On Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism

222 Pages·2016·0.87 MB·English

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Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
8-2010
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Emmett Frank Mashburn
University of Tennessee - Knoxville, [email protected]
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Metaphysics Commons
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Mashburn, Emmett Frank, "On Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism. " PhD diss.,
University of Tennessee, 2010.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/824
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To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Emmett Frank Mashburn entitled "On Alvin
Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism." I have examined the final electronic copy
of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in
Philosophy.
John E. Nolt, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Richard E. Aquila, E. J. Coffman, John R. Hardwig, Carl G. Wagner
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Emmett Frank Mashburn, Jr. entitled
“On Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism.” I have examined the
final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
with a major in Philosophy.

John Nolt, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Richard Aquila

E. J. Coffman

John Hardwig

Carl Wagner

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
On Alvin Plantinga’s
Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Emmett Frank Mashburn, Jr.
August 2010
Copyright © 2010 by E. Frank Mashburn
All rights reserved.

ii
DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation, with love and steady affection,

to
my wife
and best friend,

Louise.

iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I’d like to thank John Nolt. He met with me numerous times to talk,
think, work through problematic formulations, and encourage me during the long process.
He also took it upon himself, in the midst of an extremely busy schedule, to head the
committee and direct the entire project.

I would also like to thank the other committee members: Richard Aquila, E. J.
Coffman, John Hardwig, and Carl Wagner. They are greatly appreciated, not only for
their expertise, but also for the sacrifice of their time.

Incalculable, vast thanks go to my wife Louise for all of her patience,
understanding, support and confidence. Thanks also to my children (David, Emma,
Zach, and Rhett), my mother Charlotte, my close friends (you know who you are), and
the staff and supporters of WDA.

iv
ABSTRACT

Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) begins with the
following simple idea: the evolutionary process of natural selection selects organisms
due to adaptive behaviors, but not necessarily due to true beliefs. If this notion is even
possibly true, then it is also possible that some (or many) of our own beliefs are not
veridical and that our reasoning processes may not successfully point to truths (but are
merely evolutionarily advantageous).
Once the deliverances and processes of our cognitive faculties have been thus
called into question, it seems improper to provide an argument that one can trust one’s
cognitive faculties and processes (because such an argument requires the presupposition
of what one is trying to prove). The reflective metaphysical naturalist, upon seeing this,
realizes that she has a defeater for her belief in the reliability of her cognitive faculties,
and this eventuates into a defeater for all of her beliefs (including the belief in
naturalism). So, a belief in naturalism, when conjoined with a belief in current
evolutionary theory, puts the reflective naturalist in an epistemically undesirable (i.e.,
irrational) position. It is better, Plantinga says, to discard one’s belief in metaphysical
naturalism.
Plantinga’s argument is not a globally skeptical one. His ultimate goal is to
persuade people to give up naturalism as a metaphysical explanation, and to adopt theism
instead. EAAN is an argument against naturalism that is intended to open a door for
some later argument for theism; EAAN in itself is not an argument for theism.
In this paper, I attempt to:
(1) explain EAAN via its historical development and refinement;
(2) examine what I feel to be some of the most important critiques of EAAN
(along with some of Plantinga’s responses);
(3) put the argument in an Extended Summary in Logical Form;
(4) comment upon the Extended Summary and, in the process of discussing the
premises, settle upon what I feel to be the two main contested premises of EAAN;
and,
(5) conclude that Plantinga’s argument has thus far survived attack, and explain
why I expect it to continue to do so in the future.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page

I. Introducing EAAN ……………………………………………………………….......1
II. EAAN and Its Development ..…………………………………..……….….…........11
III. Some Concerns about EAAN and Evolution ……..………..….……………………53
IV. Some Concerns about Probability…………………………………………………...81
V. EAAN and Some Issues Concerning Skepticism and Epistemic Circularity ……….89
VI. Regarding EAAN and Similarities with Some Important Related Arguments .......107
VII. Some Thoughts on Defeaters Given the Probability Thesis ...…………..…..........126
VIII. An Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form, with Discussion of Premises
(1) through (6)………………………………........................................................147

IX. An Extended Summary of EAAN in Logical Form: Discussion of Some Premises
after Premise (6), with Particular Attention to Premise (10) ..…...……………….194

List of References ……….....………………………………………………….….. ….206

Vita .…..…………………………………..……………………………………..……..213

vi
CHAPTER ONE
Introducing EAAN

In 1993, Alvin Plantinga published the first two books of his eventual trilogy on
epistemic warrant.1 The first book, Warrant: The Current Debate,2 was a survey of many
important contemporary accounts of warrant.3 Plantinga found all of these accounts
unsatisfactory for various reasons. In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function,4
he explicated his own version of warrant, defined there briefly by him as that “… elusive
quality or quantity enough of which, together with truth and belief, is sufficient for
knowledge …”.5 In the last chapter of WPF there appeared an argument where Plantinga
maintained that the holding of metaphysical naturalism and current evolutionary theory6
is epistemically faulty in an important sense. This argument, dubbed by him the
Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (hereafter EAAN) was refined in the third
book of his trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief,7 and in later articles.8

1 The third and final book of the trilogy, Warranted Christian Belief, was published seven years later, in
2000.
2 Hereafter WCD.
3 Warrant being defined here as “that, whatever precisely it is, which together with truth makes the
difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 3.
4 Hereafter WPF.
5 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) v.
6 I.e., holding these two beliefs together at the same time.
7 Hereafter WCB; Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000).
8 See principally Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God (Malden, MA: Blackwell,
2008); Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Alvin
Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in James Beilby, ed., Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s
Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Ithaca: Cornell, 2002) 204-275; and Alvin Plantinga,
“Respondeo” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of
Knowledge, Jonathan L. Kvanvig, ed. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996) 307-378. For an
extensive list of articles responding early on to EAAN, see Alvin Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts” in
Beilby, 204, footnote 1.
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