On intuition and discursive reasoning in Aristotle

196 Pages·1988·4.28 MB·English

by  Kal

ON INTUITION
AND DISCURSIVE REASONING
IN ARISTOTLE
PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA
A SERIES OF STUDIES
ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
EDITED BY
W. J. VERDENIUS J. C. M. VAN WINDE N
AND
VOLUME XLVI
VICTOR KAL
ON INTUITION
AND DISCURSIVE REASONING
IN ARISTOTLE
ON INTUITION
AND DISCURSIVE REASONING
IN ARISTOTLE
BY
VICTOR KAL
E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN • NEW YORK • K0BENHAV N • KOLN
1988
The publication of this book has been made possible by a grant from the
Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research
(Z.W.O.)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kal, Victor.
On intuition and discursive reasoning in Aristotle.
(Philosophia antiqua, ISSN 0079-1687; v. 46)
Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.
I. Aristotle-Views on reasoning. 2. Reasoning.
3. Intuition. I. Title. II. Series.
B491.R4K35 1987 121 '.3 87-18309
ISBN 90-04-08308-1 (pbk.)
ISSN 0079-1687
ISBN 90 04 08308 1
© Copyright 1988 by E. ]. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche
or any other means without written permission from the publisher
PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS BY E. j. BRILL
CONTENTS
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Part One
INTUITION AND DISCURSIVE REASONING IN ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL WORKS
I. Syllogism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
II. Proposition and premiss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
III. Dialectic and demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
IV. Forms of dialectic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
V. The dialectical syllogism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
VI. Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
VII. The demonstrative syllogism .. .... ..... ... ............. .... ... .. 31
VIII. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
IX. Experience and intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
X. Controversies about induction, experience, and intuition 54
Part Two
ARISTOTLE'S EPISTEMOLOGY
I. Logic, epistemology, and psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
II. Epistemology in Aristotle's psychological work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Part Three
ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY OF COGNITION
I. Cognition as the object of psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
II. Psychology of sensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
III. Psychology of the imagination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
IV. De anima I and II on the mind ...... ........ ... ..... ... ... ... ... 73
V. The psychology of intellective cognition in De anima III 4 77
VI. Problems concerning intellective cognition in De anima III 4 81
VII. The mind in De anima III 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6 CONTENTS
VIII. The human soul and the divine mind. The mind in De
generatione animalium II 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
IX. Controversies. The history of the interpretation of De
anima III 4 and 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Notes to the text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 79
Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
ABBREVIATIONS
Note. If the bibliography contains only one work by a certain author, and
if a certain work in the bibliography is marked with an asterisk, the
author is referred to in the notes by name only. In other cases additional
information is given, usually a date. Aristotle's works are referred to by
their titles only, these being abbreviated as follows:
Cat. Categoriae
De int. De interpretatione
An.Pr. Analytica Priora
An. Post. A nalytica Posteriora
Top. Topic a
S.E. Sophistici Elenchi
De gen. et corr. De generatione et corruptione
Phys. Physica
De an. De anima
De sensu De sensu et sensibilibus
De mem. De memoria et reminiscentia
De part. an. De partibus animalium
De gen. an. De generatione animalium
Met. Metaphysica
E.N. Ethica Nicomachea
Pol. Politica
Rhet. Rhetorica

