sonstojustifythosedecisionsafterthefact.
Overall,LegalRealismisbestunderstoodasasociologicalordescriptive
theoryoflawandadjudicationinthatittellsuswhatlaw
isandhowjudgesactuallydodecidecases.Legal
Realismfails,however,toofferanormativeorpre-
scriptivetheoryoflaworadjudication,oratheoryof
whatthelawshouldbeorhowjudgesoughtto
decidecases.Eventhoughinrealityjudgesmaytypi-
callydecidecasesaccordingtowhattheythinkisfair
giventhefactsofthecase,thattellsusnothingabout
whetherornotitisrightorevenacceptablefor
themtodoso.AndwhileLegalRealismrecog-
nizesarangeofpossibleinterpretationsof
existinglegalrulesandprinciples(thatcon-
tributetolaw’sindeterminacy),itoffersnoway
toevaluateinterpretationsaswithinthatrange
orunacceptably“outthere.”Infact,Legal
Realismoffersnomeansatallofevaluating
judges’decisionsandthuscansaynothingat
allabouthowajudgeshoulddecideapartic-
ularkindofcaseoraboutwhyaparticular
decisionmayormaynotbejustified.While
LegalRealismhasinterestingthingstosay
abouttheactualpracticeofthelawandthe
wayjudgesdecidecases,philosophersoflaw
(nottomentionjudges)needmorefroma
jurisprudentialtheory:weneedaviewthat
willoffersomeguidancetojudgesindeciding
casesandonethatwillgiveusthetoolswe m
nineteerdprtoeteavtiaolnusataen,damdeocnisgioonthsejurdthgiensgsm,athkee. Jones/shutterstock.oc
Erick
©
7
FORGREATERUNDERSTANDING
(cid:1)
Questions
1.WhyisLegalRealismagoodstartingpointforacoursefocusedonhow
judgesreason?
2.FromwhatperspectiveweremostLegalRealistsconcernedwiththelaw?
Suggested Reading
Frank,Jerome.“LegalRealism.”PhilosophyofLaw.8thed.Pp.125–127.
Eds.JoelFeinbergandHymanGross.Belmont,WA:Wadsworth
PublishingCompany,2007.
Holmes,OliverWendell.“ThePathoftheLaw.”Vol.10.HarvardLaw
Review,p.457,1897.
Other Books of Interest
Frank,Jerome.LawandtheModernMind.Reprint.Piscataway,NJ:
TransactionPublishers,2008.
Holmes,OliverWendell.TheCommonLaw.NewYork:Dover
Publications,1991.
Leiter,Brian.“AmericanLegalRealism.”TheBlackwellGuidetoPhilosophy
ofLawandLegalTheory.Pp.50–66.Eds.W.EdmundsonandM.Golding.
Oxford:Blackwell,2003.
Websites to Visit
OliverWendellHolmes’sTheCommonLawandabookformofThePathof
theLawarealsoavailableonlinefromProjectGutenberg—
www.gutenberg.org
E
N
O
E
R
U
T
C
E
L
8
Lecture2:
LegalPositivism,PartI
TheSuggestedReadingforthislectureisH.L.A.Hart’sTheConcept
ofLaw,chapterV,“LawastheUnionofPrimaryandSecondaryRules,”
pp.79–99.
LegalPositivismtracesitsrootsbacktothefamousutilitarianJeremy
Bentham(1748–1832).ThoughBenthamwroteextensivelyinpoliticalphi-
losophy,itwashisstarpupil,JohnAustin(1790–1859),whorefinedand
codifiedmanyofhisviewsonjurisprudence.Austin’sworkhelpedlaunch
anapproachtothephilosophyoflawwenowcall“AnalyticalJurisprudence,”
becauseofitsfocusonanalyzingandtryingtodefinetheconceptoflaw.1
Thedefinitionsof“law”Austinandhismostinfluentialsuccessorsofferedall
describedlawintermsofitsrootsinsocialpractice.Thesephilosopherswere
mostconcernedwithlawasitisposited(thatis,asitisconstructedorprac-
ticed,orperhapsevenasitisputintoplace),andnotwithlawasitwouldbe
bestjustifiedinmoralterms;thusthelabel“LegalPositivism.”
InhisTheProvidenceofJurisprudenceDetermined(1831),Austinseeksout
theessentialfeaturesoflaw,andinparticulartriestodistinguish“law”from
otherthingsthatmightbeconfusedwiththatconcept.Austindefines“law”as
“commands,backedbythreatofsanctions,fromasovereign,towhompeople
haveahabitofobedience.”Austin’skeyinsighthereisthatlawhasapeculiar
kindofforce,aforcewecannotignore,aswecanignoremereexpressionsof
wishes,especiallyfromthosewithnopowertomakeuswanttofulfillthose
wishes.Thisforce,whichobligesustoact,istobedistinguishedfromreward
orbeingprovidedpositiveincentivetoact,sincearewardmaynotmoveone
toact—andifitdoesn’tsomoveone,oneis
madenoworseoff.Thethreatofpain,under-
stoodaspunishmentorfines,hastheforce
Austinhasinmindhere.ForAustin,lawisalso
generalinitsscope:itappliestotypesof
actions,nottooneisolatedactononeparticular
occasion.Thus,asovereign(whetherakingor
alegislatureorotherlegitimateauthority)com-
mandthatJoeSmithwearbluepantsonthe
fourthofOctoberthisyearwouldnotbealaw,
whileacommandthateveryonewearblue
pantsonthefourthofOctobereachyearcould
boainebtgio.entdTeiher(sreniibncrleecyeqcsuapoirnenecembifeciecans,natoniondofettt-obhtieemcaiepnpecttouhopremelehmt’shaaibshniatdcbosoi)fnt.uosBabidlueetyr-- man/shutterstock.com
moreimportantly,thestipulationthatpeople MaiseiRa
©
1.ThisfocusistobecontrastedwithNormativeJurisprudence,whichcentersonthelawasit
shouldbe.
9