Table Of ContentNOTES ON BOOK ZETA
OF
ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS
being the record
by MYLES BURNYEAT and others
of a seminar held in London, 1975-1979
Sub-Faculty of Philosophy,
Merton Street,
10
Oxford,
1979
(reprinted 1986)
PREFACE
Once a month on winter Saturdays a group of scholars converges
on New York City by car, train and aircraft to discuss some
Greek philosophical text. On his return to Britain the group's
founder, G.E.L.Owen, set up a daughter house in London, which
first met at the British Academy in Piccadilly on Sth February
1975 and began discussion of Aristotle's Metaphysics book
z.
M.F.Burnyeat took minutes of the meeting, which he later wrote
up and circulated. The record was continued, by Burnyeat and
others, at every subsequent meeting until, on 17th March 1979,
we reached the end of Z.
This volume contains those minutes, together· with two
previously unpublished papers, by G.E.L.Owen and G.J.Hughes,
which we had before us during our discussions of Z7-9 and
Zl3 respectively. The proposal to publish was made in May
1979, when�it was decided to leave all the material in the
form in which it had originally been circulated, with only
minor editorial deletions and clarifications. What follows,
therefore�is a record of the London group's discussions, now
and then embellished (as will appear) , but for the most part
merely organized,' by the subsequent labours of the recorders.
In comparison with a commentary our record must lack unity
and comprehensiveness; but we offer it in the belief that
others will find value in an account of what a number of
people, working together, thought about this difficult text.
We express our cordial thanks to the British Academy for
making their premises available to us from 1975 to 1977, and
to the Ins�itute of Classical Studies in Gordon Square for
extending the same favour since October 1977 .
Nearly half the minutes are by Myles Burnyeat, the rest by
Julia Annas, Lesley Brown, Christopher Kirwan, Alan Lacey,
Gwilym Owen, Malcolm Schofield, Bob Sharples and Michael Woods.
Others who attended meetings (many not often) were Elizabeth
Anscombe, Jonathan Barnes, David Charles, James Dybikowski,
Theodor Ebert, Gail Fine, Peter Geach, Gerald Hughes, Edward
Hussey, Terence Irwin, Barrington Jones, Anthony Kenny,
i
Geoffrey Lloyd, Anthony Long, Brian McGuinness, Richard
McKirahan, Gareth Matthews, Richard Sorabji, Christopher
Taylor, David Wiggins and Kathleen Wilkes.
C.A.Kirwan
October 1979'
ABBREVIATIONS
The works of Aristotle are referred to as follows:
An. Pos:t Posterior Analytics
Cat. Categories
De An: De Anima
EN Nicbmachean Ethics
GC De Generatione et Corruptione
Met. Metaphysics
PA De Partibus Animalium
Phys. Physics
Pol. Polictics
Rhet. Rhetoric
SE De Sophisticis Elenchis
Top. Topics
Capital Greek letters refer to rooks of the Metaphysics unless
otherwise specified.
Unprefixed page numbers, as in '1002b 10' , refer to the
Metaphysics.
.· . .
- ii
ll
Other references:
Apostle Aristotae•s Metaphysics , translated
with commentaries by Hippocrates
G. Apostle, Indiana 1966
Asclepius In Aristotelis Metaphysioorurtt<'Libros
A-Z Commentaria, ed. M.hayduck,
Berlin 1888.
Barnes Aristotle' s Posterior Analytics,
translated with notes by
Jonathan Barnes, Oxford· 1975.
Bohn Aristotle, the Metaphysics,
translated by Revd. John H.
M'Mahon, Bohn's Classical Library,
London 1857.
Bonitz Index Aristotelicus, H. Bonitz,
Berl1n 1870,
or
Aristotelis Metaphysica, H.Bonitz,
Bonn 1848-9 .
Jaeger Aristotelis Metaphysica, Jaeger,
w.
Oxford Classical Texts, 1957.
Oxford translation Volume VIII (Metaphysica1. translated
W.D.Ross) in The Works of Aristotle
translated in.co E11glish-, Oxford
1928.
Ps. Alexander Commentary on Z (in fact by a
later hand) in Alexander of
Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis
Metaphysica Commentaria, ed.
M. Hayduc�, Berlin 1891.
Reale Aristoteles, la Metafisica,
traduzione, introduzione e
commento, Giovanni Reale,
Loffredo 1968
Ross Aristotle's Metaphysics, text and
commentary, W.D.Ross, Oxford 1924.
