Table Of ContentOn Minds and Symbols
W
Approaches to Semiotics
117
Editorial Committee
Thomas A. Sebeok
Roland Posner
Alain Rey
Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York
On Minds and Symbols
The Relevance of Cognitive Science
for Semiotics
by
Thomas C. Daddesio
Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York 1995
Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague)
is a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.
© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the
ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication-Data
Daddesio, Thomas C., 1951 —
On minds and symbols : the relevance of cognitive science for
semiotics / by Thomas C. Daddesio.
p. cm. — (Approaches to semiotics ; 117)
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and indexes.
ISBN 3-11-013866-2
1. Semiotics - Psychological aspects. 2. Cognition. I. Title.
II. Series.
P99.4.P78D33 1994
302.2-dc20 94-23217
CIP
Die Deutsche Bibliothek — Cataloging-in-Publication-Data
Daddesio, Thomas C.:
On minds and symbols : the relevance of cognitive science for semiotics /
by Thomas C. Daddesio. - Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1994
(Approaches to semiotics ; 117)
ISBN 3-11-013866-2
NE: GT
© Copyright 1994 by Walter de Gruyter & Co., D-10785 Berlin.
All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book
may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, includ-
ing photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher.
Printing: Ratzlow Druck, Berlin. — Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin.
Printed in Germany.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the following people who, in one way or another,
gave me valuable assistance over the years: Myrdene Anderson, Paul
Bouissac, Donald Cunningham, John Deely, Floyd Merrell, Michael Opitz,
Charls Pearson, François Rigolot, Gary Shank, C. W. Spinks. I am also
grateful to Mary Neidenfuer, at the College of St. Benedict, who was
extremely helpful in the middle stages of the preparation of my manuscript
and to Margaret Saunders, at Walter de Gruyter, who patiently guided me
through the arduous process of preparing camera ready copy. Special thanks
go to my wife, Eva Tsuquiashi for weathering the many storms that this
project brought with it. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Ralph and
Jane Daddesio, for having taught me the importance of leading a balanced
life.
Contents
Acknowledgements ν
Introduction 1
1. Semiotics and cognition 17
1.1. Introduction 17
1.2. Critique of pure semiotics 17
1.3. Just how pure is pure semiotics? 25
1.4. Morris and Peirce on mentalism 27
1.5. Mentalism reconsidered 35
1.6. John Deely on signs and ideas 40
2. Cognition in the wake of the linguistic turn 45
2.1. Introduction 45
2.2. The linguistic turn 47
2.3. Antimentalism and formalism within the analytic tradition 50
2.4. Reasons for the cognitive shift 52
2.5. Problems with cognitivism: the language of thought and
the formalist stance 55
2.6. The second phase of cognitivism 57
2.7. Connectionism and the multiplicity of mind 69
3. Beyond traditional mentalism 79
3.1. Introduction 79
3.2. General Principles of Cognitivism 80
3.3. Cognitivism and objections to traditional mentalism 84
3.4. The language of thought and computational theories of mind ... 92
4. Prelude to a cognitive theory of symbols 103
4.1. Introduction 103
4.2. Truth conditions, conventions, and cultural units 104
4.3. On symbols and indices 109
4.4. Symbols reconsidered 113
4.5. Conclusion 122
5. Steps towards a theory of representations 125
5.1. Introduction 125
5.2. Criteria for evaluating cognitive theories 126
5.3. Preliminaries for a theory of representations 134
5.5. Dretske's model of elementary behavior 141
6. Functional autonomy and the arbitrariness of symbols 145
Vili
6.1. Introduction 145
6.2. Perception and understanding 146
6.3. Functional autonomy 149
6.4. Functional autonomy and the relation of signification 162
6.5. Functional autonomy and cross-modal transfers 165
6.6. Functional autonomy and imagination 170
6.7. Functional autonomy and the evolution of
symbolic communication 172
7. The development of symbolic communication in children 179
7.1. Introduction 179
7.2. Piaget's sensorimotor period and the child's first words 181
7.3. Intentions in young children 185
7.4. The child's conceptual system 186
7.5. Pure performatives and functional autonomy 192
7.6. Cognition and social development 200
7.7. Conclusion 209
Afterword 211
Notes 217
References 243
Index of Names 257
Subject Index 261
Introduction
This book is intended to be a provisional charting of a largely unexplored
territory, the cognitive dimension of semiosis. The assertion that this area
is unchartered can, surprisingly, give rise to two diametrically opposed
reactions. The first would consist in attempting to refute this claim by
pointing to the role accorded to thought and ideas in the formulations of