INTRODUCTION
Aristotle lived from 384 to 322 BC. The interpretation of his work, which
starts with his pupil Theophrastus, is by no means concluded today,
more than two millennia later. Scholars have failed to reach agreement
on important issues. One of these is the question of what role Aristotle
assigns to induction.1 Moreover, some parts of Aristotle's work are still
felt to be somewhat cryptical. The most famous and arguably most im-
portant example of these is his exposition on the mind in De anima III 5. 2
In the following study I shall attempt to arrive at a closer understanding
of several widely discussed, but persistently difficult chapters in Aristo-
tle's work.
The subject of this study is intuition and discursive reasoning in
Aristotle. We will be concerned with the distinction between intuition
and discursive reasoning and with the relation which Aristotle establishes
between both.
It is not unusual to distinguish between intuition and discursive
reasoning with regard to Aristotle. This distinction plays a role in well-
known studies by, for instance, Hamelin, Le Blond, Ross, Oehler, and
Von Fritz.3 The terms 'intuition' and 'discursive reasoning' are actually
used in these studies. The term 'intuition' in this context has nothing to
do with introspection or any such notion. Nor should intuition as it is dis-
cussed here be regarded as a kind of instinct or as an extraordinary type
of intuitive faculty . The term 'intuition' serves here to translate a Greek
word which also signifies 'mind'. 4 The term 'intuition' indicates an im-
portant function of the mind: the mind inasmuch as it can have insight
or cognition. This is the knowing mind. On other occasions Aristotle uses
the same Greek word in a less specific sense to indicate broadly the
human mind in all its functions. 5 Besides intuition, these include the
function of discursive activity. The discursive mind is the mind inasmuch
as it reasons, argues, or orders; it is the thinking mind. Sometimes
Aristotle uses a special Greek word to indicate the thinking mind, other
times he does not. 6 By the distinction between intuition and discursive
reasoning, therefore, we mean the distinction between knowing and
thinking, between the view which the mind has cast upon the world and
the reasoning, arguing activity of the mind. Our aim is to bring out in
full relief the distinction which Aristotle makes between intuition and
discursive reasoning and to draw in a consistent manner the line which
separates one from the other in his work. Our main resource will be to
10 INTRODUCTION
determine precisely what relation, in Aristotle's vtew, exists between
both.
We approach the subject of our enquiry by investigating the forms of
argumentation and reasoning which Aristotle distinguishes. These forms
of discursive reasoning can also be called procedures of thought; the
works in which Aristotle discusses these procedures are regarded as his
logical works. 7 Hence the first part of this study is entitled: 'Knowing
and thinking in Aristotle's logical works'.
Our enquiry into the forms of discursive reasoning distinguished by
Aristotle begins where he himself begins his logical expositions, namely
at the syllogism, i.e an argument or chain of reasoning consisting of a
pair of premisses <!nd a conclusion drawn from the premisses. This en-
quiry will show that Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of
premisses, and thus between two kinds of discursive reasoning: dialec-
tical syllogism and demonstrative syllogism. Within dialectic he makes a
further distinction between two discursive procedures: the dialectical
syllogism proper and induction. First we deal with the dialectical
syllogism proper, which again occurs in two forms. And our discussion
makes the following points: that the dialectician obtains the premisses of
the argument in a manner characteristic of the dialectical method; that
in argumentation or discussion the dialectician is a tactician; finally, that
he can also be called a logician, since he knows about the rules of reason-
ing. By this time we are discussing Metaphysics Gamma with the purpose
of showing how far the competence of the dialectician extends, and in
order to make more explicit what the differences are between dialectic
and proof or demonstration. The interpretations of Metaphysics Gamma
which I present are certainly not generally accepted. But a discussion
with other interpreters has been omitted in this section, since it is meant
to be a brief intermezzo. Finally, we examine the function which Aristo-
tle assigns to dialectic in connection with the difficulty of speaking in a
demonstrative way about the premisses or principles upon which
demonstration or proof is based.
Next, we turn our attention to the other form of dialectic, induction.
This is the first controversial topic in our discussion. I defend the view
that in Topics I 12, Topics VIII 1 and 2, and Prior Analytics II 23 Aristotle
is talking about the same form of induction. I reject the view found in
Ross, for example, that in Prior Analytics II 23 Aristotle speaks of a com-
plete induction, i.e. an induction in which all special cases falling under
a general rule are actually enumerated. 8 Next, I emphasize once again
that induction too is a form of dialectic. This means that it is limited in
the function which it can exercise in relation to the premisses or prin-
ciples upon which the proof is based. By means of induction these prin-