Table Of ContentPEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE CHALLENGE FOR ISRAEL
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Peace in the Middle East:
The Challenge for Israel
edited by
EFRAIM KARSH
D Routledge
Taylor &. Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First published 1994 by
FRANK CASS & CO. LTD.
Published 2013 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY, 10017, USA
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business
Copyright © 1994 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Peace in the Middle East: Challenge for
Israel
I. Karsh, Efraim
327.1720956
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record of this book is available from the
Library of Congress
ISBN 13: 978-0-714-64614-5 (hbk)
ISBN 13: 978-0-714-64141-6 (pbk)
This group of studies first appeared in a Special
Issue on ‘Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge
for Israel’ of Israel Affairs, Vol.l, No.l, Autumn
1994, published by Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without the prior permission of the publisher.
Typeset by Vitaset, Paddock Wood, Kent
Contents
Introduction Efraim Karsh viii
Peace by the End of the Century? A Personal
Gloss on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process P.J. Vatikiotis 5
Peace and Israeli Security Dov S. Zakheim 13
The Diaspora and the Peace Process Max Beloff 27
The Boundaries of Peace Moshe Brawer 41
Reassessing the US-Israeli Special
Relationship Bernard Reich 64
The Effects of the Peace Process on the
Israeli Economy Ben-Zion Zilberfarb 84
New Directions in Israel’s Foreign Policy Aharon Klieman 96
The Politics of Israeli-European Economic
Relations Rosemary Hollis 118
Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past,
Present and Future Elisha Efrat 135
Israeli Professionals and the Peace Process Michael Keren 149
Index 164
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Introduction
EFRAIM KARSH
ScITh apporoacohesl it,s fiftieth anniversary, the State of Israel seems
closer than ever to its professed loftiest ideal: contractual peace
with all its Arab neighbours, first and foremost the Palestinians. The
Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, signed on the White House Lawn on 13 September
1993, was a watershed in the one-hundred-year war between Arabs
and Jews. After a century of denial and rejection, of blood-letting and
bereavement, Arabs and Jews have finally agreed to bury the hatchet
and settle for peace, based on mutual recognition and acceptance.
Jordan followed the Palestinian example within a day by signing ajoint
agenda with Israel on the framework for peace. Even President Hafiz
Asad of Syria, the paragon of Arab rejection of the fact of Israel, has
been grudgingly reconciling himself to the idea of a fully-fledged peace
with the Jewish state.
This is neither to ignore the problems and obstacles that lie ahead,
nor to discount the disruptive power of extremists on both sides, as
starkly demonstrated by the Hebron, Afula and Hadera massacres.
Yet, even the most implacable foes of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement
would concede that it has changed the Middle Eastern political land
scape beyond recognition. The Rabin-Arafat handshake; the countless
working sessions between Israel and the PLO; the bursts ofjoy in Gaza
and Jericho on the arrival of the first Palestinian policemen; visits by
Israeli officials to Gulf emirates and their hosts’ open endorsement for
close economic relations with Israel, all these images of the rapidly
changing Middle East are unlikely to evaporate into thin air in the face
of future setbacks, which are bound to accompany the historic recon
ciliation between Arabs and Jews.
This volume explores the significance and implications of the nascent
peace process for Israel, its security, economic well-being and inter
national standing. In the opening contribution, P.J. Vatikiotis, a long
time observer of Middle Eastern affairs, casts a personal gloss on the
Arab-Israeli peace process. He views the Israeli-Palestinian accord as
“the best news I have had in fifty years of living with this conflict”,
and believes that the mutual resignation to the notion of peaceful
coexistence, embedded in the agreement, can readily culminate in
2 PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CHALLENGE FOR ISRAEL
comprehensive peace and regional cooperation. However, were Arabs
and Israelis to prove unable to surmount the acrimonious legacy
between them - and Vatikiotis considers religious-cultural rejectionism
as peace’s worst enemy - then a physical separation between these two
communities or nations must be effected, with international forces
interposed between them as a buffer.
