Philoponus : against Proclus on the eternity of the world 12-18

199 Pages·2006·1.84 MB·English

by  Philoponus

PHILOPONUS
Against Proclus
On the Eternity of
the World 12-18
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PHILOPONUS
Against Proclus
On the Eternity of
the World 12-18
Translated by
James Wilberding
Duckworth
Ancient Commentators on Aristotle
General editor: Richard Sorabji
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Acknowledgements
Academic or the author.
The present translations have been made possible by generous and
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Contents
Conventions vi
Introduction 1
Departures from Rabe’s Text 11
Translation 13
Chapter 12 15
Chapter 13 22
Chapter 14 54
Chapter 15 60
Chapter 16 66
Chapter 17 83
Chapter 18 92
Notes 117
Select Bibliography 141
English-Greek Glossary 143
Greek-English Index 155
Subject Index 181
Index of Passages 189
Conventions
[(cid:125)] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to
the translation or the lemmata for purposes of clarity, as well as those
portions of the lemmata which are not quoted by Philoponus.
<(cid:125)> Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e.
additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and
editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompa-
nying notes provide further details.
((cid:125)) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses,
contain transliterated Greek words.
Introduction
In chapters 12-18 of Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World
Philoponus continues to do battle against Proclus’ arguments for the
beginninglessness and everlastingness of the ordered universe.1 In this
final section there are three notable issues under discussion.
First, in chapter 13, Philoponus is concerned to explain the composi-
tion of the heaven and its manner of movement. Some background is
helpful here. Both Plato and Aristotle described the universe as a series
of concentric elemental spheres, with earth at the centre and the
heavens rotating in a circle at the periphery. Plato’s universe, as
described in the Timaeus, is constituted entirely of the four Empedo-
clean elements: earth, water, air and fire. Moreover, these are not
merely the only elements in the universe; Plato seems to say something
stronger, namely that everything in the universe (i.e. every sensible
thing) is itself made up of all four elements. This is because in order to
be visible a thing must contain fire, and in order to be tangible it must
contain earth, and in order for earth and fire to be co-present in the
same body, water and air are required to mediate between them.2
The important consequence of this stronger thesis is that the celes-
tial bodies are constituted of the same four elements as sublunar
things are, with fire predominating to account for their brightness.3
While accounting for the superlunar region by means of the same
elements as the sublunar region is economical, it raises two major
questions: (1) why do superlunar bodies move in a circle around the
Earth, whereas sublunar bodies seem to move up, e.g. fire, and down,
e.g. earth? And (2) why are sublunar beings constantly being de-
stroyed and going out of existence, while superlunar bodies are
apparently free of such destruction?
(1) Unlike Aristotle, Plato does not frame his discussion of elemental
motion around the natural/unnatural dichotomy.4 Instead, it is the
opposition between necessity and reason upon which he constructs his
theory. The upward and downward motions of the elements, and con-
sequently the rough division of the universe into four concentric
spheres, is due to a pre-cosmic shaking that causes the large and dense
material to go toward the centre of the universe and rare and light
material to go to the periphery.5 Hence, this rectilinear motion is due
to necessity, and not reason.6 By contrast, Plato attributes the circular
2 Introduction
celestial motion to reason via the World-Soul, which has two primary
parts: the ‘circle of the different’ accounts for the eastward planetary
motion, and the ‘circle of the same’ accounts for the westward motion of
the fixed stars.7
(2) For Plato the question of whether a given body will perish is
determined not by its constituent parts but by its maker. Although in
general it is true that whatever is generated is also liable to destruc-
tion,8 the Timaeus distinguishes between those things that are made
directly by the Demiurge, i.e. the celestial gods (stars and planets) as
well as the mythical gods, and those things that are made only indi-
rectly by the Demiurge by means of these generated gods. Although
both products are strictly speaking subject to destruction, only the
latter will in fact suffer destruction, while the former will be preserved
‘by the will of God’.9 This solution, which is echoed in the Statesman
myth,10 gave rise to a debate as to whether God’s will is in fact capable
of forever deterring what is natural.11
Aristotle considered Plato’s answers to both of these questions un-
satisfactory12 and argued that there must be a fifth element, aether,
