Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency

193 Pages·2010·1.13 MB·English

by  Jack Martin

Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood
and Agency
· ·
Jack Martin Jeff H. Sugarman
Sarah Hickinbottom
Persons: Understanding
Psychological Selfhood
and Agency
123
JackMartin JeffH.Sugarman
SimonFraserUniversity SimonFraserUniversity
DepartmentofPsychology Fac.Education
8888UniversityDrive 8888UniversityDrive
BumabyBCV5A1S6 BumabyBCV5A1S6
Canada Canada
[email protected] [email protected]
SarahHickinbottom
KwantlenPolytechnicUniversity
DepartmentofLearningCommunities
12666-72ndAvenue
SurreyBCV3W2MB
Canada
[email protected]
ISBN978-1-4419-1064-6 e-ISBN978-1-4419-1065-3
DOI10.1007/978-1-4419-1065-3
SpringerNewYorkDordrechtHeidelbergLondon
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Preface
The discipline of psychology is primarily concerned with understanding human
action and experience for the purpose of bettering the lives of persons both indi-
viduallyandcollectively.However,forthemostpart,psychologistshavegivenlittle
attention to the question of what a person is. Rather, in the attempt to achieve the
precision and control of the natural sciences, much mainstream psychology, per-
haps somewhat unreflectively, has adopted a materialist perspective that considers
all psychological phenomena to be reducible to underlying biological and neuro-
physicalsubstratesand/orcomputationalandpsychometricmodels.Thechallenge
tothisviewinrecentyearslaunchedbysocialconstructionistthinkers(e.g.,Gergen,
1985;Shotter,1993),whorejectthenotionoffixed,essentialselvesinfavorofan
interpretiveselfthatderivesmeaningfromthesocioculturalandhistoricaltraditions
andpracticesinwhichitisembedded,overcomesmanyofthedifficultiesassociated
withbiophysicalandcomputationalformsofreductionism.Yet,thisalternativemay
benolessproblematic.
Whenoneconsidersthattheabilitytomakechoicesandactonthesechoicesto
impactone’sownlifeandthelivesofothersisthemostdistinctivefeatureofper-
sonhood, it becomes clear that neither essentialist nor constructionist approaches
provide an adequate account of psychological phenomena. From the essentialist
view, our experience of selfhood and agency is illusory, reducible to biological
foundations.Fromtheconstructionistview,ourexperienceofselfhoodandagency
is merely a fiction, determined by cultural scripts that might have easily been
otherwise. Either way, the reality of psychological phenomena is dismissed as
reducible to underlying biological or sociocultural determinants. Consequently, it
becomes questionable just what, if any, role psychology has to play in furthering
understandingaboutthehumancondition.
Thisvolumerepresentstheeffortsoftheoreticalandphilosophicalpsychologists
JackMartinandJeffSugarman toresuscitateapsychology ofpersonhood. Martin
and Sugarman retrieve ontological questions from obscurity with the aim of for-
mulatingaviableconceptionofpersonsthatretainstheirmostdistinctivefeatures,
andexploretheimplicationsoftheiraccountfordisciplinarypsychologyandother
domains that call for adequate conceptions of personhood and selfhood. Persons,
MartinandSugarmanargue,arisefrom,butareirreducibleto,theirbiologicaland
socioculturalconstituents.Tosupportthisargument,MartinandSugarmanprovide
v
vi Preface
a unique synthesis of philosophy and psychology in the form of a developmental
accountofaselfwithbiologicalcapacitiesforprereflectivethoughtandactionthat
is thrown into the world and, as it develops, appropriates the linguistic and rela-
tional practices of the pre-existing sociocultural context to structure thought and
transformitsmodeofbeingfromprereflectiveactortoreflective,intentionalagent.
Suchgenuinepsychologicalbeingsrequireabiophysicalbody,butarenotreducible
to it. They are shaped by the sociocultural practices in which they are embedded,
buttheyarenotfullydeterminedbythem.Perhapsmoreimportantly,suchpsycho-
logical agents are real in that they exert influence on their own lives and the lives
ofothersandcancontributetoandchangethesocioculturaltraditionsandpractices
withinwhichtheyemerge.