The convention has usually been followed of writing mentioned
Greek words without inverted commas.
iii
Note to 2nd Impression
The text is revised only by the correction of a misprint on
page 1. I shall be happy to receive further corrections and
comments from readers, for the benefit of future impressions.
C.A. Kirwan
Exeter College,
Oxford.
March 1986.
iv
i1 L
CHAPTER
1
Zl
-
8th February 1975
1028a 10 :t:o �v ;>.,(ye:l:aL n:oA.A.ax�k. We looked for a rendering
that would least suggest a definite unitary subject, since
the thesis says there is none·while it would be misleading
to take a linguistic expression as the subject. Perhaps
'whatever we call )o\,v ', manufacturing a class by reference
to the expression.
1028a anua(ve:L. Supply as subject a linguistic ex
i1
pression from i;(J �v. We discussed, but failed to illuminate,
the sense of onuaL/v e:Lv tiere• We also debated the issue
of complete vs. incomplete e:'tva L. The incomplete,
suggested to some by 1028a 15-18, where Aristotle deals
with sentences like 'This is a man/warm' , foundered on the
abstract nouns in a 19-20 illustrating ,(x �A.A.a �v•a (a 18)
i:othwv 14) the i3'vi:a signified at a ll-l3 . Thereafter
= (a =
we often translated 'exists' .
1028a 11-!2 {-6ignifiesl what a thing
is and (that it is) a this something, a subject. It was
suggested that the ua( joins the two marks of o�o(a that will
later get pressed, indeed overpressed, in different directions:
·
form and subjecthood (matter) .
1028a 14 anua(ve:L. Again supply a linguistic subject from
( "!oi: L via the answers that question collects: these are
'
what onuaL/v e:L •'nv o,,�oL,,.,a v.
1028a 15-18. The parenthesis explains not why .(),IJ OL/a is
n:pchov �ov- but why ( the answer to) l:L/ ,e:a. l:L signifies otoL/a .
To perform this role it evidently presupposes (a) we know that
a man or a god are substances, . (b) that the 'this' about which
the questions l:( n:o1ov !al:L1 etc. are asked is a substantial
individual, not e.g. a colour.
l.
1028a 18 NOTES ON ZETA
1028a 18-20 was thought to yield a two stage analysis for e.g.
'Heliotrope exists' : (a) H is a quality, (b) H qualifies some
6(.i;a.)
substance. (Uninstantiated qualities are not By contrast,
'Socrates exists' says that Socrates is a substance and that is
all - there is no analogue to (b) in the analysis of what it is
for a substance to exist. But:-
l028a 18 i:ot'\u ouC/i: wb ?fvi:oi;;. The substance mentioned in (b) will,
of course, be an ts'v in its own right, but should we infer that
an account for what it is for a substance to exis.t must be
included in the analysis of what it is for a quality to be an
7fvr Such a requirement is made for i:ci,6ya:e:L'il� in r2, but here at
least it seems otiose. &i:wi;;· in a 18 is ambiguous on the point:
:
if it is read as part of the analysis of ·?fvi:a, we get the
parallel with r, but it might equally be Aristotle's way of
designating (from outside the analysis, so to speak) the sort
of �v which the qualities, etc. must qualify if they are to
exist.
�rtop(a·
1028a 20-2. The arises. from the dependent nature of
non-sub&tantiaL existence::· if .�·�;1.;\.a are .not npc;;i;wi;; '>ovi:a
but only '6vi:a in the dependent way described, maybe they are
not �vi;a at all.
l028a 21 No great anxiety was felt about the readings onµa(ve:L
g\,. With either it was thought that ifu.aai:ov d'ui;f;N
�· �).I.�
should be taken as subject (contra Ross): and that the sense
of the point was not affected.
rte:q>uu.&'i;;.
1028a 23 Here, on the other hand, there was some
inclination to bracket the word, with Jaeger against Ross, on
the ground that the usual expansion for u.aa 'a�i:o is ;\.e;yc(µe;vov;
this to weighed against texts where non substantial items
be
are u.aa' ani:&' ;\.e;yc{µe;va.
l028a 24-25 i:'o 13a5L,,.!: ov etc. refer to particulars (cf. a 27)
,.. specimen walkers and the like. Hence:
2
CHAPTER 1 1028a 26
1028a 26-9 The point being made is that with 'the walker',
'the sitter', etc. a reference to a definite subject is
manifest (tµ�a(vE•aL) in the expression itself, -� Kaana8aL
equally requires a subject, but when we speak of sitting we
,,,
may not have any determinate subject in view. For xa•nyopLa
= designation cf. 1047a 34.
