Table Of ContentLoughall and the British SAS at Gibraltar
By Thomas B. Hunter (© 1998 Special Operations.Com)
Beginning in late 1986, the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (IRA) had turned its attention to driving out the
security forces based in Northern Ireland. In response, the
British government stepped up action to monitor the
movements of IRA members, in an effort to head off further
incidents. As part of this escalation, the SAS began regular
rotations of its soldiers into Northern Ireland to work with
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and elements of the
UK MI5 intelligence organization. The IRA, however, had
been at war with the British Government for over sixty years
and had adapted well to the presence of the growing
antiterrorist apparatus. In fact, that by early 1987, the
Republican guerrillas had perpetrated no fewer than 22
separate attacks on police stations alone. And while some
incidents had been prevented, at the time there seemed no
end in sight to the ongoing urban war. A series of related
events that occured during this time, however, would soon
bring about a dramatic reduction in the IRA campaign.
Loughall
In 1986, an IRA team had used a similar heavy vehicle in
an earlier attack by means of a large explosive device
placed in the JCB's steel bucket. The vehicle was then
driven through the closed main gates of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC) station at The Birches, County
Armagh, and the device detonated, causing major damage.
For this reason, authorites were on the alert specifically for
thefts of similar heavy equipment. When just such a vehicle
was reported stolen, in April 1987, RUC security initiated an
immediate investigation.
Following the theft of a JCB mechanical digger/tractor from
a construction site in East Tyrone, an alert went up
throughout the intelligence networks of the security forces.
The digger was soon discovered, parked near a disused
farm just 16 km from the RUC station at Loughall.
Suspecting an attack was soon to follow, security forces
contacted the SAS. In short order, surveillance teams from
the RUC's E4A unit monitored IRA terrorists transporting
explosives to a disused barn.
On May 8, the RUC intercepted a phone call between two of the
group's members: the IRA was ready to strike.
Immediately, a joint RUC/SAS team moved in around the
Loughall station, which had been quickly but quietly
evacuated. RUC snipers took up position while SAS
troopers spread out through the compound and nearby
countryside (to prevent the escape of any IRA members
following the attack). The intercepted call had also provided
the SAS ample time to establish a box-type ambush,
centered on the most likely approach route.
At approximately 7:20 p.m., an eight man IRA unit (actually
two active service units - ASU's - operating in tandem)
approached the RUC station in a stolen blue Toyota van,
followed closely by the JCB, laden with beer kegs filled with
500 pounds of explosives in its bucket. Following their plan,
five gunmen exited the van and opened fire on the
compound, effectively preventing security forces from
intercepting the JCB as it smashed through the main gate
and made its way into the courtyard. The three terrorists
(the driver and two armed guards) jumped from the tractor
and ran towards the safety of the getaway van.
The RUC and SAS, however, had anticipated this and as
the terrorist entered the pre-established kill zone, they
opened fire. Seconds later, the bomb was detonated. In the
massive explosion that followed, a large section of the
closest RUC building was demolished as was as another
structure some 50 feet away. Chunks of plaster, steel and
wood were sprayed in all directions, however the design of
the JCB's bucket directed the majority of the blast toward
the RUC station. In the maelstrom that followed, all eight
terrorists were killed. In a tragic development, two civilians
in a white Citroen car appeared, unknowingly driving
directly into the ambush zone. Thinking that the car
belonged to an unexpected IRA team, the SAS opened fire,
killing the driver and seriously wounding the passenger. A
later investigation revealed that these individuals had no
affiliation with the IRA.
According to standard procedure in counterterrorist
operations designed to retain anonymity, British Army
helicopters soon arrived to extract the SAS team and
deliver them to a secure area.
For a period of time following the failed Loughall operation,
the IRA reportedly suffered from a significant disturbance
within the group. Elements of the IRA leadership suspected
that a mole had revealed the details of the operation to the
security forces. This theory caused no small degree of
disruption as the group's internal security was reviewed and
revised. In time, however, the IRA search for a mole proved
fruitless and it gradually accepted the fact that the security
forces were wholly responsible for uncovering the plan.
Having lost eight of its top operatives, senior leaders
decided not to let Loughall go unrevenged. And this time,
secrecy would be paramount.
Operation Flavius
Following the dual setbacks of Loughall and the elections,
the IRA needed a victory against the British government in
order to demonstrate its continued viability and restore the
confidence of its supporters at home and abroad. Target
selection, therefore, was of the utmost importance. Having
learned from Loughall, the IRA began to plan for what
would be one of its most important operations. Following a
brief period of deliberation, it was decided that the British
presence on Gibraltar was the best of all possible targets,
for a number of reasons.
Gibraltar was considered a 'soft' target; British soldiers
were commonly rotated to the peaceful location following
demanding duty in Belfast as an unofficial reward. Security
was, while not lax, much lighter than any that might be
found in the calmest areas of Northern Ireland. So, while
they were still on active duty and not on leave, soliders
could usually look forward to a long period of rest and
relaxation. From an IRA perspective, this mindset was
ideal. Additionally, and of at least equal importance,
Gibraltar was one of few remaining locations in the world
that still represented Great Britain's colonial-imperialist
power (much like that the IRA felt had been thrust upon it in
Ireland). For this reason, an attack on the military presence
there would not only inflict direct harm on British soldiers,
but also stab at the heart of the government in London.
Long-time IRA members Daniel McCann, Sean Savage and
Mairead Farrell were selected to carry out the attack.