The work is structured in three parts that reflect the progression of Martin and
Sugarman’sthoughts.PartI,ATheoryofPersonsandSelvesforPsychology,intro-
ducestheproblemthatinstigatedthiscorpusofworkandprovidesthereaderwitha
detailedaccountofMartinandSugarman’sdevelopmentalontologyofpsychologi-
calphenomena,aswellasanexplorationoftheimplicationsofthisperspectivefor
politicalthought.PartII,HumanAgencyandtheIrreducibilityofPersons,offersa
sustainedexaminationoftwoaspectsofMartinandSugarman’stheory.First,draw-
ing on philosopher Charles Taylor’s claim that personhood consists in relation to
moral goods and commitments, the ways in which Martin and Sugarman’s theory
can clarify this relation and its implications for understanding moral agency are
explored. The question of irreducibility is then tackled through systematic exami-
nation of theories of emergence and the proposal of a “levels of reality” approach
thatdemonstratespersonsarebothsubstantivelyandrelationallyemergentwithina
biologicalandsocioculturalworld.Following thearticulationofthesetwoaspects
ofMartinandSugarman’stheory,thesectionisbroughttoconclusionwithareview
of the work of Scottish philosopher John Macmurray. This alternative, yet com-
patible,developmentalconceptionofpersonsasirreducibleagentsemphasizesthe
importance of action, rather than reflection, as the appropriate starting point for
psychological theorizing. Such a position is shown to challenge nativist psycho-
logical theories that view human relations as secondary to biology, developmental
stages, psychological capacities, or social categories. In Part III, Perspectives,
Selves, and Persons, the examination of the ways in which psychological theory
andinquirymaybeinformedbyphilosophyisextendedthroughreviewingtheoret-
ical accounts of perspective taking (e.g., those contained in the work of George
Herbert Mead, William James, and others). It is suggested that the construal of
self as perspectival has implications for the training of psychologists, understand-
ing moral deliberation and moral problem solving, education, and developmental
inquiry.
ForthosefamiliarwithHeidegger’sontologyofbeing,Vygotsky’sdevelopmen-
taltheory,Macmurray’sphilosophyofthepersonal,Mead’sfallibleperspectivism,
or philosopher Charles Taylor’s claims about the moral nature of selfhood, these
ideas will cover some familiar territory. What will be unique is the coherent syn-
thesis of these disparate views into a viable ontological account for psychology.
It is an argument that is at once philosophical and psychological. Moreover, it is
Preface vii
a perspective that demonstrates the rich possibilities that arise for psychological
inquiry when theory is philosophically informed. The way in which this is done
canbreathenewlifeintoadisciplinethathasbecomeoverlyfocusedontechnique,
method, and formulaic accounts of human action and experience. The psychology
endorsed here is an interpretive psychology that is cognizant of the emergent, yet
irreducible,natureofpersons,selves,andagency.Followingthehermeneutictradi-
tion,suchapsychologyacceptstheperspectivalnatureofunderstandingbutrejects
the strongly relativistic conclusions that some have drawn from such acceptance.
Thus, this approach will be of interest to those concerned about ethnocentrism in
psychology and the need to develop approaches that are more appropriate to our
increasinglyglobalizedworld.Suchapsychologyalsoinvolvesaradicalreconcep-
tualization of theories of mind, behavior, morality, politics, and education. While
readersmaynotagreewitheveryaspectofthisview,theyarecertaintocomeaway
fromthisvolumewithafreshperspectiveonpsychologicalresearchandtheory,and
theuniquecontributionspsychologycanmakeinattemptstobetterunderstandthe
humancondition.
