Operations Security For Patriot units to successfully accomplish their mission on the air-land ...

79 Pages·2009·13.98 MB·English

CHAPTER 8
Operations Security
For Patriot units to successfully accomplish their mission on the air-land
battlefield, information about friendly unit activities, plans, and operations
must be denied to enemy forces until it is too late for these forces to effectively
react. Operations security (OPSEC) and ADA survivability are synonymous for
all practical purposes.
Generally, OPSEC includes the coordinated application of a wide range of
techniques and procedures to deny information to an enemy. It is primarily
common sense systematically applied to a unit's situation and mission. Coun-
tersuppression actions are taken to protect friendly operations from attack.
OPSEC and countersuppression actions and procedures fall into four catego-
ries, the first three of which are OPSEC areas:
* Countersurveillance - action to protect the true status of friendly
operations.
* Countermeasures -actions to remove or reduce the enemy intelligence and
electronic warfare threat.
* Deception - actions to create a false picture of friendly activities and
operations.
* Countersuppression - actions taken to directly defend or enhance the
defensive capability of the unit.
CONTENTS
page page
Section I - COUNTERSURVEILLANCE Section III - DECEPTION
AREAS OF COUNTERSURVEILLANCE ..... 8-2 DECEPTION OPERATIONS ............... 8-10
STANDINGOPERATING PROCEDURES ... 8-6 DUMMY POSITIONS...................... 8-10
DECOYS ... ... ....................... 8-11
Section II - COUNTERMEASURES
Section IV - COUNTERSUPPRESSION
MSOTVIENMGENETR..8 -9A ND SMALL ARMS FIRES...... 8-11
RADAR EMISSION CONTROL ............. 8-9 NBC DEFENSE TECHNIQUES.............8-12
8-1
FM 44-15
Section I - COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
AREAS OF COUNTERSURVEILLANCE
Measures and actions in this subcate- the KG-27 used with the AN/GRC-103 UHF
gory are those takei to prevent location of the radio, and the VINSON family of speech
unit by visual, electronic, or photographic secure devices.
means. Countersurveillance encompasses the
This equipment sends an unintelligible
following four areas:
signal to receivers not having the same equip-
1. Signal security (SIGSEC). ment. If the enemy has a limited SIGINT
capacity, monitoring these secure nets will
2. Electronic counter-countermeasures.
probably be of lower priority than nets oper-
3. Information security. ating in the clear.
4. Physical security. These secured radio nets allow easy,
rapid communications and are not as vulner-
Countersurveillance measures comprise
able to certain forms of electronic counter-
the bulk of the actions available to the unit
measures. To maintain secure nets, it is
commander when incorporating OPSEC into
essential that proper encryption codes and
his operations.
authenticators are used. Codes are changed
SIGNAL SECURITY regularly as prescribed.
Signal security encompasses actions units
Transmission Security. When using direc-
can use to minimize enemy interception and
analysis of radar and radio signals. Catego- tional antennas (dipole, flyswatter, dish),
units should position antennas to keep trans-
ries of SIGSEC are electronic security
mission lobes from facing directly toward the
(ELSEC), communications security, and
enemy. This will decrease vulnerability to
TEMPEST.
ESM and ECM. Whenever possible, emplace
Electronic Security equipment where terrain will mask transmit-
ters from the enemy.
ELSEC is the protection of transmis-
sions from noncommunication devices. It
includes measures such as approved operat- Emission Security. Brevity is also one of
ing procedures, proper siting techniques, the keys to COMSEC. Unless a need exists to
maintenance procedures, and training pro- transmit, radios should remain silent. Neces-
grams. Radar emission control is the princi- sary AM and FM transmissions should be
pal ELSEC measure and is addressed in sec- kept short, 20-30 seconds to include short
tion II. concise RATT messages. As much reporting
as is tactically feasible should be transmitted
(Ccmriunications Security
via written reports and courier. The remainder
COM()SEDri nc udes meas ires taken to should be channelled into the UHF system
deny the nem info:mation from friendly because that system normally operates 24
hours a day.
comm oic.lttiuo ns. This includeb crypto secur-
ity, trar smissicn security, emission security,
physical security of COMSEC information, Physical Security of COMSEC Informa-
and mE asulres to ir_ sure the authenticity of tion. COMSEC materials must be very closely
commuylicati< n .. controlled. Limited dissemination is very
important. Generally, radio operators should
Crypto Security. Crypto security centers on not have more than two or three changes of
the use ar d cor trol of speech secure equip- secure codes. If operations lend themselves to
ment and codes. This equipment currently closer control, the new codes should be issued
consists of buik encryption devices, such as on an "as. needed" basis.
