Perception in Aristotle's Ethics

264 Pages·2014·1.3 MB·English

Perception in Aristotle's Ethics
Author: Sharon Eve Rabinoff
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3323
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2013
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Boston College

The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

Department of Philosophy

PERCEPTION IN ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS

A Dissertation

By

SHARON EVE RABINOFF

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

December 2013
© Copyright by SHARON EVE RABINOFF
2013
Perception in Aristotle’s Ethics

Dissertation by Eve Rabinoff
Under the Supervision of Dr. Marina McCoy

Abstract

The project of this dissertation is to examine the role that perception plays in
Aristotle’s ethics. Aristotle is famous for offering what might be called a situational
ethics: discerning what one ought to do is not derivable from universal laws, but must be
assessed with respect to the particulars that make up the situation in which one must act.
Aristotle argues that what virtue calls for is acting and feeling in an appropriate manner,
i.e. at the right time, to the right degree, in the right manner, with respect to the right
people, and so on (Nicomachean Ethics 1106b21-24). Moreover, because of the
situational specificity of right action, one must also have the right character in order to
discern what virtue calls for—only the virtuous person sees what is truly good. If one has
a faulty character, the particulars will appear in a distorted manner, just as the wine tastes
bitter to those who are ill (1113a25-29).
It appears that a consequence of the situational specificity of virtuous action is
that in order to be virtuous one must see rightly, in a literal sense. Aristotle is consistent
in designating perception as the faculty that apprehends the particular (De anima 417b21-
29, Nic. Eth. 1109b23, 1113a1-2, 1126b4, 1142a27, 1143b6, 1147a27, 1147b18).
Moreover, if those who are not virtuous cannot discern instances of virtuous action as
virtuous (as a person who is ill cannot taste wine as sweet), this means that there is a limit
to what the powers of intellect can accomplish with regard to virtuous action, for if virtue
were simply a matter of understanding, whether one does or does not have the right
character should not matter. Discerning virtuous action, then, seems to be a matter of
perception.
This consequence, however, carries some difficulties with it. In the first place, it
appears to contradict the very definition of virtue as the excellent activity of the rational
part of the soul. This suggests that it is not perception, a faculty of the non-rational part
of the soul shared with animals, that discerns what is virtuous, but intellect and reason. In
the second place, Aristotle conceives of perception as a bodily power in an important
way: it is a power that operates through sense organs that are affected (physically) by the
objects of sense. But it would be strange to consider goodness (or justice, or temperance,
etc.) a physical object capable of affecting the sense organs and producing perception.
Aristotle seems to be in a theoretical bind: perception is the faculty that discerns the
particulars yet it is seemingly not equipped to discern ethical particulars.
There are two ways one might get Aristotle out of this bind: one way is to give
perception a merely instrumental role in the discernment of ethical particulars, where it is
by the judgment of intellect upon the data provided by perception that one apprehends
ethical particulars. If one adopts this strategy, one maintains that it is indeed the rational
part of the soul that discerns virtuous action, but risks undermining the situational
specificity of such discernment. Insofar as intellect operates with universals, on this
strategy virtuous action is determined by subsuming particulars under universal rules,
which Aristotle denies. I adopt a second strategy and offer an account of perception such
that it is receptive to ethical particulars, by which I mean that human perception is able to
apprehend particulars in their significance to virtuous action.
Adopting this strategy straightforwardly resolves the second difficulty, but is left
with the first, namely, that this appears to make virtue not the excellent activity of the
rational part of the soul but of the non-rational, perceptual part of the soul. To avoid this,
I offer a shift in perspective and consequently in the uses of ‘rational’ and ‘non-rational.’
Rather than consider perception abstractly, outside of the context of a human soul and a
human life, I consider perception as an integrated part of the intellectual soul. This
holistic perspective enables me to offer an account of intellectual perception: a way of
perceiving that is informed by intellectual accomplishments. For example, reading or
hearing speech in one’s native language is a kind of intellectual perception. The words on
the page are perceptually intelligible—even when drunk or asleep, when intellect is
dormant, one comprehends words. Yet one must learn the language in order for such
perceptual comprehension to occur. I argue that human perception generally and ethical
perception specifically is similarly intellectually informed perception. This avoids the
problem of virtue being discerned by a non-rational capacity because intellectual
perception is rational—it is infused, so to speak, with intellect. The non-rational
perceptual part of the soul is fully integrated with the intellectual part, so that the soul as
whole is rational, rather than a composite of rational and non-rational parts.
My argument proceeds in four chapters. In the first chapter, I establish that the
perceptual part of the soul enables the perceiver to apprehend concrete particulars in their
significance to pursuing goals, that is, as occasions for acting. I argue, first, that concrete
particulars, which Aristotle calls incidental perceptibles, are genuine objects of
perception, and, second, that the perceptual power of imagination expands the temporal
horizons of the presently perceived particular. In the second chapter, I argue that human
perception differs from that of non-rational animals by virtue of being a part of an
intellectual soul. I first address the internal complexity of the soul, and especially
Aristotle’s claim that the parts of the soul are in the soul potentially. I argue that the parts
of the soul are functionally incomplete in the sense that their activity is dependent upon
the activity of higher parts of the soul. In light of this structure, I argue that human
perception (in a well-developed soul) is informed by intellect. However, the human soul
is not naturally whole: Aristotle maintains the possibility that intellect is uniquely
separable from the rest of the soul. In the third chapter, I argue that this separability of
intellect constitutes the psychological ground for ethical development. The task of ethical
development is to bring about a harmony of soul that resembles the natural harmony of
soul of non-rational creatures. More specifically, the task is to integrate the dictates of
perception with the dictates of intellect such that what appears good to one truly is good;
it is to develop intellectual perception. I confirm this thesis with an interpretation of the
phenomenon of akrasia, lack of self-restraint, as a failure of perception. Finally, I address
the manner in which intellect informs perception through an interpretation of the virtue of
phronēsis, practical wisdom. I argue that phronēsis is, in part, a state of soul that issues in
accurate perception of particulars as occasions for virtue. Specifically, I argue that it is an
ethical mean of perception. Aristotle holds that perception is a mean state between terms
that govern what can be perceived. For example, sight, which perceives color, is a mean
between white and black. I argue that phronēsis is an ethical mean of perception, a state
of soul consisting in a balanced proportion of ethical terms supplied by one’s
understanding of the good. I conclude with some suggestions about how such intellectual
perception may be developed.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
 .................................................................................................................
 iii