Despite the extensive security precautions taken by the
IRA, Savage and McCann were spotted in November 1997
in Spain by terrorist experts from Madrid's Servicios de
Informacion office. After observing their movements and
relaying the findings to MI6 (the British foreign intelligence
agency) and SAS headquarters, it was generally agreed
that the duo could only be in the region for one of two
reasons - to carry out an operation against the 250,000-
strong British presence on the Costa del Sol, or a British
Army target in Gibraltar. This was narrowed down in the
months that followed by a concentrated period of
cooperation between British and Spanish intellgience and
counterterrosit experts. They soon agreed: the target would
most likely be the changing of the guard outside the the
Governor of Gibraltar's residence. In fact it was, and
although they did not know it at the time, all the IRA's secret
planning had been in vain.
Havign arrived at this conclusion in November, a cover
story was produced that would postpone the scheduled
event to March 8, 1988. The story that was released was
that the change in scheduling was due to a planned
refurbishing of the guardhouse. In fact, the event was
deferred in order for authorities to have more time to plan
their course of action against the terrorists.
On March 1, authorities documented the arrival of Irish
woman travelling under a false name, Mary Parkin. She
was observed closely watching the changing of the guard
ceremony on numerous occassions during the previous
month. There was little doubt - she was providing advance
reconnaissance for the IRA team to follow. The following
day, the determination was made by the Joint Intelligence
Committee in London (on which the SAS had a liason
officer) that an attack was imminent and the time to act had
arrived. So, on March 3 a team of sixteen operators from
the SAS Special Projects Team were dispatched to
Gibraltar - all arriving on different flights and at different
times. Their mission, code-named Operation Flavius, was
to effect the arrests of all suspects before they could carry
out the attack.
Having confirmed the target, it was up to the SAS to
decipher how the IRA would carry out its mission.
Intelligence provided to the SAS team indicated that the
terrorists were heavily armed and that the method of attack
would almost certainly via a remotely-detonated bomb
planted in a car, and parked next to the change of
command. For this reason, the orders given to the SP
Team were expanded to authorize the use of deadly force
'if those using them had reasonable grounds or believing an
act was being committed or about to be committed which
would endanger life or lives and if there was no other way
of preventing that other than the use of firearms.' This was
an important distinction, as a terrorist planning to set off a
remote-controlled bomb could do so with the flick of a
switch on a minaturized detonator. This meant, to an
experienced operator, that any untoward movement - a
hand moving to a pocket or bag - could indicate an attempt
to set off the remote and detonate the bomb.
Endgame
At 2:50 p.m. on March 6, the three IRA men were spotted
entering the town center. Savage had been watched earlier
as he drove a white Renault 5 car into the main square and
parked it next to the site where the changing of the guards
would later take place. After strolling through the square for
a short time, they met again in front of the Renault. Minutes
later, the three left the area and began walking back toward
the border to the north.
Siezing the opportunity, an SAS bomb disposal expert ran
to the Renault and quickly inspected it for any signs of a
bomb. He reported back that while he could not see an
explosive device, it was still possible that the vehicle could
contain one - a fact that could not be determined with
certainty without actually removing the car to a safe location
and dismantling it. This, of course, was out of the question
and the SAS had to assume that the Renault did in fact
contain a bomb. Acting on the information, Gibraltar's police
commissioner signed over authority for the arrests to the
SAS.
On the ground, a four man SAS team trailing the IRA trio
was given the go-ahead to nab the suspects and prepared
to move in. Back at the operations center, the police chief
called over the radio for one of his men to return to base so
that he would have a vehicle ready to transport the
terrorists to jail. The officer acknowledged the call, however
at the time found himself stuck in a long line of traffic. In an
effort to expedite his return to base, he switched on his
siren and pulled out onto the wrong side of the road.
A short distance away, the sound of the siren rang out
across the town square. Already tense from the days spent
planning the upcoming car bombing, McCann and Farrell,
who were walking together, froze. Looking around, they
spotted the SAS men who were then only 10 meters away.
McCann then made what was deemed an 'aggressive
movement' across the front of his body and the closest SAS
trooper opened fire, striking him once in the back. In that
instant, Farrell made a move for her handbag. Believing
that the bag might contain the detonator, the trooper fired
twice, killing her instantly. McCann, wounded but still
believed to be a threat, was then shot five more times.
A short distance away, Savage heard the gunfire and spun
around - directly into the two man SAS team assigned to
arrest him. He was ordered to halt, however instead of
raising his hands he put his right hand down to his jacket
pocket. Again believing that a remote device could be
concealed anywhere on his body, both soldiers opened fire,
striking Savage between 16 and 18 times. Within a period
of seconds, all IRA terrorists were killed and an attack
which would certainly have killed and mained scores of
civilians was prevented.
Aftermath
In the months that followed, a major inquiry into the incident
was launched, amidst accusations that the SAS had never
intended to arrest the trio, but rather had been sent as part
of an assassination team formed to eliminate three of the
IRA's top operatives. Civilian eyewitnesses to the shootings
claimed that the IRA operatives made gestures to
surrender, but were shot anyway. The investigation also
revealed some disturbing facts: none of the three, McCann,
Farrell, or Savage were armed at the time of the shootings.
Nor did any of them have in their possession a remote
detonation device. Finally, an examination of the Renault
found no trace of explosives.
A board of inquiry conducted in the eventually acquitted the
SAS shooters, however Operation Flavius remains a point
of contention in Great Britain to this day.