Poinsot, Locke, Peirce, Saussure, and other pivotal figures in the history of
semiotics, while the second would insist that such neglect is quite deserved
for there is no place within semiotics for talk of mental entities. Although
detractors might attribute the disparity of these two reactions to the inability
of semioticians to agree upon the basic nature of their discipline, I would
suggest that this difference in perspective is instead the product of historical
circumstance, since, at the precise moment—the beginning of the twentieth
century—when semiotics became first conceptualized "as a field in its own
right, rather than through its adjacency with other lines of immediate
investigation" (Deely, 1988 133), the conception of signs in terms of ideas
was replaced by a conception of ideas in terms of signs. It would seem then
that mentalist approaches to signs would solely be worthy of interest as an
episode in the history of semiotics but would be excluded from present and
future explorations of this realm. However, before we rush to this
conclusion, we must consider a second implication of this situation. If the
antimentalism which characterizes contemporary semiotics is the product of
the intellectual climate that accompanied and nourished its emergence as a
self-conscious field of inquiry, then this stance would not follow necessarily
from the very nature of the semiotic enterprise but rather would constitute
a contingent, historical one. This circumstance makes it possible to entertain
the possibility that cognition is not intrinsically antithetical to the study of
signs. I hope to show that although traditional mentalism1 has proven
incompatible with the theory of signs, there is no overwhelming reason to
rule out all reference to mental entities within semiotic inquiry. The present
book will constitute an extended reflection on this very possibility.
It is my belief that a cognitive account of semiosis is a goal eminently
worth pursuing; the pressing task is to establish this line of inquiry on firm
grounds, to suggest what sort of problems this field will investigate and to
provide a glimpse at the type of solutions we can expect to achieve. I am
not unaware of the difficulties attending to such a project, but I have chosen
2 Introduction
to confront them convinced that little is to be gained by endlessly putting
off the discussion of important questions. My project will pursue two
complementary objectives. The first part of this book will be concerned
with overcoming the obstacles presently standing in the way of a cognitive
approach to signs and with developing a view of cognition that is not
vulnerable to standard criticisms of traditional mentalism. In the second part
I will attempt to demonstrate both the feasibility and the utility of a
cognitive approach to semiosis by setting forth a cognitive theory of
symbols, which I will then apply to a particularly difficult area of inquiry,
the development of symbolic communication in children.
As a first step toward elaborating a cognitive framework within semiotics,
I will examine the reasons for the present exclusion of mental processes
from the theory of signs. Although there is significant overlap between
them, I will, in order to streamline their exposition, treat separately those
factors specific to semiotics (Chapter 1) and those that characterize the
general intellectual climate in which semiotics developed as a distinct field
of inquiry (Chapter 2). I will begin my discussion of the former by
suggesting that the current resistance to a cognitive approach to signs is
linked to a deep-seated tendency to exclude from the scope of semiotics the
psychological and neurological processes that mediate signs. This view is
based on the assumption that to take into consideration such processes
would require us to transgress the disciplinary boundaries of semiotics. I
will argue, however, that no inherent feature of the study of meaning and
communication binds us to this position. Moreover, I will attempt to
demonstrate that, despite their claims of having ridden semiotics of all
reference to such mediating processes, semioticians make implicit appeal
to a theory of cognition and perception in their formulation of the basic
principles of the discipline.
After having situated the antimentalistic stance of contemporary semiotics
within this broader framework, I will examine relevant passages from
Charles Morris (1938) and Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1958) to determine
the major arguments which have been invoked in support of this exclusion.
They are: 1) mental categories are less scientific than behavioral ones; 2)
the meaning of a proposition is the ensemble of its effects and not the idea
that comes to mind when we produce or decode an utterance; 3) reference
to mental entities reveals nothing more about semiosis than that which can
be obtained from attention to signs themselves. I will then attempt to
