Table Of ContentTHE NORTON ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
Under the general editorship of
HAROLD M. HYMAN
William P. Hobby Professor of American History
Rice University
EISENHOWER AND BERLIN, 1945: THE DECISION
TO HALT AT THE ELBE Stephen E. Ambrose
THE MONEY QUESTION DURING RECONSTRUCTION
Walter T. K. Nugent
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR
Robert V. Remini
THE GREAT BULL MARKET: WALL STREET IN THE 1920’s
Robert Sobel
THE JACKSONIAN ECONOMY Peter Temin
A NEW ENGLAND TOWN: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
Kenneth A. Lockridge
DIPLOMACY FOR VICTORY: FDR AND UNCONDITIONAL
SURRENDER Raymond G. O’Connor
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE
FIRST WORLD WAR Ross Gregory
THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
Michael Les Benedict
THE GENET MISSION Harry Ammon
THE POLITICS OF NORMALCY: GOVERNMENTAL
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HARDING-COOLIDGE ERA
Robert K. Murray
THE FAILURE OF THE NRA Bernard Bellush
A HISTORY OF THE ICC Ari and Olive Hoogenboom
BLACK IMAGES OF AMERICA Leonard Sweet
DELIVER US FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN PROHIBITION Norman Clark
A RESPECTABLE MINORITY: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA, 1860-1868 Joel H. Silbey
EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: POLITICS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA
Herman Belz
ON EVERY FRONT: THE MAKING OF THE COLD WAR
Thomas G. Paterson
On Every Front:
The Making of the Cold War
Thomas G. Paterson
W • W • NORTON & COMPANY • NEW YORK
Copyright © 1979 by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. Published simul
taneously in Canada by George J. McLeod Limited, Toronto. Printed in
the United States of America. All Rights Reserved.
FIRST EDITION
Library óf Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Patterson, Thomas G. 194 l'
on every front.
(The Norton essays in American history)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. United States—Foreign relations—1945-
2. Russia—Foreign relations—1945- 3. United
States—Foreign relations—Russia. 4. Russia—Foreign
relations—United States. 5. World politics—1945-
I. Title.
E744.P312 1979 327.73'047 79-4509
ISBN 0-393-01238-7
ISBN 0-393-95014-x pbk.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
For Stephen W. C. Paterson
Contents
Preface ix
1 Rubble: The World in 1945 1
2 Conflict: The Postwar International System 19
3 Spheres: The Quest for Influence, 1944-50 33
4 Abundance: The “Fundamentals”
of the United States 69
5 Toughness: The Tactics of Truman’s Diplomacy 92
6 Consent: American Public Opinion and Congress 113
7 Suspiciousness: Soviet Foreign Policy 138
and Its Makers
8 Bipolarity: The World in 1950 169
Appendix: The Events of 1944-50 174
Sources 178
Index 203
vii
Preface
THE WORLD, Winston Churchill told President Truman in
early 1946, was “bewildered, baffled, and breathless.”1 With his
dramatic “Iron Curtain” speech just a little over a month ahead,
the former British prime minister, always the phrasemaker and
forthright analyst, believed that he knew why international
affairs had descended so precariously from the Grand Alliance
into what would soon be called the Cold War. If less eloquent
than the venerable Churchill, scholars have also penned their
commentaries on the postwar crisis. We have learned much from
most of them—from monographs that plumb particular issues,
from descriptive narratives that tell an engaging story, and from
ambitious overviews that subordinate vast data to overarching
themes.
This book attempts a modest synthesis of the voluminous
historical literature and different schools of thought. It presents
new research in rich archival sources that have become available
to scholars only in recent years. More, it studies both American
and Soviet diplomacy and, drawing upon theoretical works on
international relations and the behavior of large nations, takes
an interdisciplinary tack. My study of the “bewildered, baffled,
and breathless” state of postwar world affairs seeks a multifac
eted explanation—one more complex than that which Churchill
offered in March 1946, to his Fulton, Missouri, audience or that
which Truman contemplated (and later acted upon) as he sat
on the stage listening to the message that Churchill had assured
the president he would “very likely” find agreeable.2
1. Winston S. Churchill to Harry S. Truman, January 29, 1946, Box
115, President’s Secretary’s File, Harry S. Truman Papers, Harry S. Tru
man Library, Independence, Mo.
