Operations in Afghanistan

284 Pages·2011·3.18 MB·English

House of Commons
Defence Committee
Operations in
Afghanistan
Fourth Report of Session 2010–12
Volume I: Report, together with formal
minutes, oral and written evidence
Additional written evidence is contained in
Volume II, available on the Committee website
at www.parliament.uk/defcom
Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 6 July 2011

HC 554
Published on 17 July 2011
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£24.50
The Defence Committee
The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the
expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its
associated public bodies.
Current membership
Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chair)
Mr Julian Brazier MP (Conservative, Canterbury)
Thomas Docherty MP (Labour, Dunfermline and West Fife)
Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley)
John Glen MP (Conservative, Salisbury)
Mr Mike Hancock MP (Liberal Democrat, Portsmouth South)
Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney)
Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend)
Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North)
Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock)
Bob Stewart MP (Conservative, Beckenham)
Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham, Edgbaston)

The following were also Members of the Committee during the Parliament:
Mr Adam Holloway MP (Conservative, Gravesham)
Alison Seabeck MP (Labour, Moor View)
John Woodcock MP (Lab/Co-op, Barrow and Furness)
Mr David Hamilton MP (Labour, Midlothian)
Powers
The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of
which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No
152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.
Publications
The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery
Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press
notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/defcom. A list
of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this
volume.

The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral
evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed
volume.

Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.
Committee staff
The current staff of the Committee are Alda Barry (Clerk), Georgina Holmes-
Skelton (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Inquiry
Manager), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Miguel Boo Fraga
(Committee Assistant) and Sumati Sowamber (Committee Support Assistant).
Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee,
House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general
enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is
[email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson
on 020 7219 1589.
Operations in Afghanistan 1
Contents
Report
Page
Conclusions and recommendations 5(cid:3)
1(cid:3) Introduction 12(cid:3)
Our inquiry 12(cid:3)
Background 14(cid:3)
Armed Forces casualties in Afghanistan 15(cid:3)
Priorities for operations in Afghanistan 15(cid:3)
Communication of the Mission in the UK 16(cid:3)
Defence Committee scrutiny of the MoD 17(cid:3)
2(cid:3) Operations in Helmand in 2006 18(cid:3)
The decision to move into the South of Afghanistan 18(cid:3)
The objectives of the Mission 20(cid:3)
Intelligence 21(cid:3)
Planning 23(cid:3)
Challenges faced by the initial deployment 25(cid:3)
The move to north Helmand and the development of the ‘Platoon Houses
Strategy’ 26(cid:3)
Turnover of key personnel 29(cid:3)
Increased troop numbers and further support 29(cid:3)
Continuation of the Mission to 2009 31(cid:3)
3(cid:3) Military operations since 2009 33(cid:3)
McChrystal counter-insurgency strategy 33(cid:3)
Command and control arrangements in an international coalition 35(cid:3)
Command and control arrangements for UK Forces in Afghanistan and the role of
the Permanent Joint Headquarters 37(cid:3)
Armed Forces personnel 39(cid:3)
Harmony guidelines 39(cid:3)
The Airbridge 40(cid:3)
Support for operations 40(cid:3)
Close air support 40(cid:3)
Helicopters 41(cid:3)
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 42(cid:3)
Force protection 42(cid:3)
Funding and costs of operations in Afghanistan 43(cid:3)
Financial cost of operations in Afghanistan 44(cid:3)
4(cid:3) Training of the Afghan National Security Forces 46(cid:3)
Afghan National Army 46(cid:3)
Afghan National Police 47(cid:3)
Afghan National Security Forces 49(cid:3)
2 Operations in Afghanistan
5(cid:3) The impact on the civilian population 51(cid:3)
Civilian casualties 51(cid:3)
Strategic Communications 52(cid:3)
The work of the Provincial Reconstruction Team 53(cid:3)
Governance and justice 53(cid:3)
Relationship of the UK PRT with US and UK Forces 56(cid:3)
The role of women in Afghan society 57(cid:3)
6(cid:3) Transition and withdrawal 60(cid:3)