8-2
FM 44-15
Additionally, physical security of radio or away from enemy forces. This will reduce
encryption equipment is of great importance. their vulnerability to jamming and detection.
If a properly coded KY-57, for example, fell
into enemy hands, the enemy would have Power Levels
access to the most sensitive unit communica- Sometimes it is possible to burn through
tions. Therefore, speech secure devices should ECM by stepping up the power of the trans-
be guarded much the same as classified mitter. To preserve this option, always oper-
paper; properly stored, accounted for, and ate on the lowest power level that will suffice.
used. This will also reduce the range at which the
threat can detect Patriot transmissions.
Authenticity of Communications. In cases
when secure nets are not available, tactical Antennas
operations (TACOPS) codes must be used. To
Radar antennas are directional by design,
prove authenticity of clear text messages,
as are certain radio antennas. Directional
authentication tables are required. It is
radio antennas should be used whenever
imperative that all radio transmissions be
possible. They will also channelize the signal
secured or authenticated.
and have the effect of boosting the radiated
power in the desired direction.
TEMPEST Hazards
This addresses those SIGSEC considera- INFORMATION SECURITY
tions that are less obvious. For example,
Compromise of information security is
radios and telephones may "leak" transmis-
the primary means whereby enemy forces
sions, known as TEMPEST hazards. If radio-
receive the bulk of their intelligence. Some
frequency shielding of radio and command
sources are lost documents, classified waste
shelters (ECS, CRG, and ICC) is damaged,
improperly disposed, passing sensitive infor-
the unit may be transmitting in directions
mation in the clear, discussing classified
that are unplanned. Another common
matters in unsecured areas, and generally
TEMPEST hazard is collocating secured
failing to follow proper plans and procedures.
wirelines with nonsecured ones. These lines
must have, as a minimum, a 6-foot separation.
Control
ELECTRONIC COUNTER- The most important area is document
COUNTERMEASURES control. Not only do documents contain a
wealth of information, but, in addition, their
Electronic counter-countermeasures are
compromise almost always affects more than
taken to protect friendly electronic emitters
one organization.
from enemy detection, location, and identifi-
cation. ECCM, in this OPSEC context, Considerations Two things to consider in
includes use of proper power settings, antenna document control are administrative control
siting, masking and remoting radio anten- and physical security. Administrative con-
nas, equipment checks for radiation leakage, trol is the use of access rosters and classifica-
and proper training. tion markings. Physical security is the pro-
tection of documents during storage, use, and
Siting
transportation.
Units should attempt to emplace the
radar set and radio antennas so that side and Dissemination. Custodians should verify
backlobes are absorbed or blocked. If this is clearances and the need-to-know of everyone
not possible, try to orient these lobes parallel requesting access to classified information.
8-3
FM 44-15
Only the minimum information necessary to certain addition procedures should be imple-
the mission should be extracted or distrib- mented as the conditions are not always the
uted to verified using personnel. same.
Denial. Units must always be prepared to Storage. In many cases, regular four-drawer
deny their classified material to enemy safes are too heavy to transport or are unavail-
forces. Measures range from simple evacua- able. Usually, field safes or field filing cabi-
tion to the destruction of materials. Since nets are used. These containers are generally
rapid destruction may become necessary, too small for the number of documents in a
documents should be maintained in central Patriot unit. Additionally, a field filing cabinet
storage facilities. If documents and equip- is not secure. Therefore, documents should be
ment must be destroyed use document de- kept in a continually manned location (CP,
stroyers and thermite grenades. Document staff operations vans).
destroyers are placed in file drawers while Classified waste. These papers (carbons,
thermite may be placed on the outside of the typewriter ribbon, extra or superceded mate-
container. It is better to overuse flame devices rial) must be securely stored until destroyed.
than to leave classified materials for the It is recommended that this material be
enemy. burned daily.