1028a 29-31 Various construals of this sentence were canvassed.
It became clear, first that •au/• nv o�u aL/a a 27, not xa•nyopL,,a,,,
=
since it would not be because of their designation that �KE(vwv
EC/x ao•ov �E"O •Lv·i second that ,,EKEL,,v, wv most . likely refers to the
more remote •'o aaoL,;.� ELV, etc. a 20-21, rather than •'o ::>ay a8o"'v ,
.
xa8n"'µ Evov a 28-291 i• f the latter, , •'L ">/ov makes the point
°"'
that •'o aaeL,;� OV must always be •'o aaoL" �OV •L1 eg, the walking
man, whereas ' the man' is complete as it stands and does not
require to be backed by an answer to the question 'The man
what?' . This reading of o� .� � was felt to need excessive
ingenuity, SO we settled for\KE�VWV = •o aaof�ELV, etc. O� .1
�v ·was then construed in the light of a 18-20: these items
can only be said to be. in that they are actions, etc. of what
is npt�wc - for them to be is to be something, an action,
quality etc. of a substance, whereas a substance, in that it
is n�•WG, just is c&n}..(;iG). All the same, this is not un
problematic in a text purportedly dealing with the complete
E-'S'L vaL. Why should Aristotle suddenly turn his contrast between
primary and dependent uses of the complete E,,.L. VaL into one
between a complete. and an incomplete.use? At this point the
suggestion was made that, xa\ o� -i:( 8.nA.£lG is parenthetical,
• • • • •
explaining precisely that the � in np�-CWG �v is intended as
the complete one, not the incomplete. Not only is this the
contrast more usually associated With � an�G VS,.�V •L but
-
it preserves the chapter's concentration on the complete E"'L vaL
and still yields the sense we want without difficulty: within
�v-r:a (complete use) substance is primary. The meeting closed
before this suggestion could be properly aired.
3
l.028a: ;30 NOTES ON ZETA
8th March 19 75
1028a 30-1 We adopted the suggestion that � "tL ·�v ?:i.A.A.' �Jv
npfu'"twb,
&nA.wb is epexegetic to "tv rather than specifying it as
the complete e't'vaL as opposed to the incomplete (see previous
note) . For "tL � dnA.�b with e'i'vaL,_y{yvEcr8aL, cf. SE 166b
37 ff, Phys.190a 32; more in Bonitz.
1028a 31-3 priority in time. Since priority in definition is
explained 34-6 and priority in knowledge 36-b 2, 33-4 is left,
by elimination, as the explanation of priority in time. How
does it work? 11 is not much help. 'Substance is separable,
�
accidents are not' cannot mean that while accidents cannot
exist without substance, substance can exist without (any)
accidents, whether-s.ubstance ·is .taken. as.'..individual or kind.
To meet this constraint, 3 types of solution were canvassed:-
(1) (a) An individual substance could exist without the
accidents, e.g. qualities, it has. Objection: the quali·ties
in question could exist without the substance, in other
individuals . No asymmetry emerges unless the qualities are
taken as particularized to the individual, and it is contro
versial whether Aristotle believed in particularized qualities.
(b) A kind of substance, e.g. animals, can exist without
exhibiting a given quality, e.g. baldness; but baldness can-
not exist without some animal having it. Objection: this
works for determinate qualities but not for (all) determinable
ones; e.g. bodies could exist without any being pink but not
without any being coloured. So to maintain this account we
would need to fill out Aristotle's brief sentence with a
story about the dependence of determinables on determinates.
(2) We looked at the idea that Aristotle had in mind something
less precise, arising out of the context.of traditional debate
which is in his mind at the end of the chapter (28b 2 ff) and
in Z2. The idea was that Aristotle represents his question
'What is substance?' as a sharpened version of the traditional
search for (one or more) primary beings. These had been primary
in several senses, most notably in explanation and often also
in time, and prior or antecedent, if not to all qualities and
accidents, still to most; hence separable from these, as Aristotle
claims his substance is. (In this connection we alluded to
4