2. Ibid.
ix
X Preface
The Cold War derived from three closely intertwined
sources: the conflict-ridden international system, the divergent
fundamental needs and ideas of the major antagonists, America
and Russia, and the diplomatic conduct or tactics of American
and Soviet leaders. To reduce the conflict inherent in the post
war structure, to satisfy their strategic and economic needs and
ideologies, and to conduct diplomacy true to their individual
personalities and domestic political environments, officials in
Washington and Moscow abandoned any quest for a community
of nations and instead built competing spheres of influence.
They thereby expanded and protected what they respectively
perceived to be their interests, divided the world, and stimulated
more conflict, which took the form of a “prolonged armed
truce,” to use the words of Soviet diplomat Maxim Litvinov.3
The first chapter introduces the world of 1945, reeling from
the dislocations of the global war. Chapter 2 identifies the char
acteristics of the unstable international system, which afforded
the great powers opportunities to extend their influence but also
placed restraints on them. Chapter 3 surveys the events of the
immediate postwar years, when the United States and the Soviet
Union constructed their respective spheres of influence and
launched the Cold War. Subsequent chapters attempt to explain
why the two powers acted as they did, although the severe
restrictions on the use of Soviet documents dictate that Ameri
can policies will receive more attention. Chapter 4 studies the
wellsprings, or fundamentals, of American foreign policy—those
internal stimuli that induced the United States to undertake an
activisit, global diplomacy. Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the
“tactics” of American leaders: how they conducted their diplo
macy, made their decisions, and functioned within the bounda
ries of their national politics. The seventh chapter, with neces
sary speculation because of the scarcity of Soviet sources, seeks
to fathom the fundamental and tactical ingredients of Soviet for-
3. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1946, VI, 763. (The Foreign Relations series is published at irregular
intervals by the Government Printing Office in Washington, D.C., in
multiple volumes for each year. Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations,
year, volume, page.)
Preface xi
eign policy in order to explain why the Soviets behaved in such a
way after World War II as to arouse fears that they were ruth
less, callous aggressors challenging the United States in an unre
lenting global contest. The last chapter is a brief conclusion,
sketching the configuration of the Cold War in mid-1950, on the
eve of the Korean War. The appendix provides a chronology of
Cold War events.
My work has always benefited from the counsel and assist
ance of others. The many scholars cited in the footnotes and
bibliography provided ideas and information through their books
and articles, and I am eager to thank them. Helpful librarians
and archivists in the depositories cited throughout facilitated the
search for sources and responded generously to inquiries. Selma
Wollman expertly typed the final draft. My students at the Uni
versity of Connecticut have listened, questioned, and debated; in
ways one cannot measure they have shaped this book. Among
them, Jean-Donald Miller, James Gormly, Eduard M. Mark,
Thomas G. Smith, Stephen Rabe, and Robert McMahon pro
vided me with documents that they unearthed in their doctoral
research. I also appreciated the research assistance of Mary
Pain, Robin Beveridge, and Charlton Brandt. The Research
Foundation of the University of Connecticut, the Harry S.
Truman Institute, and the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute pro
vided financial resources for travel in the United States and
to Great Britain. Scholars who must seek their materials in dis
tant archives know how much these grants-in-aid are appre
ciated. A fellowship from the National Endowment for the
Humanities made the writing of the first draft possible, and I
thank that valuable institution.
My editors, Harold Hyman of Rice University and Robert
Kehoe and Jane Lebow of W. W. Norton and Company made
useful suggestions for improvement. To my friend and colleague,
J. Garry Clifford, always the perceptive reader and intelligent
critic, I owe special thanks. He helped me to break through
organizational and analytical roadblocks and his red (sometimes
green) pen cut a path through literary overgrowth. Thomas Zou-
maras also read the manuscript and provided me with a reward-