Formal Minutes 66(cid:3)
Witnesses 67(cid:3)
List of printed written evidence 68(cid:3)
List of additional written evidence 68(cid:3)
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 69(cid:3)
Operations in Afghanistan 3
4 Operations in Afghanistan
Operations in Afghanistan 5
Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. We wish to pay tribute to all the British personnel, both military and civilian, who
are currently serving or have served in Afghanistan but, in particular, to those who
lost their lives in Afghanistan, and the many more who have sustained life-changing
injuries as a result of the conflict there. We also express our deep gratitude for the
vital contribution made by the families of Armed Forces personnel. We are mindful
that some of the conclusions in this Report, because they are critical of the actions of
successive Governments and their senior military advisers, may be interpreted as a
criticism of the men and women who have served in extremely hazardous, hostile
and difficult conditions. We wish to place on record that no such criticism is made.
The Armed Forces and civilian personnel in Afghanistan have our full support in
tackling the challenges before them. (Paragraph 1)
2. Communicating with the UK population about the purpose of any mission involving
UK Armed Forces is crucial. We have found that the Government’s descriptions of
the nature of the mission and its importance to UK interests have varied throughout
the campaign, lacking a consistent narrative. Whist MoD polling data has shown
some limited improvement in the public’s understanding of operations in
Afghanistan, we have observed some confusion in the communications on Libya
which reminded us forcefully of earlier stages in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 14)
3. We disagree with the MoD decision not to give us sight of documents which are now
over five years old. Refusal hinders our Parliamentary scrutiny of the MoD.
(Paragraph 15)
4. In future, we expect MoD to come to give evidence to the Committee briefed and
prepared to be frank and open about matters where the provision of information
would not put the Armed Forces at risk. (Paragraph 16)
Operations in Helmand in 2006
5. Given the demanding nature of the situation in Iraq, we do not consider that the
implications of the decision to move UK Armed Forces into the South of
Afghanistan in early 2006 were fully thought through, in particular, the potential risk
to UK Armed Forces personnel. We consider that this criticism applies equally to the
international decision to deploy into the South, in that all decisions made at such a
level inevitably involve tensions and delay, which contributed in this case to the
difficulties subsequently encountered. (Paragraph 28)
6. Notwithstanding our recognition of the limitations on intelligence in situations such
as Helmand in 2006, we are concerned that the MoD did not anticipate that the
presence of the Armed Forces in Helmand might stir up a hornets’ nest especially as
much of the intelligence was contradictory. We consider that if, because it was
essential to support improved governance in Afghanistan, the deployment could not
have been deferred or delayed until the end of the fighting season in 2006, senior
6 Operations in Afghanistan

military advisers should nonetheless have raised serious concerns about the
unpredictable nature of the conflict on which they were embarking. This briefing
should have drawn clear attention to the need for force levels to be sufficiently robust
to cope with an unpredictable conflict. We believe that such concerns as were raised
by the Armed Forces were inadequate at best, and that they were not raised, as they
should have been, to the very highest levels of Government. (Paragraph 36)
7. Whilst we recognise that senior military staff have a role in determining the level of
resources needed on specific operations and that this might mean moderating the
demands of commanders in the field, nonetheless, we are disturbed by the fact that
the Secretary of State was being told that commanders on the ground were content
with the support they were being given in Helmand when clearly they were not. We
regard it as unacceptable that hard pressed Forces in such a difficult operation as
Helmand should have been denied the necessary support to carry out the Mission
from the outset, and that this shortage had not been brought to the attention of
Ministers. (Paragraph 41)
8. We consider it to be unlikely that this fundamental change to the operation was put
to Ministers for a decision as to whether to proceed. We cannot be more certain on
this because we have been denied sight of the relevant minutes (see paragraph 15). As
the change put the lives of Armed Forces personnel at much greater risk, it should
surely have gone to the Cabinet for endorsement. Subsequent to the decision, the
new Secretary of State was told in retrospect but we do not believe that senior
military advisers briefed their Ministers with sufficient force as to the strategic
implications of the operational change which had already been made. The MoD
should tell us how relevant lessons have been learnt. (Paragraph 55)
9. The significant transfer of such senior key personnel, both political and military
would increase risks in the administration of the Armed Forces at any time but, in
2006 at such a crucial stage in both the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it gave
rise to unacceptable risks. We conclude that these risks were realised. We
recommend that the Government should avoid moving so many senior military
personnel at a time when Ministers are being moved as well. (Paragraph 56)
10. What is particularly worrying is that the much increased requirement for additional
resources and support, in particular for additional troops and helicopters, was not
acted upon quickly enough. Whilst we accept that it is not possible to prepare and
train soldiers quickly to reinforce those on the ground when circumstances change,
we are, nonetheless, concerned that no strategic reserve had been trained and
prepared in order to be readily available, particularly as this Mission had been
planned for some considerable time. There should always be a contingency reserve
available with the resources to support it. If it is used, immediate plans to restore it
should be in place. (Paragraph 62)
11. Armed Forces personnel achieved the best tactical outcomes possible in very difficult
circumstances in no small measure due to the high quality and training of the troops
themselves. But it must be acknowledged that the force levels deployed throughout
2006, 2007 and 2008 were never going to achieve what was being demanded of the
Armed Forces by the UK, NATO and the Afghan Government. We view it as
Operations in Afghanistan 7
unacceptable that UK Forces were deployed in Helmand for three years, as a result of
a failure of military and political co-ordination, without the necessary personnel and
equipment to succeed in their Mission. (Paragraph 67)
Military operations since 2009
12. We welcome the adoption of the counter-insurgency strategy by the coalition and
recognise that, for UK Forces, it was a continuation of its previously adopted strategy
although this had been badly under-resourced. It seems to us that the two crucial
aspects of the revised strategy are the decision to put the security of the local
population at its core and the acceptance of the need to hand over responsibility for
security to the Afghan Government and the ANSF. We also recognise that the
McChrystal Strategy could not work without the accompanying surge in troop
numbers. (Paragraph 71)
13. We consider that it is vital that NATO, ISAF and UN Missions and the international
alliance succeed with this latest strategy in both political and military terms. We note
the progress already made and that training and support arrangements may have to
continue for some time after the withdrawal of combat capability. [See Part 6 for
further discussion on withdrawal and transition arrangements.] (Paragraph 78)
14. We welcome the introduction of the role of the UK National Contingent
Commander and the “two star” headquarters for Regional Command South. We also
conclude that the command and control arrangements for operations in Afghanistan
in 2006 were deficient. Following the review of the operational role of PJHQ, we
require a clear description of the revised command and control arrangements for
Afghanistan including the role of the PJHQ and its relationship with headquarters in
theatre. We recognise the importance of having a readily available and capable “two
star” headquarters for these types of deployments and are concerned about the
reduction in the number of such headquarters following the SDSR. (Paragraph 88)
15. We recommend that the MoD make greater efforts to reduce breaches of harmony
guidelines for all personnel and take these breaches into account when deciding
which trades and groups of Armed Forces personnel should be subject to
redundancies. (Paragraph 90)
16. The MoD does not record centrally how many Armed Forces personnel have been
on multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and other operational theatres.
Such information is vital to allow the Armed Forces to judge the load on individual
personnel. We recommend that this information is collated and should be
considered alongside breaches of harmony guidelines when judging the pressures on
the Armed Forces, and on individuals when deciding on posting. (Paragraph 91)
17. We look forward to seeing the results of the work being done to improve the
effectiveness of the airbridge. In the meantime, we recommend that the MoD
negotiate with allies to permit the use of their resources to plug any gaps in the
airbridge. (Paragraph 93)
18. We recognise the importance of close air support and the skill and bravery of those
providing it. We would like confirmation from the MoD that the Armed Forces in
8 Operations in Afghanistan

