Party System Change in Legislatures Worldwide: Moving Outside the Electoral Arena

240 Pages·2013·2.002 MB·English

by  Carol Mershon, Olga Shvetsova

PartySystemChangeinLegislaturesWorldwide
In this book, Carol Mershon and Olga Shvetsova explore one of the
centralquestionsindemocraticpolitics:howmuchautonomydoelec-
tedpoliticianshavetoshapeandreshapethepartysystemontheirown,
without the direct involvement of voters in elections? Mershon and
Shvetsova’stheoryfocusesonthechoicesofpartymembershipmadeby
legislators while serving in office. It identifies the inducements and
impediments to legislators’ changes of partisan affiliation and inte-
grates strategic and institutional approaches to the study of parties and
party systems. With empirical analyses comparing nine countries that
differ in electoral laws, territorial governance, and executive–legislative
relations,MershonandShvetsovafindthatstrategicincumbentshavethe
capacity to reconfigure the party system as established in elections.
Representatives are motivated to bring about change by opportunities
arisingduringthe parliamentaryterm.Theyare deterredfromdoingso
bytheelementaldemocraticpracticeofelections.
Carol Mershon is an associate professor of politics at the University
of Virginia. She received her Ph.D. in political science, with distinction,
fromYaleUniversity.Shehasservedaspoliticalscienceprogramdirector
at the National Science Foundation. Mershon’s articleshave appearedin
journalssuchasAmericanPoliticalScienceReview,AmericanJournalof
Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, and
Journal of Politics. She has authored The Costs of Coalition (2002) and
co-edited Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching (2009). The
recipient of two National Science Foundation awards, Mershon has also
heldtwoFulbrightgrantsandaSocialScienceResearchCouncilFellowship.
OlgaShvetsovaisanassociateprofessorofpoliticalscienceatBinghamton
University. She received her Ph.D. from the California Institute of
Technology.Shvetsovaworksinthefieldsofconstitutionalpoliticalecon-
omyandinstitutionaldesign.HerworkhasbeenpublishedintheAmerican
JournalofPoliticalScience,ComparativePoliticalStudies,Constitutional
Political Economy, Electoral Studies, Journal of Democracy, Journal of
TheoreticalPolitics,LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,andotherpeer-reviewed
journals.Shehasauthoredseveralchaptersineditedvolumesandistheco-
authorofDesigningFederalism(2004).