Acknowledgements
Someoftheideasexpressedinthisbookhavebeenarticulatedpreviously,although
somewhatdifferentlybyJackMartinand/orJeffSugarmaninarticlesintheJournal
fortheTheoryofSocialBehaviour(2003,2005),Theory&Psychology(2005),New
Ideas in Psychology (2003), Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology
(2006),andinchaptersinthevolumesBetweenchanceandchoice,editedbyHarald
Atmanspacher and Robert Bishop (Imprints Academic, 2002), About psychology,
edited by Darryl Hill and Michael Kral (SUNY press, 2003), Studies of how the
mindpubliclyenfoldsintobeing,editedbyWilliamSmytheandAngelinaBaydala
(SUNYPress,2004),andSociallifeandsocialknowledge,editedbyUlrichMuller,
JeremyCarpendale,NancyBudwig,andBryanSokol(LawrenceErlbaum,2008).
WethankImprintsAcademic,SUNYPress,LawrenceErlbaum,Wiley-Blackwell,
Sage,Elsevier,andAPAJournalsforgenerouslygrantingpermissiontoreprintsome
ofthisworkhere.
ix
Contents
PartI ATheoryofPersonsandSelvesforPsychology
1 Introduction:TheProblemofSelvesandPersons
inPsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ABrief,SelectiveHistoryofPersonsandSelves . . . . . . . . . . 10
PlatotoLocke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
AfterLocke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Psychology’sHobbesianLegacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Hobbes’CompatibilistViewofHumanAgency . . . . . . . . . 20
ProblematicAspectsofPsychology’sHobbesianLegacy . . . . . 21
2 ATheoryofSelfandPersonhoodforPsychology. . . . . . . . . 27
ABriefConceptualizationofPersonhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
ADevelopmentalTheoryofSituated,AgentivePersonhood . . . . 28
OurDevelopmentalTheory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
SelfasaKindofUnderstandingthatDisclosesandExtends
ParticularBeingWithinTraditionsofLiving . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Possible Challenges to Conceptualizing the Self
asanUnderstanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
ImplicationsforUnderstandingHumanAgency . . . . . . . . . . . 40
ConcludingRemarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3 ThePoliticalDispositionofSelfasaKindofUnderstanding . . 45
LiberalandCommunitarianDispositionsofSelf . . . . . . . . . . 46
ThePoliticalDispositionofSelfasaKindofUnderstanding . . . . 50
PartII HumanAgencyandtheIrreducibilityofPersons
4 PersonsandMoralAgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Taylor’sCritiqueofNaturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
MoralOntology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
PersonhoodinQuestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Taylor’sMoralOntologyinQuestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
xi
xii Contents
PersonsandMoralAgency:APsychologicalPerspective . . . . . . 67
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5 EmergentPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
ExamplesandClaimsofRecentEmergentistTheorizing
inPsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
SharedandDisputedClaims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
AnEmergentOntologyofPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
ReductionismVersusEmergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Additional Assumptions Concerning the Emergence
ofPsychologicalPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
LevelsofReality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Phylogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Ontogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
ConcludingComment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6 JohnMacmurray’sPhilosophyofthePersonal
andtheIrreducibilityofPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
HumanAgencyandtheFormofthePersonal . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
HumanRelationsandtheFormofthePersonal . . . . . . . . . . . 90
ImplicationsforaPsychologyofthePersonal . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
PartIII Perspectives,Selves,andPersons
7 RealPerspectivalSelves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
AgainstStrongNaturalismandtheIllusorySelf . . . . . . . . . . . 104
AgainstStrongConstructionismandtheFictionalSelf . . . . . . . 106
ThePerspectivalSelf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
TheDevelopmentalEmergenceofthePerspectivalSelf . . . . . . . 111
WhatisReal? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
8 Perspectival Selves in Interaction with Others:
Re-readingG.H.Mead’sSocialPsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Mead’sTheoryofPerspectives:SocialityandAgentiveSelfhood . . 119
Mead’sDialecticofSelfandOther . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
EngagementwithOthers:ANeo-MeadianPerspective . . . . . . 127
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
9 PerspectivesandPersons:Ontological,Constitutive
Possibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
PerspectiveTaking,Perspectives,andPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
PerspectivesandPersons:ASelectionofExtantFormulations . . . 143
Practices,Perspectives,andPersons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Some Possibilities for the Study and Promotion
ofPerspectiveTaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152