Introduction
 ...............................................................................................................................
 1

Section
 1:
 Aristotelian
 Motivations:
 Perception
 and
 Intellect
 ...........................................
 1

Section
 2:
 Scholarly
 Motivations:
 Perception
 and
 Moral
 Psychology
 .............................
 7

Section
 3:
 Philosophical
 Motivations
 and
 Promise:
 Modern
 and
 Contemporary

Ethics
 .....................................................................................................................................................
 9

Chapter
 Summaries
 .......................................................................................................................
 14

Chapter
 1:
 The
 Perceptual
 Part
 of
 the
 Soul
 ..................................................................
 17

Introduction
 .....................................................................................................................................
 17

Section
 1:
 The
 Parts
 of
 the
 Soul
 .................................................................................................
 18

Section
 2:
 The
 Basic
 Powers
 of
 Perception
 ...........................................................................
 26

Section
 3:
 The
 Derivative
 Powers:
 Phantasia
 .......................................................................
 57

Conclusion
 ........................................................................................................................................
 67

Chapter
 2:
 Human
 Perception
 ..........................................................................................
 71

Introduction
 .....................................................................................................................................
 71

Section
 1:
 The
 Unity
 of
 the
 Soul
 .................................................................................................
 77

Section
 2:
 Noetic
 Perception
 ......................................................................................................
 95

Conclusion
 ......................................................................................................................................
 116

Chapter
 3:
 The
 Duality
 of
 the
 Human
 Soul
 ................................................................
 118

Introduction
 ...................................................................................................................................
 118

Section
 1:
 Neither
 by
 Nature
 nor
 Contrary
 to
 Nature
 ......................................................
 120

i
Section
 2:
 The
 Separability
 of
 Intellect
 .................................................................................
 123

Section
 3:
 The
 Duality
 of
 the
 Soul
 and
 the
 Ethical
 Task
 ..................................................
 154

Section
 4:
 Akrasia
 .........................................................................................................................
 161

Conclusion
 ......................................................................................................................................
 183

Chapter
 4:
 Phronēsis
 .........................................................................................................
 185

Introduction:
 The
 Limit
 of
 Logos
 and
 the
 Apprehension
 of
 the
 Particular
 ..............
 187

Section
 1:
 Phronēsis
 ....................................................................................................................
 194

Section
 2:
 Virtue
 and
 Phronēsis
 ...............................................................................................
 198

Section
 3:
 Phronēsis
 and
 Perception
 .....................................................................................
 209

Section
 4:
 Phronēsis
 and
 Deliberation
 ..................................................................................
 231

Section
 5:
 Phronēsis
 and
 Virtue
 ...............................................................................................
 233

Conclusion
 ......................................................................................................................................
 234

Conclusion
 ............................................................................................................................
 238

Recapitulation
 ...............................................................................................................................
 238

Ethical
 Development
 ...................................................................................................................
 240

Bibliography
 ........................................................................................................................
 248

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Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge, first and foremost, my advisor, Dr. Marina McCoy, for her
tireless efforts, insightful comments, and encouragement throughout the process of
writing this work. Under her guidance, this project became an exciting, enjoyable, and
enlightening work. I would like to thank my readers, Dr. Arthur Madigan and Dr.
William Wians for their support and thoughtful responses to my work, which has been
greatly improved by their input. I would like to thank the faculty of the philosophy
department at Boston College for providing such an enriching environment in which to
pursue graduate study, and RoseMarie DeLeo, for making the process run so smoothly.
Last, I would like to thank Eric Sanday for his constant philosophical friendship.
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