Table Of ContentCornelia-Adriana Baciu · John Doyle
Editors
Peace, Security
and Defence
Cooperation in
Post-Brexit Europe
Risks and Opportunities
Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation
in Post-Brexit Europe
(cid:129)
Cornelia-Adriana Baciu John Doyle
Editors
Peace, Security and Defence
Cooperation in Post-Brexit
Europe
Risks and Opportunities
Editors
Cornelia-AdrianaBaciu JohnDoyle
SchoolofLawandGovernment SchoolofLawandGovernment
DublinCityUniversity DublinCityUniversity
Dublin,Ireland Dublin,Ireland
ISBN978-3-030-12417-5 ISBN978-3-030-12418-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12418-2
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Foreword
If the EU and the UK do not manage to create a strategic partnership in foreign
policyanddefence—a‘specialrelationship’,asitwere—bothsideswilllose.There
is no point therefore in debating who needs the other more. Both Brussels and
Londonstandtogainfromapragmaticpartnership.
SuchanEU–UKpartnershipwillhavetobeclearlydefined.Firstofall,aEuro-
British ‘special relationship’ must be just that: special. It cannot be seen as a
precedentforsimilararrangementswithanyotherstate(which,formostEUmember
states, means: with Turkey). That is easy to justify, if necessary: after Brexit, only
onenon-EUEuropeanstatewillhaveapermanentseatintheUNSecurityCouncil,
soonlythatonestatequalifiesforthisparticulartypeofstrategicpartnership.
AstheUKhasalwaysstronglyopposedfreeriding,itcannotnowdosoitself.One
far-reachingwayofinstitutionalisingaspecialrelationship,forexample,wouldbeto
maintainaBritishseatintheForeignAffairsCouncil(FAC).Butsuchaseat,even
withoutvotingrights,cannotcomeforfree.TheCFSPremainsanintergovernmental
area of EU policy: decisions require unanimity. In practice, member states hardly
evervoteintheFACoritspreparatorybodies,buteithertakedecisionsbyconsensus
ordonotdecideatall.Aseatwithoutavotethusactuallycomesveryclosetohaving
anormalseat.Therefore,itwouldbebutlogicalthatinthisscenariotheUKwould
continuetoabidebyallTreatystipulationsontheCFSPandcontinuetopayintothe
CFSP budget. An ‘opt-in’ into the CFSP cannot be partial: it would have a very
negative impact on decision-making if the UK subscribed to one EU common
positionandnottoanother.HavingaseatimpliessubscribingtoallCFSPdecisions,
anddefendingtheminallotherforums,justliketheEUmemberstates.
This would senda strongsignalto theother powers,such asRussia and China,
thatindiplomacyevenafterBrexittherewillstillbeoneEurope,whichwouldbein
theinterestofallEuropeanstates.TheUKwouldalsobenefitbecauseitwouldretain
an important asset in its relationship with the USA. And the EU member states
wouldbenefitbecauseiftheUKremainsfullyinvolvedintheCFSP,theyneednot
fear the emergence of new parallel circuits that would bypass the EU. Smaller
member states especially would not be keen on the UK trying to influence foreign
v
vi Foreword
policy from the outside through bilateral relations with the other big European
players,FranceandGermany.Atthesametime,itwouldbeclearthatifoneleaves
theUnion,onecannotcomebackinonthecheap.
Thebiggestobstacle tosuchapartnership,however, aretheBritish themselves.
TheBritishgovernment,initspaperon“ForeignPolicy,DefenceandDevelopment:
A Future Partnership Paper” (September 2017), expressed a very positive view of
CFSP andCSDP.One almost wonders whyit wouldwishtoleave.Unfortunately,
and contrary to the British reputation for pragmatism, in the debate on the EU and
Brexit ideology and emotions prevail. That has rendered it very difficult for the
Britishpoliticalleadershiptoadoptanuancedandrealisticstance.Britishdomestic
politics have become extremely volatile. This has certainly not made the Brexit
negotiationsanyeasier.
Not just in foreign and defence policy, but in many other policy areas there are
very good reasons to maintain practical cooperation between the UK and the EU
even after Brexit. Cooperation betweenpoliceand intelligence servicesand justice
departmentsinthefightagainstterrorismisanobviousexample.Theproblemisthat
wheneveryBritishministrydrawsupthelistofwhatitwouldstillbedesirabletodo
together with the EU after Brexit, and London then assembles all those lists, the
resultwilllookverymuchlikemembership.Thatwillbepoliticallyunfeasible,even
though every individual item on every list will be perfectly logical. This demon-
stratesthesheerabsurdityofBrexit:afteryearsofnegotiatingonhowtoleave,the
UKwillthenhavetostartanotherroundofnegotiationsonhowtolinkbackupwith
theEUinawholerangeofareas.