Field Security Procedures Site Police. A thorough clean up of paper
Units should exercise the same care and scraps should be conducted to insure no clas-
safeguards over classified material in the sified material is inadvertently lost. All other
field as is practiced in garrison. However, document waste should be buried.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
Actions and measures used to defend a large perimeter. To accomplish this, all avail-
Patriot position are discussed in this para- able means of defense must be employed. The
graph. As a Patriot firing battery normally typical firing battery ground defense scheme
disperses over an area 1,000 meters in radius, illustration shows a sample ground defense.
commanders must be prepared to defend a
TYPICAL FIRING BATTERY GROUND DEFENSE SCHEME
8-4
FM 44-15
Barriers and Entry Control Bunkers/Weapons Sites
All high-speed avenues of approach Sites for M60 machine guns should be
(roads, trails, open terrain accessible to vehi- selected to provide all-around defense. Sites
cles) should be blocked if possible. Methods to are selected to give the best defense the ter-
accomplish this include: rains allows. Then use trip flares, booby
traps, and Claymore mines, and employment
" Mines.
of reaction forces to cover gaps in the machine
" Wire barriers. gun fields of fire. Insure that LAWs are
available along vehicle approach routes. If
" Road blocks (vehicular).
time permits, crew-served weapon sites
" Earthworks (engineer support needed). should be bunkered to enhance their survi-
val. These weapons are the backbone of the
" Cratering (engineer support needed).
defense and will be targeted. Weapon sites
One route should be left open and moni- should be dug for all individual and crew-
tored by an entry control point (ECP). If an served weapons. Bunkering is a desirable
access route is not blocked, it should be second priority.
covered by light antitank weapon, M203, or
Each weapon site should have a range
crew-served weapons. If units have access to
card showing sectors of fires. The bunkered
indirect fire support, (field artillery, mortars)
sites must have communications to the com-
preplanned missions should be coordinated.
mand post. Wire communications are prefer-
Whenever possible, units should use availa-
able; FM radio serves as a backup until wire
ble engineer support to assist in constructing
is laid. These sites are continuously manned.
barriers.
It is necessary to have access to the posi- Observation Posts/Listening Posts
tion, however, the ECP must be rigidly con-
Observation posts (OP) or listening posts
trolled. To achieve control, it is necessary to
(LP) along covered avenues of approach
halt vehicles and personnel. For this reason,
should be continuously manned. Properly
an ECP must either be covered, or have a
positioned OPs and LPs provide early warn-
covered holding area nearby. Communica-
ing and may provide fire direction if artillery
tions to the unit command post are essential.
support is available. Typically, the security
Most organizations collocate their ECP with
squad mans two OPs, the launcher platoon
a bunker, providing medium weapon cover-
mans four OPs, fire control platoon mans one
age and communications through the perim-
OP, maintenance platoon mans one OP, and
eter defense net.
battery headquarters mans the ECP. These
The function of the ECP is to halt, iden- posts must have communications to the CP
tify, and record the passage of personnel and via wire lines. These short stretches of wire
equipment in and out of the battery position. will not hamper unit mobility, as the posted
Personnel who are not assigned to the unit personnel can recover the wire as they return
should not be allowed to enter until autho- to the perimeter. If the battery is not aug-
rized by the CP. The ECP is normally manned mented with a security squad, adjustments
by an element from battery headquarters. must be made in the ground defense plans.
During night operations, personnel man- The wire lines also provide a ready guide
ning an ECP should split into two teams. for personnel returning to the perimeter at
These are the security team and control team. night. By following the lines, soldiers will
The control team challenges and records enter the perimeter at the same place each
entries and exits, while the security team time. To facilitate safe passage and control,
provides cover from a concealed overwatch wire lines are routed through a bunker or
position. ECP.
8-5
FM 44-15
In addition to OPs and LPs, small patrols matic (as with chemical M8 series) or man-
may be employed as an additional physical ual. Manual alarms can be sounded by anyone
security measure. The security squad is detecting a hazard, or on direction of the CP.
trained on patrolling techniques.