This cautious optimism is shared by other writers. According to
Dov Zakheim, while peace will allow Israel to rationalize its defence
expenditures and restructure its armed forces, it will still need to
maintain a strong military posture “to account not only for threats
from states not willing to subscribe to a settlement at all, but those that
might renege on it”. This, in turn, will demand considerable resources
that will probably “wipe out any chance of peace dividend, other than
that which might be realized through increased military sales abroad”.
That, however, “remains a small price to pay for obtaining what Israel
has sought since its birth: a reduced threat of war and therefore, a far
less stressful existence for its citizens”.
A more sanguine assessment of the economic implications of peace
is offered by Ben-Zion Zilberfarb. Although sceptical of peace’s direct
economic gains, such as a trade boom between Israel and the Palestinian
autonomy, or for that matter between Israel and the wider Arab world,
he deems the indirect effects of peace to be highly beneficial to the
Israeli economy. These include trade relations with countries which
hitherto refused to trade with Israel, and a possible increase in foreign
direct investments. Above all, he estimates that a gradual reduction in
military outlays and its diversion to development investments may
increase Israel’s economic output by $35 billion over a ten-year period,
a substantial gain indeed.
Where Israel has already reaped a substantial “peace dividend” is in
the critical realm of “Israel among the nations”. The “special relation
ship” with the United States, which plunged to one of its lowest ebbs
during the latter part of the Bush presidency, has made an impressive
recovery following Labour’s ascendency in June 1992 and the resultant
reinvigoration of the peace process; so have Israel’s relations with the
European Community. Yet while Bernard Reich expects the US-
Israeli relationship to retain its uniqueness for the foreseeable future, if
not without occasional frictions and disagreements, Rosemary Hollis
is more sceptical on how close Israel’s relations with the European
Union can become. Not only have the West Europeans been more
lukewarm than their American counterparts towards Israel over the
past decades; not only do the internal politics of the European Union
and the fear of economic competition preclude a full Israeli member
ship, but “from the perspective of the EU, Israel is and will remain part
of the Middle East”.
INTRODUCTION 3
The peace dividend, argues Aharon Klieman, has not been confined
to Israel’s enhanced standing and active re-engagement with the inter
national community; it has also mitigated the wariness and distrust
with which Israelis tend to view the outside world, ushering in a
greater spirit of openness and self-assurance. In the words of Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin: “We have got to rescue ourselves from the
pervading sense of isolation gripping us for the better part of a half-
century. We must join the worldwide movement towards peace,
conciliation and cooperation, for otherwise we shall be left behind,
standing alone at the station platform.” One special relationship that
has already been affected by this buoyant mood, and is certain to
undergo a fundamental transformation as the peace process unfolds, is
that between Israel and the Jewish diaspora. As Max Beloff puts it,
One has the impression that Israel’s ambassadors increasingly see
their relations with the local Jewish community as one of
expounding the Israeli government’s own position and less than it
used to be of seeking the opinions of their interlocutors ... As
the demographic changes make their effect, indifference to what
the diaspora can do is likely to grow. What matters will be what
happens in Israel and the rest will be marginal. If some form of
peace ensures security, even the American Jewish lobby will cease
to be valued.
Before peace can ensure security, however, some hurdles have yet to be
crossed. Tall among these stand the Israeli settlements in the occupied
territories, the West Bank in particular, which have arguably made the
surrender of these lands to Arab control inconceivable. Not so,
maintains Elisha Efrat. If anything, the fact that only 120,000 Jews, a
mere three per cent of Israel’s Jewish population, have made the West
Bank their home, speaks volumes of the lack of public support for this
endeavour. This, together with the small size of many of these
settlements and their wide geographical distribution, means that most
of them will wither away as peace strikes root.
No less daunting a task confronting Arabs and Israelis will be the
demarcation of their future borders, for no other reason than that it
impinges on such existential issues as retention of strategic depth and
control over water resources and arable lands. To prevent a deadlock,
Moshe Brawer advises peacemakers on both sides to avoid rigid
adherence to past boundaries. There is nothing sacred in either the
colonial borders or the lines established in the wake of the 1948-49
War, he argues, as both were dictated by practical considerations of the
time, which were largely mindless of the needs of the local inhabitants,
and have anyway been rendered obsolete by the demographic,
technological, and physical changes that have taken place ever since.