Perhaps,ifofferedthechancetovoteagain,Britishcitizenswouldprefertostay
in the EU after all. Meanwhile, however, the EU itself will (hopefully!) have
advanced and made new steps towards more integration. Even if the UK was to
remain, which personally I strongly hope, something, sadly, has been broken
betweentheUKandtherestoftheEU.
Egmont—RoyalInstitutefor SvenBiscop
InternationalRelations,Brussels,
Belgium
GhentUniversity,Ghent,Belgium
Acknowledgements
The editors of this volume would like to thank Professor Ulrich Krotz, Director of
Europe in the World Programme at the European University Institute, Florence;
Jeremy Stöhs, Research Analyst at the Institute for Security Policy, University of
Kiel; Dr Heiko Borchert, Security Analyst and Managing Director, Borchert Con-
sulting &Research AG; DrThomasWithington, ResearcherandDefenceAnalyst,
MönchPublishingGroup,fortheircommentsinrelationtothiswork.Wewouldalso
liketothank ProfessorRobert Elgie, School ofLawandGovernment, Dublin City
University; Dr Azra Naseem, Research Fellow at the Institute for International
Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, Dublin City University; Dr Sebastian
Bruns, Director of the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security, University of
Kiel; and Daniel Pust, DAAD Lecturer at the Department of Germanic Studies,
Trinity College Dublin, for their assistance and support. Finally, we thank all
contributors for their commitment and professionalism during various stages of
processingthisbook,whichweareverypleasedtopresent.
vii
Contents
PartI TurningtheTables:TheCollaborativePotentialofFuture
EU-UKRelationsinPeace,SecurityandDefence
1 UK-EUMilitaryCooperationandBrexitfromaNeoclassical
RealistPerspective:NoBigDeal?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
LeeDavidTurpin
2 ChannelTrouble?ChallengestoUK-EUSecurityCollaboration
AfterBrexit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
MonikaSusandBenjaminMartill
PartII BeyondBrexit:RethinkingtheFutureofEurope
3 TheFrench-GermanMilitaryCooperationandtheRevival
ofEuropeanDefenceAfterBrexit:BetweenReality
andPoliticalMyth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
DelphineDeschaux-Dutard
4 TheEffectsofBrexitontheGoodFridayAgreement
andtheNorthernIrelandPeaceProcess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
JohnDoyleandEileenConnolly
5 AlliancePersistence,MilitarySecurityandthe2016Brexit
Referendum:TheCaseofEstoniaandtheUnitedKingdom. . . . . 97
JonasJ.Driedger
PartIII NewSourcesofLegitimationandPowerinEuropeanPeace
andSecurity
6 TheEU’sTechnologicalPower:HarnessingFutureandEmerging
TechnologiesforEuropeanSecurity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
RalucaCsernatoni
ix
x Contents
7 CollaborativeNavalProcurementandGrandStrategy
Post-Brexit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
MichaelFriederichKluth
8 EuropeanNuclearDeterrenceandSecurityCooperation:
Post-BrexitRelationsandChallenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
AdéritoVicente
PartIV Post-BrexitStrategy:TowardsNewParadigmsofEuropean
Resilience,StabilityandSecurity
9 ConceptualisingEuropeanSecurityPost-Brexit:Turbulence,
ComplexityandInterdependence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
EffieCharalampaki
10 Conclusion:TheFutureofEurope—TowardsaNewParadigm
ofEuropeanSecurityandResilience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Cornelia-AdrianaBaciuandJohnDoyle
List of Contributors
Cornelia-AdrianaBaciu SchoolofLawandGovernment,DublinCityUniversity,
Dublin,Ireland
Effie Charalampaki Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies, Institute of International
Relations,Athens,Greece
EileenConnolly SchoolofLawandGovernment,DublinCityUniversity,Dublin,
Ireland
RalucaCsernatoni CharlesUniversityPrague,Prague,CzechRepublic
VrijeUniversiteitBrussels,Brussels,Belgium
DelphineDeschaux-Dutard UniversitéGrenobleAlpes,Grenoble,France
John Doyle School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Dublin,
Ireland
JonasJ.Driedger EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy
HigherSchoolofEconomics,Moscow,Russia
Michael Friederich Kluth Department of Social Science and Business, Roskilde
University,Roskilde,Denmark
BenjaminMartill LondonSchoolofEconomics,London,UK
MonikaSus HertieSchoolofGovernance,Berlin,Germany
LeeDavidTurpin LancasterUniversity,Lancaster,UK
AdéritoVicente EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Florence,Italy
xi