Due to the large area covered by a Patriot
Reaction Forces unit, audible alarms originating from a sin-
gle source will probably not be heard through-
To counter small-unit, sabateur, and ter-
out the area. Additional alarm points and
rorist attack, two quick-reaction teams are
visual markers must be used to insure all per-
designated and on standby. These teams
sonnel receive warnings of hazards. These
have the following tasks:
alarms range from vehicle and equipment
" Defend the firing battery with empha- horns and sirens, metal ring and bar systems
sis on the fire control and launcher platoons. to colored flags and geometric shapes. All
unit personnel must be trained to recognize
" Contain penetrations.
and react properly to all alarms.
" Counterattack to restore the perimeter.
Control of Ground
" Act as hunter teams to suppress snipers.
Defense Operations
The fact that these teams are available
All activities conducted to insure the unit
does not remove the requirement for all avail-
is defended must be integrated into a central
able personnel to respond to ground attack
control element at the battery CP. This gives
and return fire. Both quick-reaction teams
the commander an ability to oversee his
should not be dispatched to the same area
entire defense from one location; to direct
unless necessary. This will prevent over-
actions and monitor the status. The CP also
committing manpower to a feint attack.
collects tactical information from bunkers,
Alarm Systems ECPs, OPs, LPs, and quick-reaction teams.
It is not feasible to disseminate voice The CP must have communications with
warnings to all soldiers. Therefore, audible the subordinate elements. Wire is preferred,
and visible area alarms are used. Standard and two separate networks should be avail-
means for both types are prescribed in a var- able. Rapid relay of NBC reports and warn-
iety of publications such as STANAGs and ings to and from the perimeter is also accom-
joint manuals. Control of the alarms is auto- plished over the ground defense nets.
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
As a general rule, countersurveillance infrared scattering and radar transparent.
procedures such as camouflage, conceal- The radar/infrared scattering is the primary
ment, pattern painting, and light and noise system and comprises the bulk of the unit's
discipline are covered in SOPs. SOPs also issue. Radar/infrared scattering screens are
cover the way units make use of buildings, used to camouflage selected unit equipment
forests, roads, and equipment. except radar and radio antennas. The trans-
parent screens are used specifically for that
purpose as radars and radios can operate
CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT
beneath them without significant signal deg-
These are the two traditional methods of radation. As these screens are not inter-
reducing visibility on the battlefield. With
changeable, care must be exercised to insure
the great variety of detectors available to
each is used for its intended purpose. There
modern armies, they have become more
are also different color schemes for each;
important than ever before.
woodland and jungle.
Camouflage Screen Systems
Camouflage screen systems are lessened
These systems come in two types: radar/ in value if the support systems are not prop-
8-6
FM 44-15
erly employed. The poles and spreaders must billets, CP and decontamination facilities,
be placed to raise the screen off the top and and landline communications.
away from the sides of the item being camou-
TONE DOWN
flaged. This prevents the outline from being
revealed. In the case of the radar transparent By itself, camouflage and concealment
screens, poles should not be placed in front of are not sufficient to completely hide a unit (it
the antenna lens. Care must be used when may be impossible). Even a well concealed
camouflaging the LS. The front of the launch position can be revealed if proper tone down
tube and rear of the LS must be kept clear. has not been accomplished.
Vegetation And Terrain Reflective Surfaces
The Patriot system is unique among Reflectors, lights, and windows will reflect
ADA systems in that it can be almost com- and "flash" sunlight if they are not properly
pletely concealed without affecting system covered. Anything, such as canvas, clothes,
operations. The RS and LS can be sited in grass, mud, and sandbags, can be used to
woodlines, as long as openings exist for their perform this function. The only limiting factor
tactical operation. Equipment in fields should is the ingenuity of the soldiers and leaders.
be placed near the edges to blend the camou-
Infrared Sources
flage with the woodline. Emplacing in and
One common method of tone down for
around woods has the following advantages:
vehicle windshields is to raise the hood. This
* Camouflage is natural and less likely
method is good if the engine is cold. Raising
to attract attention.
the hood when the engine is hot just exposes a
* Radar/infrared scattering screens can very good infrared source to enemy detection.
be employed primarily along the sides of Camouflage paints issued to US forces are
equipment to help defeat side-looking airborne infrared absorbing, therefore the hood should
radar (SLAR) surveillance. stay down until the block has cooled. Other
infrared sources that are easily identified
* Air under trees is cooler; branches and
include:
leaves spread heat from equipment and
* Exhaust pipes.
shadow heat sources. This reduces infrared
detectability. * Tires (heated by road march).