Afghanistan now have access to sufficient and timely close air support. (Paragraph
95)
19. We are conscious that our predecessor Committee was told in previous inquiries that
UK Forces have enough helicopters only to discover subsequently that this was not
true. We are not convinced that UK Forces yet have access to sufficient helicopter
hours. We recommend that, in response to this Report, the MoD set out how the
new helicopters delivered into theatre have impacted on the availability of helicopter
hours, any outstanding delivery of helicopters and how much reliance and use we are
making of helicopters from the USA and other countries. (Paragraph 97)
20. We recognise that the Taliban continues to change its tactics and methods and that
the extent of the use of IEDs has changed and developed since 2007. However, we
believe that the MoD did not respond quickly enough to these challenges as they
developed. We continue to be concerned about the time taken to get a suitably
capable vehicle fleet into theatre. Protecting Armed Forces personnel is a critical duty
of the MoD. We recommend, in its response to this Report, the MoD explains how
current equipment levels are providing the Armed Forces with the necessary
protected vehicles, body armour and counter-IED support. The MoD should
prioritise the protection of personnel when considering the funding of such needs
that emerge in the future. (Paragraph 102)
21. We recognise that civilian contractors provide valuable support to the MoD. We
require that the MoD should monitor and report on casualties of contractors
working on behalf of the UK Government. (Paragraph 103)
22. It seems to us that the convention under which all additional costs of operations
should be met from the Treasury reserve has been breached with the introduction of
the concept of ‘urgent defence requirements’ and the requirement to pay back
expenditure on UORs over the estimate. We recommend that the classification of
UDRs be dropped permanently and that the MoD be not required to pay back
expenditure on equipment needed on operations. We would like confirmation that
all additional costs for Afghanistan are being met and will continue to be met from
the General Reserve. We seek a similar confirmation for the costs of the Libya
operation. (Paragraph 105)
23. Whilst we recognise that the MoD cannot calculate accurately the full cost of
operations, we nevertheless ask the MoD to provide us with a broad estimate of the
total costs of operations in Afghanistan. We also ask the NAO to do a study into the
level of costs of Afghanistan. (Paragraph 108)
Training of the Afghan National Security Forces
24. There have been significant improvements in the training of the ANA but there is
much progress yet to be made before the ANA is ready to take over responsibility for
security in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. We welcome General Richards’ assurance
that the aim of a sustainable ANA is being aggressively pursued but the MoD must
maintain its focus on training the ANA, in qualitative as well as quantitative terms.
(Paragraph 116)