that comprises the celestial region and accounts for both its distinctive
motion and its everlastingness. His primary argument for this conclu-
sion is that for each simple motion there naturally corresponds a simple
body, and since circular motion is simple, there must be a simple body
that naturally moves in a circle.13 Other considerations showed that
this element must be ungenerated and indestructible. In GC Aristotle
defines each of the four sublunar elements in terms of two sets of
contrary qualities – the hot and cold, and the moist and dry: fire is hot
and dry, air is hot and moist, water is cold and moist, and earth is cold
and dry. This allowed Aristotle to define elemental destruction as one
quality being replaced by its contrary (Cael. 270a14ff.).14 It would seem
to follow, then, that whatever element is characterized by these four
contrary qualities is susceptible to destruction. Since all four possible
combinations of the hot/cold and moist/dry pairs are exhausted by the
four sublunar elements, the fifth element must not be characterized by
them. It is rather beyond all contrariety and consequently beyond
generation and destruction.
The attitude of later Platonists on this issue is complicated. As
Platonists they of course wanted to stay as close to Plato’s teaching as
philosophically allowable, but they also thought there was something
objectionable about saying that ordinary earth and water elements are
floating around the heavens. This is due in part to the problems listed
above, and in part to Aristotle’s arguments, though they tended to see
Aristotle’s own solution of introducing another element as being of the
deus ex machina variety.15 Reconciliation was achieved by taking the
heavens to be constituted – not of ordinary specimens of the four
elements – but of the so-called ‘pinnacles’ of the four elements. This
interpretation of the Timaeus’ elemental theory was taken to different
Introduction 3
lengths by different thinkers,16 and Proclus and Philoponus offer a case
in point. Proclus uses this line of interpretation to establish Plato’s
theory of the heavens as anticipating Aristotle’s fifth element.17 Phi-
loponus, too, wants the heavens to consist of the pinnacles of the four
elements, but he maintains a more considerable distance from the
Aristotelian view by, for example, insisting that these celestial pinna-
cles are still characterized by contraries and so subject to destruction
and that their circular motion is due entirely to soul rather than
nature.18
As we saw above, Plato’s offer of God’s will as an explanation of why
the heavens and the universe as a whole will never be destroyed set off
a wave of debate on the limitations of God’s will. In chapter 16 of Contra
Proclum we find Philoponus’ own views on the nature and scope of
God’s will. Here he addresses issues that become central to medieval
philosophical and theological discussions, including the unity, timeless-
ness and indivisibility of God’s will and how these features are not at
odds with His willing and knowing the many particulars that exist in
time. Proclus argues that saying that God created the world in time
compromises the uniformity of God’s will, since His will at first – prior
to the creation – must not be directed at creating the world but then
changes when He decides to create the world. Any way you look at it,
says Proclus, this subjects God’s will to change and time.
Philoponus agrees with Proclus that God’s will cannot be subject to
change and time, but he attacks Proclus’ claim that this necessarily
follows from a temporal creation of the world. His strategy is simply to
point out that the very problem that Proclus raises here about God’s
will turns up again when one considers His knowledge (and provi-
dence). The problem here derives from two principles that are common
to both Plato and Aristotle: (i) knowledge is divine and is the proper
possession of divinity;19 and (ii) true knowledge is only of universals and
is not subject to change.20 The apparent consequence is that there is
quite generally no knowledge of individuals and more specifically that
God is unaware of human affairs.21 Philoponus begins his reply with an
ad hominem attack on Proclus: since Proclus in other writing concedes
that it is possible for God to know individuals without sacrificing God’s
unity, consistency demands that Proclus acknowledge that it is also
possible for individual, temporal events to be objects of God’s will
without depriving His will of unity.22 He then offers his own positive
argument in two parts for the possibility of quasi-temporal mental
processes in atemporal substances, first considering created intellects
and then the creative intellect itself, God. Regarding created intellects,
Philoponus’ argument consists in the defence of two claims: thinking
for them proceeds discursively, and yet they are beyond time. He
concludes that even though intellective thinking proceeds sequentially,
the sequence in question is not strictly speaking temporal.23 This is
meant to provide a generic argument for the possibility of atemporal