* Trees provide some natural protection * Exhaust vents.
against small arms, fragments, and NBC.
* Power cables.
Trees also reduce and screen missile backblast
and launch flash. Everything should be covered with proper
camouflage screening and/or infrared paint.
* Personnel can move more freely when
Tires can be smeared with mud. Cables should
concealed by woods.
be buried or covered. Units may consider
* Trees absorb radar and radio sidelobes carrying a supply of white material to serve
and backlobes. as winter camouflage.
In the event a unit is employed in an area Tracks
that is built up, a modified approach is taken.
When driving into positions, it is inevi-
Equipment can be emplaced in and around
table that some tracks (ruts in mud or soft
buildings without great difficulty. Trucks
earth, trampled grass and weeds) will be left.
and generators should be parked and camou-
These tracks are excellent indicators of
flaged in places where shrubbery would nor-
occupied positions, as well as individual sites
mally be found. A camouflaged item standing
within a position. After the system is opera-
in the middle of a paved area is not hidden.
tional, the following actions should be accom-
As another example, placing a radar set in a
plished:
courtyard will block side and backlobe radia-
tion. The buildings also provide shelters, * Fill in any rutted areas.
8-7
FM 44-15
* Rake over or standup any flattened * Gunfire.
weeds or grasses.
These sounds are not necessarily loud,
* Move vehicles away from the points but they are distinctive and catch attention
where they entered the woods. easily.
Until erased, any tracks left by the vehicle While noise control is a consideration 24
will act as a pointer to the vehicle's site. hours a day, light discipline really only comes
into play during night operations. White
To avoid leaving trails in obvious loca-
light can be seen for extremely long distances
tions the following rules apply:
at night, and even the red "blackout" lights
* Enter and travel through fields and are visible a good distance. To reduce the
meadows on the edges. Tracks are harder to light signature from unit locations perform
see near boundaries, and often trails are the following:
already established.
* Cover bottom flaps of all tents. Repair
* When crossing a plowed field, when- holes and tears to prevent leaks. Keep venti-
ever possible cross in the same direction as lation flaps closed at night; the night air is
the furrows. cool enough to keep temperatures down.
* Emplace equipment near the edges of * Keep the M14 protective airlock
open areas, close to woods or roads and trails. installed on the ECS/ICC.
This provides covered routes or even already
* Turn out all lights when entering or
existing farm trails to equipment locations.
exiting tents/vans. Proper entry control will
* Refuel the 15-kw generator on the eliminate problems. Use shades on all lights.
Patriot LS using 5-gallon fuel cans. This will Use blue or green bulbs whenever possible.
avoid leaving trails with the unit tanker.
* Use blackout drive when moving at
If revetting is to be accomplished, obtain night. When flashlights must be used, use a
dirt from covered or distant locations, or use blue or green filter. Try to avoid shining the
the dirt excavated when placing equipment light upward.
in trenches or dugouts.
* Emplace away from likely ground
approach routes. Emplace in covered loca-
NOISE AND LIGHT DISCIPLINE
tions whenever possible.
Even if all other passive defense mea-
* Use no fires. Mess burners are kept
sures are implemented perfectly, they are
inside at night.
useless without proper noise and light
discipline. * Keep covers on control panels with
indicator lights closed. Open them under
Noise discipline will be somewhat hard
cover; (a poncho or blanket).
to implement fully due to the requirement to
operate generators. Current models are rea- * Make every effort to emplace LSs in
sonably quiet and the noise can be deadened woods, and clear flammable material from
further by vegetation and buildings. Using the backblast areas. Trees help screen the
ducting materials can further muffle sound. flash from the launch; clearing the back area
The following are other sounds that should will reduce the fire hazard.
be minimized:
* Metal striking metal. SITE HARDENING
As with all electronic equipment, Patriot
* Loud voices.
units are vulnerable to damage from small
* Ringing telephones. arms fire and fragmentation.
