Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility: Volume 1

328 Pages·2013·1.39 MB·English

by  David Shoemaker

OXFORD STUDIES IN AGENCY AND
RESPONSIBILITY VOLUME 1
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Oxford Studies
in Agency and
Responsibility
Volume 1
Editedby
DAVID SHOEMAKER
1
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP,
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#theseveralcontributors2013
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Contents
NotesonContributors vii
Introduction 1
David Shoemaker
1. ThePossibilityofActionastheImpossibilityofCertain
FormsofSelf-Alienation 12
Sarah Buss
2. TheFecundityofPlanningAgency 47
Michael E. Bratman
3. CanIOnlyIntendMyOwnActions?Intentionsandthe
OwnActionCondition 70
Luca Ferrero
4. Regret,Agency,andError 95
Daniel Jacobson
5. PhenomenalAbilities:IncompatibilismandtheExperience
ofAgency 126
Ois´ın Deery, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols
6. Reasons-Responsiveness,Agents,andMechanisms 151
Michael McKenna
7. Responsibility,Naturalism,and“TheMoralitySystem” 184
Paul Russell
8. TheThree-FoldSignificanceoftheBlamingEmotions 205
Zac Cogley
9. UnwittingWrongdoersandtheRoleofMoral
DisagreementinBlame 225
Matthew Talbert
10. PartialDesert 246
Tamler Sommers
11. Values,Sanity,andResponsibility 263
Heidi L. Maibom
12. FairnessandtheArchitectureofResponsibility 284
David O. Brink and Dana K. Nelkin
Index 315
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Notes on Contributors
MattBedkeisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofBritish
Columbia
MichaelE.BratmanisU.G.andAbbieBirchDurfeeProfessorintheSchool
ofHumanitiesandSciences,andProfessorofPhilosophy,StanfordUniversity
DavidO.BrinkisProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego
SarahBussisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofMichigan
ZacCogleyisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophy,NorthernMichiganUniversity
Ois´ınDeeryisPhDcandidateinPhilosophy,UniversityofBritishColumbia
LucaFerreroisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofWisconsin,
Milwaukee
DanielJacobsonisProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofMichigan
HeidiL.MaibomisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophy,CarletonUniversity
MichaelMcKennaisProfessorandKeithLehrerChair,Departmentof
PhilosophyandCenterforthePhilosophyofFreedom,UniversityofArizona
DanaK.NelkinisProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego
ShaunNicholsisProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofArizona
PaulRussellisProfessorofPhilosophy,UniversityofBritishColumbia
DavidShoemakerisAssociateProfessor,DepartmentofPhilosophy,Murphy
Institute,TulaneUniversity
TamlerSommersisAssociateProfessor,PhilosophyDepartmentandHonors
College,UniversityofHouston
MatthewTalbertisAssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPhilosophy,West
VirginiaUniversity
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Introduction
David Shoemaker
It is my pleasure to introduce the inaugural volume of Oxford Studies in
Agency and Responsibility, a new entry in the Oxford Studies series. The
papers in this volume are excellent illustrations of the important cutting-
edgeworkbeingdoneinthisfield.
“AgencyandResponsibility”isanewlabelforanoldsetofunified,yethighly
diverse,concerns.Itinvolvesinvestigationintosuchfamiliarquestionsasthese:
(cid:1) Whatdoesitmeantobeanagent?
(cid:1) How(ifatall)doesthenatureofpersonhoodandpersonalidentityacross
timebearonquestionsofagency?
(cid:1) What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility?
Whatistherelationbetweenmoralandcriminalresponsibility(ifany)?
Istherearelevantconceptionofresponsibilitygenerally?
(cid:1) Whatistherelationbetweenresponsibility(moral,criminal,orgeneral)
andthemetaphysicalissuesofdeterminismandfreewill?
(cid:1) Whatdovariouspsychologicaldisorders(e.g.autism,psychopathy,mental
retardation,insanity,anddementia)tellusaboutagencyandresponsibility?
(cid:1) Howdomoralagentsdevelop?Howdoesthisdevelopmentalstorybear
onquestionsaboutthenatureofmoraljudgmentandresponsibility?
(cid:1) Whatisthewill,willpower,andweakness(orstrength)ofwill?Whatrole
canpsychologyplayintheinvestigationoftheseissuesgenerally?
(cid:1) What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our
questionsaboutagencyandresponsibility?
(cid:1) Whatisthenatureofpoliticalagency(e.g.citizenship),andhowdoesit
differ,ifatall,frommoralagency?
(cid:1) What is the nature of autonomy and how is it related to agency and
responsibility?
Workonthesequestions,whilemoreorlesshavinganuneasyhomebaseinthe
world ofmoralphilosophy,draws from adiverserange ofcross-disciplinary