Table Of ContentOCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS
A volume in the series
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt
A list of titles in this series is available at
www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
OCCUPATIONAL
HAZARDS
Success and Failure in
Military Occupation
David M. Edelstein
CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON
Copyright © 2008 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts
thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from
the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House,
512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 2008 by Cornell University Press
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Edelstein, David M.
Occupational hazards : success and failure in military
occupation / David M. Edelstein.
p. cm. — (Cornell studies in security affairs)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–8014–4615–3 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Military occupation. 2. United States—Armed Forces—
Foreign countries. I. Title. II. Series.
D25.5.E34 2008
355.4'90973—dc22
2007033718
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Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction: The Challenge of Military Occupation 1
1. When to Occupy: The Threat Environment 22
2. How to Occupy: Strategies of Occupation 49
3. When to Leave: The Occupation Dilemma 87
4. Who Occupies: Multilateralism and Military Occupation 136
Conclusion: The Future of Military Occupation 153
Appendix 1. Case Selection 171
Appendix 2. Military Occupations, 1815–2007 175
Notes 193
Index 229
Acknowledgments
This book asks a simple central question: why do some military occupations
succeed whereas others fail? The research on this project began in the fall of
2002 as the United States was preparing for its eventual invasion and occupation
of Iraq. I was driven to write this book by an unease with the analogy so often
drawn then between the potential occupation of Iraq and the post–World War II
occupations of western Germany and Japan. In retrospect, the occupation of
Iraq looked nothing like those occupations, and the United States paid a heavy
price in its attempts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. One goal of this book is to help
explain why the United States encountered such difficulty. I identify lessons that
one should learn not only from Iraq but also from the larger history of military
occupation. My hope is that future political leaders might heed these lessons
before again occupying a foreign country.
Though my name alone is on the cover of this book, it truly would not be
before you without the help, support, and advice of numerous people. John
Mearsheimer gave the shove I needed to begin work on this project, and he has
been a faithful supporter throughout. Despite his substantial administrative
responsibilities while I was writing this book, Stephen Walt was always quick to
respond to an e-mail with words that were simultaneously critical, helpful, and
encouraging.
Three friends and colleagues warrant special acknowledgment. During those
inevitable frustrating moments that attend writing a book, Daniel Byman was
always willing to read drafts and comment on them with remarkable alacrity.
Ronald Krebs is simply the toughest critic that I have, and for this I am enormously
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
grateful. Ron disagrees with parts of the argument presented in this book, but
that has never interfered with his willingness to help me make it better. Jasen
Castillo has been a friend and confidant since our days studying together at
the University of Chicago. A few weeks before I submitted the manuscript for
review, Jasen and I spent three invaluable hours in a conference room with
nothing but coffee and a whiteboard, attempting to clarify the argument. These
three—Byman, Krebs, and Castillo—deserve much of the credit for what suc-
ceeds in this book, but none of the blame for what does not.
I am grateful to numerous other colleagues who have provided comments and
advice on parts of this book: Robert Art, Andrew Bennett, Nora Bensahel, Michael
Brown, Charles Glaser, Donald Daniel, Alexander Downes, Tanisha Fazal, Matthew
Kocher, Adria Lawrence, Keir Lieber, Robert Lieber, Charles Lipson, Robert Pape,
Barry Posen, Elizabeth Stanley, and Leslie Vinjamuri. The book has also benefited
from presentations in seminars at Columbia University, Georgetown University,
Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of
Chicago, and the University of Virginia. An earlier version of the argument was
published as “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,”
International Security 39, no. 1 (summer 2004): 59–91. At Cornell University Press,
I thank Roger Haydon for his guidance, Karen Hwa, and Jack Rummel for copy-
editing the manuscript. David Prout ably and expeditiously prepared the index.
I am fortunate to have researched and written this book while on the faculty of
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Govern-
ment at Georgetown University. Within Georgetown, my home has been the Cen-
ter for Peace and Security Studies. As directors of the center, Michael Brown and
then Daniel Byman have shown consistent devotion to the faculty. The center’s
staff, led by Bernard Finel, Natalie Goldring, and now Ellen McHugh, ensured
that faculty can focus on their research and teaching. The center has also supported
four outstanding research assistants, whom I thank for their help and their more
than occasional willingness to chase wild geese for me: Christopher Machnacki,
Christine Shoemaker, Philipp Bleek, and Dov Gardin. James Reardon-Anderson
and Charles King, as chairs of the faculty of the School of Foreign Service, and
Joshua Mitchell and George Shambaugh, as chairs of the Department of Govern-
ment, have protected junior faculty so that we could focus on our research.
Georgetown has also been a wonderful environment because of the colleagues
around me. Leslie Vinjamuri and I have endured the challenges and rewards of
being junior faculty together. Dan Byman, Kate McNamara, Liz Stanley, Dan
Nexon, Andy Bennett, Victor Cha, Bob Lieber, George Shambaugh, Tony Arend,
Chris Joyner, Marc Busch, Bob Gallucci, Jennifer Sims, Don Daniel, and Sunil Das-
gupta have made Georgetown an invigorating place in which to write this book
and to study international relations more generally.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix
Both my family and my wife’s family have been wonderfully supportive
throughout this project. In particular, I thank my parents for their constant
encouragement and for their emphasis on education above all else. My wife’s
family has welcomed me and supported me as one of their own. I am enormously
thankful for it.
Finally, my wife, Robin, has offered endless support. Even when I doubted
myself, she never did. She endured the highs and lows of this process with an
astounding amount of patience and understanding. Our son, Levi, was born only
two weeks after this book went off for review. He has brought perspective and
an unimaginable level of joy into my life. As wonderful a wife as Robin is, she
has unsurprisingly proved to be an equally amazing mother. For all of this and
so much more than words can easily express, this book is dedicated to her with
love and gratitude.
