Table Of ContentPhilosophical Progress
Philosophical
Progress
In Defence of a Reasonable
Optimism
Daniel Stoljar
1
3
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Contents
PrefaceandAcknowledgements vii
1. Introduction 1
2. MattersArising 20
3. AnArgumentforOptimism 38
4. TheArgumentDefended 60
5. ExtendingtheArgument 83
6. TheExtensionDefended 103
7. TwoArgumentsfromDisagreement 121
8. SixFurtherArguments 143
Conclusion 165
References 169
NameIndex 181
SubjectIndex 184
Preface and Acknowledgements
Can there be progress in philosophy? On the one hand, it is often
thoughtthatphilosophicalproblemsareperennialsforwhichitispoint-
less to expect a solution. On the other hand, professional philosophy
seems to have organized itself, perhaps unconsciously, around the
oppositeview:howelsetoexplainthepanoplyofbooks,papers,journals,
conferences, graduate programmes, websites, etc.? Who is right? And
whatturnsonwhoisright?
This book defends a reasonable optimism about philosophical
progress.Optimistic,becauseIarguethat,contrarytowidespreadbelief,
we have correctly answered philosophical questions in the past and
therefore should expect to do so in the future. Reasonable, because the
optimismIhaveinminddoesnotextendtoeveryinstanceofthesortof
problem called ‘philosophical’ or even to every subkind of that sort of
problem.
IndefendingreasonableoptimismIhaveatleastthreesortsofoppon-
ents. First are the unreasonable optimists who think they have some
recipe or formula to solve all philosophical problems. So far as I know
thereisnosuchrecipeorformula,butthatisnoreason for pessimism.
Secondarethepessimistswithinphilosophy.Itissurprisingtodiscover
howwidespreadpessimismorsomethingneartoitisinphilosophy;we
willneedtoexamineandunderminethereasonsbehindthis.Thirdare
thepessimistsoutsideofphilosophy.Fromtheoutside,thatphilosophy
makesnoprogressseemsatruism,andsoitisimportanttopointout,as
Iwilltrytodo,thatitisatruismthatisfalse(or,iftruismsareessentially
true,thatitisnotatruismatall).
The book falls into four parts, each of which has two chapters. The
first part introduces the issues. Chapter1 outlines the version of opti-
mism I wish to defend, making it clear, among other things, that what
Ihaveinmindisoptimismaboutbigquestions,andnotjustsmallones.
Chapter2 discusses in further detail the nature and significance of
reasonableoptimism.
Thesecondpartpresentsanargumentforoptimismthatfocusesona
particular type of problem, which I call a boundary problem. Roughly,
viii PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
a boundary problem is a logical problem involving independently
plausible but mutually inconsistent theses, each of which concerns
what it takes for a claim, or a certain class of claims, to be true or
knowable or understood. To solve problems of this sort you need to
resolvethetension:eithertorejectormodifyoneorotherofthetheses.
The argument for optimism focused on boundary problems has two
premises: first that philosophical problems are often of this type; and
secondthatifthatistrue,reasonableoptimismistrue.Chapter3setsout
theargument,defendingthefirstpremisebypresentingitasalegitimate
generalization from a set of cases, and the second premise by pointing
outthatnumerousproblemsofthissorthaveindeedbeensolvedinthe
past—I focus particularly on cases in which we have solved problems
of this type by rejecting or modifying(what I call)the boundary theses
thatareconstitutiveofthem.Chapter4respondstovariousobjectionsto
theargument.
Thethirdpartstartsbyaskingwhethertheargumentdefendedinthe
second part may be extended from boundary problems to problems of
other types, and argues that it can be—to a type of problem I call a
constitutive problem. Roughly, a constitutive problem is an explanatory
problemthatpresupposesthatvariousitemsofphilosophicalinterestare
located at the apex of what I call a constitutive hierarchy, a vast and
complicated explanatory structure among facts (i.e. true propositions).
To solve problems of this sort, you need to provide information of a
certainsortabouttheexplanatorystructureinquestion.
The argument for optimism focused on constitutive problems is
structurally the same as that focused on boundary problems: its first
premiseisthatphilosophicalproblemsareoftenofthistype;itssecondis
that if that is true, reasonable optimism is true. Chapter5 defends the
argument—I focus in particular on the point that there is no ‘unit of
explanation’(toborrowaphraseDavidLewisusesinasimilarcontext)
andthatprovidingexplanatoryinformationaboutconstitutivestructures
is multidimensional. Chapter6 responds to various objections to
theargument.
The fourth part turns from defending optimism to criticizing
arguments for pessimism. In Chapter 7, I discuss two arguments from
disagreement, one of the central sources of scepticism internal to the
discipline about philosophical progress. The first, which is due to
David Chalmers, asserts on empirical grounds that there is no large
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix
collective convergence to the truth on the big questions of philosophy.
Irespondthattheempiricalclaimsappealedtointhisargumentshowno
such thing, for they are silent on whether the current disagreements in
philosophy are over the same issues as disagreements in the past. The
second argument, which is inspired by Peter van Inwagen, asserts that
disagreement in philosophy is of a certain special epistemological kind,
viz.itrationallyrequiressuspensionofjudgement,atleastinmanycases;
henceprogressisimpossible.Irespondthatrealcasesofdisagreementin
philosophyarenomorepronetomeetthisdescriptionthanarerealcases
ofdisagreementinotherfields.
In Chapter 8, I consider six further arguments against progress: the
womb of disciplines argument, which suggests that philosophy is by
definition the subject that does not make progress; the methodology
argument, which suggests that philosophers are using the wrong tools
for the problems that confront them; the pseudo-problems argument,
which suggests that philosophical problems are not the sort for which
progress should be expected; the speculation argument, which suggests
thatphilosophyinvolvesanillegitimateandirresponsibleformofspecu-
lation; the history argument, which suggests that philosophy bears a
different relation to its past than do sciences such as physics, and in
consequence exhibits a different pattern of success and failure; and the
technicalia argument, which suggests that the technical language so
prevalent in philosophy is a bar to progress. I argue that, while these
considerationsraisesomechallengingissues,theypresentnogroundsfor
doubtingreasonableoptimism.
Inabriefconclusion,Ioffersomereflectionsonwhat,apartfromthe
argumentsjustconsidered,thecausesofpessimismmightbe,bothinside
andoutsidethedisciplineofphilosophy.
Thisisasmallbookonabigsubject,indeedaverybigsubject.Ihave
nottriedforanexhaustivetreatmentofthesubject.Foronething,Ihave
stuckmainlytoexamplesfrommyownareasofexpertise:philosophyof
mind and related parts of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy
oflanguage.ButIamwellawarethatotherexamplesmightbediscussed
and that even the examples I do consider are treated very lightly. Why
therestriction?Partlyit’s‘writewhatyouknow’.Partlyit’sbecausethose
who express pessimism or something close to it, as we will see in
Chapter1,veryoftenhavetheseareasinmind;hencewedonotdistort
the topic by focusing on them. And partly it’s because I do not aim in