Party System Change in Legislatures
Worldwide
Moving Outside the Electoral Arena
CAROL MERSHON
UniversityofVirginia
OLGA SHVETSOVA
BinghamtonUniversity
32AvenueoftheAmericas,NewYork,ny10013-2473,usa
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©CarolMershonandOlgaShvetsova2013
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Firstpublished2013
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
AcatalogrecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary.
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Mershon,Carol.
PartySystemChangeinLegislaturesWorldwide:MovingOutsidetheElectoralArena/
CarolMershon,OlgaShvetsova.
pages cm
isbn978-0-521-76583-1(hardback)
1. Partyaffiliation–Crossculturalstudies. 2. Politicalparties–Crosscultural
studies. 3. Legislators–Crossculturalstudies. 4. Legislativebodies–Crosscultural
studies. I. Shvetsova,Olga(OlgaVitalievna) II. Title.
jf2071.m47 2013
328.3069–dc23 2013004059
isbn978-0-521-76583-1Hardback
CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof
urlsforexternalorthird-partyInternetWebsitesreferredtointhispublication
anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchWebsitesis,orwillremain,
accurateorappropriate.
Contents
ListofFigures pageix
ListofTables xi
Preface xiii
Acknowledgments xv
part one the prospect of party system change
between elections
1 ThePhenomenonofPartyandPartySystemChange 3
1.1 ApproachestoAnalyzingChangeinPartiesandPartySystems 4
1.1.1 ChangeintheNumberandPositionofPartiesas
EmanatingfromtheElectoralArena 5
1.1.2 ChangeinCompetitionfortheExecutive 7
1.1.3 NewAttentiontoChangeinLegislativeParties 9
1.2 ThePossibilityandRealityofPartySystemChangebetween
Elections 10
1.3 TheArgumentinBrief 15
1.4 TheMapoftheBook 16
2 HowParliamentaryPartySystemChangeMattersforPolicy 18
2.1 LegislativeCoalitionsandPolicy 19
2.1.1 LegislativePartiesasCoalitionsofIncumbents 19
2.1.2 LegislativeMajorityCoalitionsandExecutiveCoalitions 20
2.1.3 TheCore,PolicyChoice,andChangingtheStatusQuo 21
2.2 ManipulatingtheCore:ThePowerofInterpartyMoves 22
2.3 TectonicShiftsoutofPartyMoves:EmpiricalIllustrations 23
2.3.1 Two-PartySystem:U.S.House 23
2.3.2 Two-PartySystem:U.S.Senate 24
v
vi Contents
2.3.3 Four-PartySystem:CanadianHouse 25
2.3.4 FiveSizableandManyMinorParties:ItalianChamber 25
2.4 Conclusion 31
3 WhyandHowIndividualIncumbentsChangeLegislative
PartySystems 32
3.1 AnIntegratedModelofInducementsandDeterrentstoChangesof
AffiliationamongIndividualIncumbents 32
3.1.1 InducementstoChangingPartiesintheUtilityFunctionof
Incumbenti 33
3.1.2 TheIncumbent’sTime-ContingentChoiceandthe
ParliamentaryCycle 35
3.1.3 TheElectoralValueofStablePartyLabels 36
3.1.4 Voters’Calculus:AgencyRisksandRewardsforPartisan
Constancy 38
3.1.5 UnifiedAnalysisoftheCalculationsofPoliticiansand
Voters 40
3.2 TestableImplications:Inducements,Deterrents,andtheTimingof
InterpartyMoves 43
3.3 ResearchDesign 47
3.4 Conclusion 50
part two discerning mechanisms through case studies
4 Legislators’PursuitofBenefitsandLegislativePartySystemChange 53
4.1 RevisitingtheParliamentaryCycle 54
4.1.1 OperationalizingStagesoftheParliamentaryCycle 54
4.1.2 ElaboratingtheHypothesisonTimingMovestoSeize
Gains 58
4.2 InducementsattheGranularLevel:1996–2001Italyand
1993–1995Russia 59
4.2.1 RationaleforSelectionofTwoPrimaryIn-DepthTerms 60
4.2.2 VariationsinIncumbentChangesofPartyacross
AggregatedStages 61
4.2.3 MPInterpartyMobilityDisaggregatedbySubstage 64
4.3 EnlargingtheView:MPInterpartyMobilitybyStage 69
4.4 TheFormationofNewParliamentaryParties 75
4.5 Conclusion 78
5 AvoidanceofElectoralCostsandStabilityinParliamentaryParties 80
5.1 RevisitingtheLogiconIncumbentAvoidanceofElectoralCosts 81
5.2 TheClosestScrutinyofDeterrentstoChangingParty:1996–2001
Italyand1993–1995Russia 81
5.2.1 AFirstLookattheTimingofInterpartyMovesRelativeto
Elections 82
Contents vii
5.2.2 TimingandLimitingMoves:ComparisonsacrossGroups
ofMPs 84
5.2.3 FindingaBalance?AvertingElectoralCostsYetReaching
forParliamentaryBenefits 88
5.3 ExpandingtheInvestigationofElectoralDeterrents 90
5.3.1 AFirstCutatLocatingMovesinTime 90
5.3.2 WhatTimeTellsaboutMPEffortstoCurbElectoralCosts 93
5.4 Conclusion 95
part three generalizing in a broader empirical setting
6 SettingUptheAnalysisofOneHundredandTenParliaments 101
6.1 MeasuringIncumbents’ChangesofParty 102
6.2 InducementstoMPMobilityamongParties 104
6.3 DeterrentstoMPMobility 107
6.4 AlternativeInfluencesandControls 109
6.4.1 PartySystemPropertiesattheMostRecentElection 109
6.4.2 DemocraticInstitutions 111
6.4.3 AscriptiveCleavagesandEconomicFactors 114
6.4.4 CulturalFactorsandSalientIssues 115
6.5 Conclusion 116
7 InstitutionalInducementsandPreference-BasedDeterrentsto
LegislativePartySystemChange 117
7.1 IntroducingtheStatisticalModels 117
7.2 ExplainingtheAbsoluteNumberofMonthlyMPMoves 119
7.2.1 TheBasicModelandtheSMD–PRDivide 120
7.2.2 Inducements,Deterrents,andCountryEffects 123
7.2.3 InducementsandDeterrentswithInstitutional,Economic,
andCulturalConditions 126
7.2.4 InducementsandDeterrentswithInstitutions,Economic
Conditions,andPartySystemPropertiesattheMostRecent
Election 129
7.2.5 SocietalCleavagesasBarrierstoChangeinParliamentary
PartySystems 133
7.3 PresenceorAbsenceofMPSwitching 133
7.4 Stability,SoloMoves,orMassMoves 135
7.5 TheRelationshipbetweenInterelectoralPartySystemChangeand
ElectoralVolatility 141
7.6 Conclusion 145
8 ComparativeStatics:WhereOurAssumptionsMayNotApply 147
8.1 WhatDifferenceDoAssumptionsMake? 147
8.2 InterelectoralPartySystemChangeasaFunctionof
VoterPreferences 148
viii Contents
8.2.1 IllustrativeCasesMeetingExpectations 151
8.2.2 Anomalies 153
8.3 EnforcementofConstraintsonSwitchingasaFunctionofVoter
Preferences 154
8.3.1 ParchmentBarriers 155
8.3.2 LooseConstraints 157
8.3.3 ConstraintswithConfounds 157
8.3.4 ClearConstraintswithQuestionsonVoterPreferences 158
8.3.5 WindowsandSunsets 159
8.4 TheCaseofSpainasaReferenceGroupagainstOurMainFindings 161
8.5 Conclusion 162
9 Conclusions 164
9.1 Reappraisal:OfTimeandPartySystemStability 165
9.2 IllustrativeApplicationsinFurtherResearch 167
9.3 BroaderTheoreticalImplicationsfortheField 169
9.3.1 SourcesofInstitutionalChange 169
9.3.2 ControlofGovernmentandtheLegislativeAgenda 170
9.4 RebalancingtheConceptofPartySystems 172
Bibliography 175
ParliamentaryRecords 175
NewspapersandPeriodicals 177
OtherPrimaryandSecondarySources 178
Appendixes 203
AppendixA:ChapterAppendixes 203
AppendixB 211
AuthorIndex 213
SubjectIndex 218