8-8
FM 44-15
The most common method of gaining especially for crew-served weapons. Obvi-
protection from hostile fires is to use the ously, the degree of hardening depends on
existing terrain. Except for the radar set, how long the unit will be occupying a par-
emplacing in gullies, ravines, woods, even ticular position. Bunkers and foxholes should
buildings, provides cover (and concealment) have overhead cover as a defense against
from attack. Patriot units have no organic napalm and NBC. This overhead cover could
earthmoving equipment. Any major site not hamper small arms fire against aircraft.
improvement will have to be done by support-
Whether or not time exists to revet and
ing engineer units. If engineer support is
fortify, proper dispersal of equipment enhan-
available, revetments should be constructed
ces survival. In a highly mobile situation,
for the system and personnel areas.
dispersal may be the only way to protect the
To enhance unit ability to survive ground system.
and air attack, fortifications may be devised,
Section II - COUNTERMEASURES
MOVEMENT
Countermeasures are actions taken to at least once daily.
reduce the enemy threat by removing or cov-
To maintain the Patriot unit's mobility,
ering indicators of unit presence, or actions
planning and care in execution must be exer-
that offset an inherent weakness of the unit.
cised. The Patriot equipment is large and
Movement is a primary method of insur- heavy, so emplacement and convoy move-
ing survival. Multiple launches will reveal ments will become more important than for
unit positions despite any other attempts at previous HIMAD systems. Silent moves
concealment. Movement is critical to Patriot could be the normal. Movement procedures
survival. Patriot firing batteries should move are detailed in chapter 7.
RADAR EMISSION CONTROL
Radar equipment should only radiate are prepared at battalion level. Emission
when required. Repairs and checks should be control schedules for three and six opera-
accomplished in a quiet mode whenever pos- tional firing batteries are shown in the emis-
sible. Initialization parameters should be sion control schedule illustration. In this
loaded or -obtained from other sources to example, each battery is in two hours of
avoid having to radiate unless active surveil- standby, when the unit exercises EMCON,
lance, mapping or engagement is being con- and one hour of surveillance operations when
ducted. Only radars needed for early warning the unit actively performs surveillance. This
should radiate; all others can wait in ambush. radar blinking makes RDF efforts less suc-
When two or more units can maintain sur- cessful. Shorter radar blinking periods
veillance over the same area, coverage can be increase survivability by reducing the effec-
alternated between units. Units should plan tiveness of enemy RDF equipment, but may
to change PTL of firing batteries at intervals, cause increased radar maintenance. EMCON
if this can be done without degrading the combined with movement are two keys to
battalion radar coverage. EMCON schedules Patriot survival on the air-land battlefield.
8-9
FM 44-15
EMISSION CONTROL SCHEDULE
Section III - DECEPTION
DECEPTION OPERATIONS
Deception operations are taken to mis- Deception operations may be conducted
lead an enemy. They may include the because a commander sees an opportunity to
following: deceive the enemy. A deception may be
required because countersurveillance opera-
" Dummy equipment.
tions are not sufficient to mislead the enemy
" Demonstrations. so an operation can succeed.
" Distortion of an activity so it is not By properly using deception techniques,
what it seems. units can enhance the effectiveness of their
other defense measures.
" Feints.
" Manipulation of electronic signatures.
DUMMY POSITIONS
If enemy forces believe a false position is smoke signatures. A deliberate dummy posi-
real, they will either cease looking or be less tion generally requires more equipment, and
sensitive to indicators of an actual position. thus more time. The advantage of a deliber-
Dummy positions can be one or two items of ate position over a hasty site lies in its believ-
equipment "accidentally" exposed to enemy ability. A deliberate position has more ancil-
surveillance. These exposed "end items" can lary items, such as camouflage nets, tents,
be wooden mockups; cannibalized, destroyed, and personnel.
or non-operational pieces of equipment.
Building fires in concealed sites near the Another form of deception is infrared
dummy items can give false infrared and deception. Infrared sensors are commonly
8-10