Table Of ContentPSYOP IN PANAMA
OPERATION JUST CAUSE
For many Americans, the first time they heard the word PSYOP was in conjunction
with the final stages of Operation Just Cause. They watched on television as a group of
PSYOP soldiers played deafening rock music, 24 hours a day, over loudspeakers that
ringed the Vatican Embassy compound where General Noriega had taken refuge. The
siege continued until General Manuel Noriega couldn't take it anymore and
surrendered. It is unfortunate that this is what most Americans remember of PSYOP
in Panama because in actuality, the role played by PSYOP in Operation Just Cause
far outweighed the music playing outside the Vatican Embassy which was highlighted
by the press.
PSYOP contingency planning and preparation for hostilities in Panama began years
before Operation Just Cause. PSYOP materials to include prerecorded TV, radio and
loudspeaker tapes were developed, radio and loudspeaker scripts were prepared, and
possible themes and designs were identified for printed materials. The Commander
for the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion, the battalion with area responsibility
for Panama, was designated Commander of the PSYOP Task Force in the event
hostilities should arise. They didn't have to wait long.
During the spring of 1988 Noriega increased his anti-
American propaganda and directed his troops to harass US
Forces. The US responded by adding additional security
elements which included, military police, another infantry
brigade and three PSYOP loudspeaker teams.
As the duration of the hostilities was unknown, the 4th
PSYOP Group took advantage of the situation by rotating
loudspeaker teams in order to give them real world on site
training to virtually all team members. As tensions ignited,
the loudspeaker teams found themselves supporting the US
security forces against staged protests by members of the
Panama Defense Force (PDF) and Dignity Battalions
(DIGBAT). In each case the loudspeaker teams proved their
worth utilizing pre-recorded tapes and scripts that later
would be invaluable during Operation Just Cause.
In May of 1989, Noriega nullified the presidential elections
after Guillermo Endara was elected President. This action further contributed to
worsening internal conditions as well as international relations. This heightened unrest
in the country signaled that a combat scenario might be required after all.
On October 3rd members of the Panama Defense Force (PDF) attempted an
unsuccessful military coup. In response to this attempt, Noriega purged the PDF
military leadership leaving only those that he felt he could trust. This action proved to
be unpopular with many PDF soldiers and would later be useful in the employment of
PSYOP.
As discontent within Panama increased along with anti-American propaganda,
concerns for the safety of US personnel and property increased. The handwriting was
on the wall, the escalation of the threat against United States interest as well as the
overall well being of the Panamanian population left little choice but to plan and
prepare for a full scale combat operation.
The 1st PSYOP Battalion Commander was designated by General Stiner,
Commander, Joint Task Force South, as a member of the 20-man Joint task Force-
South staff element identified to pre-deploy to Panama in advance of the assault forces
if the combat contingency should become a reality.
On 18 December 1989, two days after the shooting of a US servicemember and the
harassment of another and his wife by the PDF, the 20-man advance JTF-South team
received the go ahead to deploy to Panama.
The forward PSYOP Task Force in country now consisted of the 1st PSYOP Battalion
Commander, a forward liaison cell, the loudspeaker detachment already in country, a
pre-positioned 4th PSYOP Group 10,000 watt AM radio broadcast team, Volant Solo
PSYOP TV/radio broadcast aircraft from the 193 Special Operations Group (SOG) of
the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, and the USSOUTHCOM J-3 PSYOP office.
On 20 December 1989, Operation Just Cause was executed. The loudspeaker
detachment in country fielded 5 loudspeaker teams, which linked up with their
designated supported units. Other loudspeaker teams would deploy with their
supported combat units (82nd Airborne Division, 1/75th Rangers, US Marines, Navy
Seals, etc).
The Opposing Forces
The Panamanian Defense Force numbered nearly 12,800 troops, national guard,
police, and officials- but only about 4,000 could be classified as combat troops. The
ground forces of the Panama Defense Force were organized into 2 infantry battalions,
5 light infantry companies, I cavalry troop, and 2 public order companies; their
equipment included 28 armored cars. The PDF air force comprised five hundred
troops with an assortment of reconnaissance, transport and training planes as well as
unarmed helicopters. The PDF navy numbered four hundred sailors equipped with a
handful of patrol craft, cutters, and launches. In addition, Noriega's forces included
up to eighteen paramilitary Dignity Battalions.
Before H-Hour, American forces in Panama numbered nearly thirteen thousand
troops, including the 193d Infantry Brigade, a battalion from the 7th Infantry Division
a mechanized battalion from the 5th Infantry Division, two companies of Marines, and
an assortment of military police, Air Force, and Navy personnel. On and shortly after
H-Hour, the airlift brought in a strike force of seven thousand troops: a composite
brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), and the
equivalent of five or six battalions of other special operations forces that included
Army Special Forces, Navy Sea-Air-Land forces (SEALs), Navy special boat units, Air
Force special operations personnel and psychological operations specialist.
Later on D-Day, and during the next few days, an additional seven thousand troops-
mostly from the 7th Infantry Division (L) and the 16th Military Police Brigade and
various civil affairs and psychological operations units-arrived to relieve the assault
forces, engage in stability operations, and help establish the new government. The last
increment brought to twenty-seven thousand the total of U.S. forces in Panama for
JUST CAUSE; nearly twenty-two thousand actually engaged in combat operations as
members of the conventional task forces, ATLANTIC, PACIFIC, BAYONET,
SEMPER Fl, or of the unconventional warfare task forces, GREEN, BLACK, BLUE,
WHITE, and RED.
