Table Of ContentPhilosophical Representation
This book focuses on how we should treat philosophy’s theoretical
representations. It argues in favor of an instrumentalist attitude towards
pivotal cases of theoretical representation in philosophy that are commonly
regarded under a realist attitude.
Philosophy is awash with theoretical representations, which raises the
question of how we should regard them. This book argues that representations
in philosophy should not be regarded under a realist attitude by default
as individually disclosing the nature of what they represent. Ori Simchen
introduces the reader to the general theme of representations in philosophy
and our attitudes towards them via case studies: numbers, modality, and
belief. He offers a framework for deciding when a realist attitude towards a
theoretical representation is warranted and concludes that the representations
deployed in the case studies fail the proposed test. The next part of the
book illustrates the attractiveness of attitudinal instrumentalism towards
representations in semantics, in the philosophy of mind, and within the
problematics of rule-following.
Philosophical Representation will appeal to researchers and advanced students
working in the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics,
philosophical logic, and philosophical methodology.
Ori Simchen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia,
Canada. He is the author of Semantics, Metasemantics, Aboutness (2017), and
Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness (2012).
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Luca M. Possati
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Edited by Michiel Meijer
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Sebastian Morello
The Ethics of Interpretation
From Charity as a Principle to Love as a Hermeneutic Imperative
Pol Vandevelde
The Nature and Practice of Trust
Marc A. Cohen
A Plea for Plausibility
Toward a Comparative Decision Theory
John R. Welch
Living with the Dead
On Death, the Dead, and Immortality
J. Jeremy Wisnewski
Free Will’s Value
Criminal Justice, Pride, and Love
John Lemos
For more information about this series, please visit: w ww.routledge.com/
Routledge-Studies-in-Contemporary-Philosophy/book-series/SE0720
Philosophical Representation
Studies in Attitudinal Instrumentalism
Ori Simchen
First published 2023
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© 2023 Ori Simchen
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been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
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Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-032-30742-8 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-30743-5 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-30644-3 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003306443
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We create models to explain nature, but the models wind up gatecrashing
nature and driving away the original inhabitants.
David Mitchell, Ghostwritten
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xix
1 Philosophical Explanation 1
1.1 Realist vs. Instrumentalist Attitude 1
*1.2 Case Study 1: Frege on Number 4
1.3 Case Study 2: De Re Modality 6
1.4 Case Study 3: Indirect Reference 10
1.5 Semantic Descent 13
2 Justified Attitudinal Realism 17
2.1 Theoretical Identifications 17
2.2 Semantic Representations in Metaphysics 22
2.3 A Brief Aetiology 30
2.4 Philosophical Theoretical Representations 35
3 Attitudinal Instrumentalism in Semantics 39
3.1 Formal Semantic Evaluation 39
*3.2 Representing Truth 43
*3.3 Indirect Reference Again 51
4 Semantics and Ordinary Language 61
*4.1 Attitudinal Instrumentalism and Analysis 61
4.2 Performativity 72
viii Contents
5 Propositions and What Is Said 81
5.1 The Metaphysics of What Is Said 81
5.2 Attitudinal Instrumentalism and Propositions 85
*5.3 The Russell-Myhill Paradox 88
6 The Content Program 93
6.1 Significance and Content 93
6.2 Attitudinal Instrumentalism and Content 95
6.3 Attitudinal Instrumentalism and Metasemantics 98
6.4 Attitudinal Instrumentalism and RTM 101
7 Rules and Representation 109
7.1 Representing Behavior 109
7.2 Calculating 111
7.3 Inferring 113
7.4 Rules as Representations 120
Postscript 126
Bibliography 128
Index 133
Preface
Philosophy is notorious for asking questions at a very high level of generality,
seemingly so far removed from our earthly daily trappings as to strike many
as irrelevant at best. Philosophy’s childlike manner of posing difficulties out
of the blue—What is time? How do I know I am not dreaming? How do I
know you have a mind?—is often emphasized by its detractors over its origi-
nation in human affairs. This makes it an easy target for self-fashioned intel-
lectual adults who see philosophy as old-fashioned and impertinent. But
there are times when even those who are otherwise gripped by philosophy’s
ethereal aspect cannot help but reflect on it as a human enterprise immersed
in the flow of time. For reasons too complex to summarize, we are living in
a time when lofty reflections as such, including philosophical ones, demand
renewed attention and support. Pondering whether asking seemingly time-
less questions is sustainable or whether it is just a waste of time is itself a
familiar philosophical preoccupation. In what follows, I would like to make
an extended case for philosophy’s aspirations and methods as continuous
with those of our other theoretical endeavors.
In Philosophical Investigations , Wittgenstein writes:
And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be any-
thing hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all
explanation , and description alone must take its place. And this descrip-
tion gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical
problems.
( 2009 : §109)
Such words have spawned the famous—many would say infamous—anti-
theory legacy of Wittgenstein’s philosophical oeuvre. How to interpret
them, on the other hand, is far from clear. It just isn’t obvious what remains
of philosophy once we do away with all theories and explanations. Aren’t
generalizations about philosophy, even a general claim to the effect that
philosophical problems arise from “the bewitchment of our understanding
by the resources of our language” (§109), theoretical contributions w ithin