Effectiveness of Loudspeaker Teams
At H-Hour, 1-508th Airborne had the mission of
securing Ft. Amador, an installation shared by
the U.S. and PDF. Because of the need for
OPSEC, American dependents could not be
evacuated in advance of the attack. This
complication, and the desire to minimize enemy
casualties and physical damage, made PSYOP
loudspeaker teams a key asset. The battalion
sealed off the PDF portion of Ft. Amador and
ensured that all noncombatants were safe. After
daylight, the task force set about systematically securing the area. When initial
appeals failed to persuade the PDF to surrender, the commander modified the
broadcasts. The holdouts were warned that resistance was hopeless in the face of
overwhelming firepower and a series of demonstrations took place, escalating from
small arms to 105mm howitzer rounds. Subsequent broadcasts convinced the PDF to
give up. The entire process allowed Ft. Amador to be secured with few casualties and
minimal damage.
The US Marines ran into heavy resistance from PDF and DIGBAT forces at La
Chorrera, a small village on the outskirts of Panama City and Howard Air Force Base.
That evening as the Marines ceased fire for the night, the loudspeaker team
broadcasted surrender appeals as safe passage leaflets were dropped. Resistance
ceased early the next morning without an additional shot being fired. Members of the
PDF and DIGBAT surrendered peacefully all the time waving the safe conduct passes
that were dropped during the night.
In addition to loudspeaker support, PSYOP activities included leaflet drops of safe
conduct passes , AM radio and television broadcasts, and wanted posters as well as
posters urging members of the PDF and DIGBAT to turn in their weapons for money.
Just as it was important for President
Bush to explain to the American people
the reason for US intervention in
Panama, informing the local population
of the US military intent in Panama was
crucial in order to obtain their support.
Three initiatives that helped keep the
general population informed were the
publication of a Spanish language
newspaper and radio and television
broadcasts by Volant Solo aircraft.
The radio and television broadcasts, all in Spanish, notified the Panamanian
population not only informed the population of US intent but also provided advice on
how to avoid becoming a casualty. This effort was cited as being a major factor in the
reduction of civilian casualties. For the television broadcast, Channel 2 was chosen, as
it was the national channel operated by the Panamanian military.
By January 8, 1990, The PSYOP
Task Force had produced and
disseminated over one million
leaflets and handbills, 50,000
posters, 550,000 newspapers, and
125,000 units of other
miscellaneous printed materials. In
addition to the Volant Solo
television broadcasts, the PSYOP
radio stations operated 24 hours a
day in an effort to get the word out
to the people of Panama.
PSYOP had once again proved
itself to be a force multiplier
through the integral role it played
during Operation Just Cause. The
loudspeaker teams deployed with
conventional units proved effective
in reducing resistance and
controlling the local populace.
Integration of major themes below
joint task force (JTF) level was
slow at first, but picked up
momentum as programs like
"money for weapons" began
impacting directly on tactical units.
LESSONS LEARNED
Early integration of PSYOP planning helped ensure overall success of the operation.
Use tactical PSYOP loudspeaker teams to encourage the enemy to surrender before
assaulting their position and to control flow of refugees by broadcasting the directions
to the collection points.
Use broadcasts to get the general population to comply with instructions and
advisories to not only keep them informed but also to keep them out of harms way.
Commanders should personally prepare messages used by PSYOP loudspeaker teams
to encourage enemy to surrender. Aspects of local culture must be considered.
Plan to use pre-printed leaflets to augment efforts of loudspeaker teams in controlling
flow of refugees.
Provisional Reorganization
of the 4th PSYOP Group (Abn)
Lastly but perhaps most important was the fact that out of the experienced gained
from the formation of a PSYOP Task Force for Operation Just Cause, the 4th
Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) recognized a need to provisionally
reorganize. Regionally oriented battalions would remain the same, but the Group
would now be better able to support a wide variety of contingencies.
Under the new tenets of the reorganization established in June of 1991:
The 4th Psychological Operations Group's (Airborne) Commander would deploy to
the theater headquarters, along with a small headquarters element , to provide
PSYOP advice and assistance to the supported theater Commander-In-Chief (CINC)
and act as an expeditor for PSYOP-related actions.
The PSYOP Task Force would continue to be commanded by the theater PSYOP
Battalion Commander, with two other battalion commanders working for him.
1. A tactical commander (the former 9th PSYOP Battalion Commander) would
control all loudspeaker teams and other tactical PSYOP assets and ensure
support to other tactical elements of the Joint Task Force (JTF). Furthermore
the 9th PSYOP Battalion would train for these support elements worldwide.
2. A media production commander (The commander of the new provisional
PSYOP Dissemination battalion) would produce all printed material,
recordings, and audiovisual products, as well as be responsible for conducting all
radio and television broadcast operations.
The effectiveness of the new provisional reorganization was to be tested only 2 months
later with the start of Operation Desert Shield and later Desert Storm. Judging by the
success of both PSYOP operations the decision to reorganize proved to be a good one.
